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ABSTRACT 
Much attention has recently been paid in aesthetics to the question of how a listener 
understands music, or what constitutes comprehending listening. While this debate is 
quite interesting, I am more concerned with a more foundational question: What is it 
that a listener must attend to in order to understand music? One suggestion that has 
been proposed by Mark DeBellis is that a listener must attend to the phenomenal quality 
of their auditory experience. This view is motivated by the thought that the 
phenomenology of musical experience should hold in common between both musically 
trained and musically untrained listeners. However, much evidence has been made 
available in the cognitive science of music perception suggesting that listeners with 
different levels of ability hear music differently. 
In this dissertation, I will examine the phenomenology of music through a detailed 
study of DeBellis' theory of music perception and the contents of musical experience. 
DeBellis argues that the phenomenal quality of musical experience must hold in 
common between both trained and untrained listeners because the contents of 
experience are nonconceptual, meaning that it is not requisite that a listener should 
possess any music-theoretic concepts in order for them to be in a perceptual state with a 
certain intentional content. 
I will argue that the phenomenological claim is unfounded. The contents of musical 
experience do not represent mind-independent properties of the external world. The 
empirical evidence of music perception and cognition reveals that subjects must possess 
a special psychological ability for the representation of musical pitch. These results can 
be given a strong or weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation, the necessary 
psychological ability would count as a conceptual ability, in which case DeBellis' 
theory of nonconceptual contents for musical experience would be flawed. On the weak 
interpretation, the contents of musical experience would be nonconceptual but would 
not be mind-independent. Rather we must posulate a new distinction between 
nonconceptual contents that are mediated and nonconceptual contents that are 
unmediated. On either interpretation, the phenomenological claim for musical 
understanding is shown to be false. 
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My motivation for writing this dissertation comes from two experiences-one musical, 
the other philosophical. Once when I was in music school, I was listening to an album 
with my mother. The album was Miles Davis' Kind of Blue. On that album, there are 
six musicians: one drummer, one bassist, one pianist, two saxophonists and one 
trumpeter. While I could clearly distinguish the six instruments, my mother could not. 
She reported only hearing the drums, bass, piano and one trumpet-she could not hear 
the two saxophones even though these were playing different parts from the trumpet. It 
was not until I drew her attention to the two saxophones by singing their parts that she 
could hear them. And after gaining this knowledge, she reported that her experience of 
the music sounded different to her-'Now I can hear it'. Should we take her report at 
face value? Did she really not hear something previously to what she can now hear? 
Cases like this, where an added piece of knowledge seems to change the listening 
experience, are surprisingly rather common. There is a popular song by the Red Hot 
Chili Peppers that I have listened to dozens of times. One day a friend pointed out to 
me that, in the background behind the drums, you can make out the rhythmic sound of a 
train engine. After having had that pointed out to me, the rhythm of that song never 
sounded the same again. It seems as though my perceptual experience of the song had 
changed irrevocably. 
The second experience that motivates my writing this dissertation is a conversation I 
had with my MA tutor in Bristol, Andrew Harrison. My MA thesis was concerned with 
the ontology of musical works. There I was most interested in examining what it is to 
hear the same song again, with understanding how we identify the complex sequence of 
sound-events as a familiar tune. During the course of my discussions with Andrew on 
this topic, he suggested that the really interesting question was not how do we recognise 
the same song, but rather how do we recognise a sound as being the same musical tone. 
As a fledgling student, I had no answer ready, nor at that time did I even possess the 
philosophical means to know how to approach the question. Andrew's question has 
haunted me since-this dissertation constitutes my first attempt at addressing that old 
question. I regret not being able to discuss my answer with him before his passing. 
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CATER ONE: 
UNDERSTANDING, PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MUSIC PERCEPTION 
`Of course, in a sense, science like mathematics or the violin, can only be perfectly 
understood by specialists. Still, the rudiments may be of public use. Greenwood here', 
indicating the little man in the blazer, `doesn't know one note of music from another. Still, 
he knows something. He knows enough to take off his hat when they play "God save the 
King". He doesn't take it off by mistake when they play "Oh, dem Golden Slippers". ' 
- from The Club of Queer Trades 
G. K. Chesterton 
1.1 The Problem of Musical Understanding 
Many philosophers have claimed that appreciating music requires understanding it. 
The claim is that it is not enough for a listener simply to be perceptually responsive 
to some auditory stimulus for that listener to appreciate music. Animals and 
electronic instruments can display sensitivity to acoustical phenomenon, in some 
cases where sensitivity to acoustical stimuli can be greater than that of humans, but 
we would not thereby attribute musical appreciation to animals or inanimate 
objects. Appreciating music, at the very least, must be a conscious affair open to 
introspective awareness-a listener must be able to look inside (or `listen inside' as 
the case may be) and attend to whatever quality of their experience it is that is 
musically salient. However music is appreciated, it is appreciated consciously. 
So for some listener to appreciate a piece of music, they must to some extent 
understand what they have heard. That sounds all well and good, and that much is 
widely agreed upon, but when the philosophical discussion turns to what 
understanding amounts to, what counts as understanding, what are the conditions 
that a listener must meet in order to be attributed musical understanding, or 
whether there is one correct understanding, then opinions vary. A minimal account 
of musical understanding must take into account what could be described as the 
immediately heard musical properties. When one is listening to music, one hears 
not just sounds ordered in sequence that vary in pitch. Rather one hears phrases, 
cadences, melodies, harmonies, tonal motion, tension, resolution, tempo, and 
dynamics. Some also claim that expression and emotion should count as 
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immediately heard properties in the music, but these are rather controversial. It 
would suffice to say, however, that the uncontroversial properties that one 
immediately hears in the music must be part of our account of musical 
understanding. ' 
Much recent debate has centred on two main opposing positions. On one end of 
the spectrum is the view that understanding music requires that the listener must 
grasp not only those immediately heard musical properties discussed above but also 
the listener must grasp some more large-scale structural properties of a musical 
composition. 2 This view holds that some large-scale `architectural' properties of 
the structure of a piece of music must play a role in the listener's appreciation of 
the music-for want of a better term, this view could be called structuralism, 
which should not be confused with Continental structuralism. For a listener to 
fully appreciate a piece of music on this view, the listener must recognise the 
musical form of a piece as there is an appreciable difference between a piece's 
being, say, a sonata and its being a fugue, or even more remotely between a piece's 
being a sonata and its being a twelve-bar blues. It is claimed that it is relevant to 
the appreciation of a piece that the listener hear, register and respond appropriately 
to the sonata form (or fugue or whatever). 
Against this is concatenation ism as defended by Jerrold Levinson, which is the 
view that all a listener needs to be attributed understanding is to attend 
appropriately to those immediately presented musical properties. 3 Understanding 
music on this view is just being able to follow the music as it moves along-it is 
sufficient for appreciation that the listener hears how it is that one phrase or 
segment of music follows from that previously heard. The listener need only 
understand what she is hearing in the present moment and be able to link this to 
what immediately preceded and what will immediately follow; those large-scale 
`architectural' properties of a piece of music being left over to the expert for 
intellectual enjoyment, which is not requisite for musical appreciative enjoyment. 
A problem common to either view is to account for the untrained-but- 
comprehending listener. Think of it this way: for a listener to understand an 
utterance of some language, they must grasp the meaning of the utterance, which 
, For discussion of these points, see Budd (1995), Davies (2003), Goodman (1976), Kivy (1990), 
Levinson (1990) and (1997), Matravers (1998), Raman (1993), and Scruton (1983). 
For examples of a defence of this view, see Kivy (1990) and Scruton (1983). 
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would at least require some proficiency with the language in question. However, 
there seems to be no neat analogue of this in musical understanding. If a listener is 
to understand the utterance `Schnee ist weiss', then grasping the meaning of this 
utterance would at least require some proficiency with spoken German. What 
proficiency must a listener have in order to understand Gershwin's Rhapsody in 
Blue? Must a listener have some proficiency with music theory? Or with the 
harmonisation of chords in jazz music? Must the listener be musically literate? 
This all seems to be much too strong-if we were to reserve musical understanding 
for those listeners with training in music theory, then we would seem to be denying 
understanding to the vast bulk of listeners who clearly do enjoy and appreciate 
music. On the other hand, what does it mean for an untrained listener to 
understand some piece of music when they lack theoretical knowledge? While 
theories on either end of the spectrum must struggle to explain how understanding 
is not dependent upon musical training, clearly what we are calling structuralism 
would be at a disadvantage, as in addition it must explain how it is that a listener 
can attend to the musical form of a piece without possessing any theoretical 
knowledge. 
A further question to ask is whether understanding comes in degrees, or is there 
one correct way to understand a musical work. If musical understanding does 
come in degrees, then it would seem that the problem of the untrained-but- 
comprehending listener would vanish. The untrained listener understands to the 
degree that they are capable, and this differs in the degree to which the trained 
listener can understand. If this is the way that the debate over musical 
understanding should be taken, then we must resist the temptation to ask whether 
the understanding of the trained listener should be preferable to the understanding 
of the untrained listener. However, I find this temptation much too strong. But if 
we reject the thought that musical understanding does come in degrees, then we are 
led into the really interesting problem, namely if there is a correct way to 
understand a piece of music and untrained listeners are at no disadvantage to 
attaining this compared to trained listeners, then what is it that holds in common 
between both trained and untrained listeners that constitutes understanding? 
The problem of the untrained-but-comprehending listener is one that I 
See Levinson (1997). 
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personally have long found deeply perplexing. I know what I do when I pay 
attention to a piece of music. I am a professionally trained musician-I was trained 
in a music conservatory. When I listen to music, I analyse what I hear. I dissect 
the music into its rhythms, beats, melodies, and chords, down to the individual 
notes that make up the complex whole. Listening to music for me is like watching 
a game of chess, or examining a mathematical proof: it is a test of my ability to 
analyse what I hear into recognisable and predictable patterns so that I might better 
be able to anticipate what will come next. 
But this isn't what most people do when they listen to music, nor should we 
think that this intellectual game is somehow necessary for musical understanding. 
As Malcolm Budd says: 
To experience music with musical understanding a listener must perceive various kinds of 
musical processes, structures and relationships. But to perceive phrasing, cadences and 
harmonic progressions, for example, does not require the listener to conceptualise them in 
musical terms. A listener can experience these phenomena whether or not he hears them 
under the description they are given in a correct analysis of the music. This description 
applies to the experience of a listener who experiences the music with understanding; but the 
listener does not need to recognise this fact in order to have the experience it describes. 4 
Budd's claim here is that understanding a piece of music is just the enjoyment of an 
experience whereby one perceives certain musical qualities, but while these 
musical qualities can be described in music-theoretic terms, it is not necessary that 
a listener must think of the music in these theoretic terms. There is nothing more to 
understanding these musical qualities than just to hear them. On this view, what I, 
as a trained musician, am doing when I theoretically analyse a piece of music is 
conceptualising it in the music-theoretic terms that I have learned-that is, I am 
doing something conceptual in addition to perceiving and experiencing the music. 
And that is all well and good, but we should remember that this conceptualising is 
not equivalent with experiencing the music. On Budd's view, understanding 
musical experience precedes understanding music theory. 
Concerning the question of correct understanding, it seems that what Budd has 
in mind is what I had described as the more interesting view. It seems that on 
Budds' view, there is a kind of musical understanding that would hold in common 
between the trained and the untrained listener. If the untrained listener can hear the 
same musical qualities that the trained listener can hear, as Budd suggests, then we 
Budd (1985): 247. 
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need not worry about degrees of understanding. This seems to be a point that Kivy 
also makes when he claims that the difference between the understanding of Tibby 
and Mrs. Munt is not a matter of degree but rather a matter of their ability to 
express what it is that they understand. As Kivy says of the difference between the 
experiences of Tibby and Mrs. Munt, `a quantitative world of difference indeed 
there is; but there is no qualitative difference at all'. 5 For Kivy, as it seems to Budd 
too, there is a common `way it is' for the musical experience of the trained and 
untrained listener. 
My concern in this dissertation is not with adjudicating between structuralism 
and concatenationism-my desire is not to enter into the debate over what 
constitutes musical understanding. Rather I am concerned with a more 
foundational problem that must precede the discussion of understanding. What 
interests me is to uncover just what it is that a listener must attend to in order for 
them to understand a piece of music if what the trained and untrained listener 
understands holds in common, and this, as I mentioned above, is really the question 
that has long perplexed me. As I said, I know what I pay attention to when I listen 
to music-I pay attention to all of those immediately presented musical properties, 
which I attempt to identify and categorise in all their fine detail. When I listen to 
music, I pay attention to those properties that I have been trained to identify. But 
what do untrained listeners attend to? Surely, they must attend to the same things 
that I do but without employing the recognitional abilities that I possess. They 
must hear and recognise the same things that I do, but in some pre-theoretical 
manner. Whatever it is that the untrained listener attends to, it is something that I 
presumably just take for granted as it has been a long time since I have been a 
naive listener and it must be this that grounds the understanding of both of us. If 
both trained and untrained listeners are equally able to understand some piece of 
music, then question is what common ground is there between my experience and 
the untrained listener's experience that grounds this understanding? What is it that 
is `qualitatively' the same for the trained and untrained listener? 
Mark DeBellis has taken up the challenge of identifying just what this 
mysterious quality is. Inspired by Budd's remarks, DeBellis claims that it is the 
Kivy(1990): 68. 
12 
phenomenology of the perceptual experience that one must attend to. 
6 Musical 
experience is rich with phenomenal feel-there is a particular way it feels to hear a 
particular melody or phrase-and the way that music feels phenomenally is 
independent of one's music-theoretic understanding. As Diana Raffinan says, 
musical understanding `fairly glitters with "raw feels"'. 
7 This is what I call the 
phenomenological claim: the phenomenology of musical experience holds in 
common between both trained and untrained listeners and it is this that grounds 
musical understanding. The phenomenological claim would hold that, despite my 
musical training and the lack of such training among any other listener, the 
phenomenological feel of musical experience must be the same for me as it is for 
any other listener. 8 If the phenomenological claim is true, then this may form the 
bedrock upon which the claims of musical understanding can be erected. 
DeBellis offers one very compelling argument for the phenomenological 
claim-the example of the intermediate ear-training student. In an ear-training 
course, an instructor typically starts off by playing pairs of notes on the piano and 
instructs the students on how to identify what intervals are being played. For a 
student to learn this, DeBellis argues, all the student has at her disposal is the way 
the music sounds. The student must learn to identify intervals by listening to and 
distinguishing between the different ways that intervals sound. According to the 
phenomenological claim, this sort of learning is only possible because musical 
experience does sound to be a certain way, and there is no prerequisite that a 
listener must meet, no training that they must go through, in order for this to be the 
case. This argument is an instance of what I call the Argument from Perceptual 
Learning. 9 In its most general form, the argument claims that, if subjects do indeed 
learn or acquire concepts from experience, then the subject must be perceptually 
sensitive to the relevant feature of experience before their having acquired the 
concept, otherwise learning from experience would not be a real case of learning. 
That the Argument from Perceptual Learning underwrites DeBellis' example of the 
6 This is a claim that is evident in nearly all of DeBellis' writing, though he makes the argument 
explicitly in his (1995). See especially §§1.2,2.3 and 3.4 in reference to the quote from Budd. 
Raffman (1993): 50. 
8 Interestingly, in a recent conference paper, DeBellis (2006) has gone so far as to suggest that the 
sort of conceptual understanding that the trained listener brings to musical experience may in some 
cases be a burden as the trained listeners becomes caught up in an intellectual exercise that clouds 
their pure enjoyment of the music. 
91 take the Argument from Perceptual Learning to be a form of what Bermudez calls the 
`developmental explanation'. See Bermudez (2003c): 294. 
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ear-training student is obvious the student learns something by attending to some 
perceptible feature of her auditory experience, she acquires some new knowledge 
or skill; and if this is a real case of learning, then she could not have possessed the 
skill prior to acquiring it perceptually. 
Of course the most immediate objection that one might raise against the 
phenomenological claim is that perceptual experiences are private mental states, 
and yet the phenomenological claim seems to suggest that I can know what it is 
like for someone else to experience a piece of music. However, DeBellis' 
intermediate ear-training student example is meant to provide an intuition that 
contradicts this objection. It would be hopeless to think that an instructor could 
tutor a student in ear training unless we already found it intuitively compelling to 
believe that the way that the music sounds to one listener must be qualitatively 
similar to the way that is sounds to another listener. This intuition certainly does 
not sweep the objection aside, but it does take away the sting. DeBellis' example 
seems to provide a hopeful start for the phenomenological claim, and for grounding 
musical understanding in the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Whatever 
`musical understanding' amounts to, it must be grounded in the phenomenology of 
music perception: the experience of listening to music feels a certain way; and it is 
this phenomenal feel that is all there is ultimately to musical understanding. It is 
argued that subjects are able to possess an understanding of music despite their lack 
of theoretical knowledge because the phenomenology of music is something we 
just get for free that is, it is just part of the perceptual experience. 
But I worry that the phenomenological claim may be unfounded the thought 
that the experience of listening to music really is phenomenally much the same for 
me as it is for any other listener is an assumption (albeit an intuitively appealing 
one) in need of an argument. Why should this be so? What is it that grounds the 
phenomenology of musical experience? What is it that guarantees that the way that 
musical experience is for me is phenomenally like the way that it is for anyone 
else? 
My intention in this dissertation will be to show that the phenomenological 
claim is unfounded. It would be enough to show that this claim is unfounded by 
showing that at least one musically salient feature of experience-that is, some 
feature that we would think should play a role in musical understanding-does not 
hold in common between different subjects. I believe that this can be shown by 
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closely examining the contents of perceptual experiences that represent tonality. 
By doing this, I hope to show that the phenomenology of musical experience is not 
something that we get for free that is, the phenomenology of musical experience 
is not available to naive perception. By naive perception, I am not referring to the 
theory of perception known as Naive Realism. Rather I simply mean perception 
that is unmediated by anything mental or cognitive, as would be the case with 
perceiving shapes or colours. Think of it this way: the phenomenology of colour 
experience is something that we just get for free-that is, the qualitative character 
of our colour experience results from our having a visual system that is 
physiologically constituted in a certain way that is responsive to certain properties 
of the external world. The phenomenology of colour experience is just part of the 
workings of any naive perceptual system that is constituted in the right 
physiological way. In this dissertation, I will argue that the phenomenology of 
musical experience, on the other hand, is not so naive. 
Showing how the phenomenological claim fails will require much backing up. 
As said above, the claim can be shown to fail when we examine the contents of 
musical experience. I will therefore need to review the argument that musical 
experience does indeed have content-that is, that it exhibits intentionality-and 
that the phenomenology of musical experience can be captured by a purely 
intentional account of the contents of musical experience. In this, I will largely be 
following DeBellis, who has recently developed an intentional theory of musical 
experience. 10 On DeBellis' view, the contents of musical experience are 
nonconceptual. DeBellis' argument is that a listener can be in a certain content- 
bearing perceptual state independently of whether or not they possess those very 
concepts that would normally constitute a belief-state with the same content. If 
two subjects can be in type-identical content-bearing perceptual states regardless of 
either subjects' level of musical training, then their perceptual experience must be 
phenomenally type-identical as well (remembering that DeBellis defends an 
intentional theory of musical experience, so two perceptual states that possess type- 
identical contents should be phenomenally type-identical as well). Therefore the 
phenomenology of musical experience must hold in common between both trained 
(or conceptual) listeners and untrained (or nonconceptual) listeners. 
10 Again, while this is a theme running through all of DeBellis' work, the argument for the 
intentional theory of musical experience is the focus of his (1991). 
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This is where I think the phenomenological claim goes wrong. I will argue that 
those musical properties that are represented in perceptual experience are not the 
sort of properties that can be represented in naive perceptual experience. Rather, 
the properties that are salient to our experience of music are what could be thought 
of as `tertiary' properties-properties that are mental or intentional. " That this is 
the case can be shown by examining empirical evidence that has been uncovered 
by psychologists and cognitive scientists studying music perception and cognition. 
My argument will be that the contents of a subject's perceptual states are dependent 
upon their possession of some cognitive ability as demonstrated by the empirical 
evidence; therefore it is theoretically possible that trained and untrained listeners 
may not be in the same content-bearing perceptual states as untrained listeners may 
lack the cognitive abilities of trained listeners; therefore their perceptual 
experiences may not be phenomenologically type-identical. I will offer both a 
strong argument and a weak argument against the phenomenological claim. The 
strong argument will be that the psychological abilities required for the 
representation of musical pitch are conceptual abilities, and so the contents of 
musical experience are conceptual. The weak argument will be that the contents of 
musical experience are nonconceptual; however these contents form a special class 
of nonconceptual contents that are strongly mind-dependent. Either of these 
arguments would be sufficient to show that the phenomenological claim is 
unfounded as both arguments require that the subject possess a special 
psychological ability for the representation of musical pitch, and insofar as two 
listeners can differ in respect of their possession of this ability, then to that extent 
the content of these listeners musical experiences may be phenomenologically 
distinct as well. 
As such, this dissertation will have both a major and a minor theme. The major 
theme of this dissertation is to understand what the phenomenological claim would 
require and to show that this is unattainable. I will address this by examining the 
perception of music and the contents of musical experience under the guiding idea 
that understanding must follow from perceiving. As such, the bulk of my 
Scruton makes a similar argument that musical properties are tertiary. See his (1983): 87. 
While Scruton and I arrive at the same conclusion, his method is very different from mine. His 
argument is based on a priori reasoning of the metaphor of musical movement when contrasted with 
spatial movement whereas mine will be based on an examination of the cognitive science of musical 
perception and cognition. 
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discussion of musical understanding will largely go on in the background of the 
theory of music perception. However, my discussion of the perception of music 
will then reveal the minor theme of this dissertation, namely that the problem of 
music perception creates some difficulties for nonconceptualist accounts of the 
contents of musical experience. 
1.2 The Phenomenology of Music 
Before moving on, I should say a bit more about the phenomenological 
contribution that tonality makes to musical experience. Providing a complete 
account of the phenomenology of musical experience would be a very complicated 
task indeed as we would need to take into account a seemingly vast number of 
perceived properties. Some of things that would need to be accounted for would be 
pitch, rhythm, tempo, dynamics, timbre, articulation, phrasing, formal structure and 
so on. That being said, what I want to focus on here is tonality. Tonality is the 
defining characteristic of musical pitch and music theorists claim is the most 
fundamental property of music. The difference between hearing a musical pitch 
and hearing a non-musical sound is that the non-musical sound does not possess 
tonality. I will explain. 
The physical basis of auditory experience is our perceptual sensitivity to sound 
waves-to regular disturbances of air pressure. Sound waves can be physically 
described as a set of frequencies resonating at a certain degree of intensity for a 
certain temporal duration. All sounds can be described in terms of their physical 
frequency, intensity and duration, so consequently a minimum account of any 
auditory experience must account for these physical properties-if musical 
experience does have content, then the properties of frequency, intensity and 
duration must figure in that content somehow. But empirical psychologists have 
found that a description of this physical basis alone is not enough to capture one's 
experience of music. In listening to music, the listener does not simply hear tones 
of a certain frequency-some higher and some lower-additionally the listener 
hears notes that stand in certain relations to each other, and the relations that notes 
stand in to one another cannot be reduced simply to physical frequency. 
For instance, consider the octave relation. If musical pitch could be reduced to 
physical frequency, then tones that are closer in physical frequency should sound to 
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be more closely related than tones that are further away in physical frequency. The 
tone 440Hz is higher than the tone 220Hz; however, 440Hz is closer in physical 
frequency to 415Hz than it is to 220Hz; so, 440Hz should sound to be more closely 
related to 415Hz than to 220Hz as they are closer in physical frequency. However, 
much empirical evidence, as well as commonsense intuition, proves inconsistent 
with this claim. Typically, tones that are separated by a ratio of 2: 1 are heard by 
musically sophisticated subjects as being more closely related to each other than 
tones that are closer in physical frequency. 
Tones that are an octave apart are heard as being harmonically equivalent-that 
is, they share the same harmonic function. The tendency to group tones across the 
entire physical frequency spectrum into octaves allows a subject to categorise what 
should be a wide array of auditory stimulus into twelve discreet `pitch classes'. 12 
And this is just what tonality is: the harmonic function of a certain pitch class 
within a particular harmonic context. That musical tones possess this property is 
just what distinguishes musical sounds from non-musical sounds-musical sounds 
are heard as having some harmonic function, while non-musical ones do not. 
Tonality is the property of a certain tone's sounding to be related to other tones in 
an harmonic way. It is necessary for a listener to hear sound-events as possessing 
tonality for that listener to hear the sound as being music. (I will return to this 
claim and examine it in more detail in Chapters Three, Four and Seven. ) 
Just to avoid one possible confusion, this is what tonality is not: it is not the 
ability to hear a tone as being the note A-tonality is not the ability to identify 
tones by note-name. Being able to identify tones by note-name requires perfect 
pitch, and is the ability to remember two instances of a tone within a certain 
range. 13 It is not necessary that a listener should possess perfect pitch in order for 
tonality to figure in their perceptual experience. 
Now I should say something about the phenomenology of tonal hearing. Within 
a given musical context, some notes will sound to be `more stable' than other 
notes. The 'unstable' notes will sound as if they are being `pulled' toward one of 
the more stable notes. To hear a tone as standing in a certain relation to another 
tone is to hear the tones as standing in these stability relations (what music theorists 
12 Assuming of course the twelve tones of the Western chromatic scale. 
13 Perfect pitch is not an ability for fine tonal discrimination; rather it is an ability for remembering 
tones. See Sloboda (1985) Ch. 5.4.1. 
18 
call `tonal relations'). These relations between musical notes form a hierarchy of 
more- to less-stable notes. The most stable notes are the tonic, the dominant and 
the mediant; the least stable diatonic notes are the subtonic, the sub-dominant and 
the supertonic. A note x sounds to be the tonic when it is heard as being the most 
stable tone; alternatively, the same note x will sound to be the dominant when it 
sounds like it ought to resolve to the tonic in a certain way; and so on. And what is 
important for us is that hearing a note as being the tonic has a different phenomenal 
quality from hearing the same note as being the dominant. 
Consider this case. 14 In the context of the key of C-major, C sounds to be most 
stable. A natural melodic progression would be for C to follow B, as in Figure 1.1 






However, in other contexts this sequence would sound to be less stable, such as in a 
G-major tonal context where the more natural resolution is just the reverse. In G- 
major, the note C has a natural tendency to resolve to B, as in the IV-1 resolution 
(Figure 1.2). In this tonal context, C would be the sub-dominant of G-major (fa) 




Two important points: first, this `sounding to be most stable' is not something 
that the note C has just by virtue of its being that frequency. The note C 
corresponds roughly to 523 hertz (Hz). If that were the case, then it should not 
matter what tonal context 523Hz appeared in, which it most clearly does. Second, 
the same notes-B and C-can sound to have different harmonic functions in 
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different context, and this difference in harmonic function is evident in the 
phenomenology of the auditory experience. In the C-major context, B is a very 
unstable note, but in G-major it is highly stable-it sounds more resolved. 
This way that musical experience sounds to a listener-its consonance and 
dissonance-is just what DeBellis is appealing to when he claims that it is the 
phenomenology of the perceptual experience that holds in common between 
trained and untrained listeners. A listener hears the C-B resolution in Figure 1.2 to 
sound consonant, and having that experience is just all there is to understanding 
that musical phrase. 
1.3 The Plan of this Dissertation 
Here is how I intend to pursue my question. As this dissertation is mainly 
concerned with the contents of perceptual experience, it would be helpful to know 
what is meant by claiming that perceptual experience has content in the first place. 
In Chapter Two I will examine the basic tenets of the intentional theory of 
perception (which is sometimes called the representational theory of perception). 
My treatment of this will be somewhat general and uncritical as I only wish to set 
the stage for DeBellis' intentional theory of musical perception. It would not be 
my place here to question whether this is the most appropriate theory of perception 
to adopt. Rather I would like to grant DeBellis as much as is reasonable so that I 
might demonstrate that, on his own terms, his support of the phenomenological 
claim cannot work. 
In Chapter Three I will introduce DeBellis' intentional theory of musical 
perception. I will mainly be concerned with explaining how musical experience 
has contents on DeBellis' view. On his view, the phenomenal character of 
experience can entirely be captured by the intentional contents of experience. In 
Chapter Four I will explain how DeBellis argues for this strong version of 
intentionalism. 
Chapters Five and Six are concerned with the notion of nonconceptual content. 
In Chapter Five I explain what concepts and contents are taken to be under the 
intentional theory of perception and explain how contents can be nonconceptual; 
14 For more on the role of context in the representation of musical pitch, see Krumhansl (1979). 
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and in Chapter Six I offer a constraint on nonconceptual contents. The argument 
for the Mind-Independence Constraint in Chapter Six will be central both to my 
attack on DeBellis' claim that the contents of musical experience are 
nonconceptual and on my claim that the phenomenology of perceptual experience 
is not available through naive perception. The Mind-Independence Constraint 
claims that for some perceptual content to be nonconceptual, it must be the case 
that the property or feature that this content represents must be appropriately mind- 
independent. Chapter Six will be devoted to explaining what being `appropriately 
mind-independent' would amount to. 
My claim will be that the contents of musical experience cannot be 
nonconceptual because musical properties are not mind-independent. That this is 
the case can be shown by examining the empirical evidence on the perception and 
cognition of musical pitch (tonality). In Chapter Seven I will review that evidence. 
However the empirical evidence may admit both a strong and weak interpretation. 
On the strong interpretation, the psychological abilities required for the 
representation of musical pitch are conceptual abilities; on the weak interpretation 
they are not, however the contents of musical experience are still mind-dependent 
in a way that would threaten the phenomenological claim. 
I will then apply these claims to DeBellis' arguments for nonconceptual content 
in Chapters Eight and Nine. DeBellis offers a weak and strong argument for 
nonconceptual content-in Chapter Eight I will explain that the weak argument 
does not work if we accept the strong interpretation of the empirical evidence. 
DeBellis' strong argument for nonconceptual content is independent of his weak 
argument, and can be shown not to work on grounds that are independent of the 
empirical evidence. I will demonstrate this in Chapter Nine. 
At this point in my dissertation, my claims about the contents of musical 
experience will be mostly negative: the contents of musical experience do not 
represent mind-independent properties of the external world. If this is true, then it 
would be of interest to know how the property of musical pitch is represented in 
perceptual experience. I will address this in Chapter Ten. 
I will be arguing that the contents of musical experience are highly mind- 
dependent, which is admittedly a very surprising claim to make considering how 
widely accepted the notion of nonconceptual content is in the case of visual 
perception. I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that musical 
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experience is a strange anomaly. That the contents of experience are mind- 
dependent is not a unique feature of musical experience. There are other auditory 
experiences of a non-musical kind that are mind-dependent though for different 
reasons. In Chapter Eleven I will demonstrate one such case: the auditory 
representation of spatiality. Auditory experience often seems to have a spatial 
component-we often hear things as being on the left, or on the right, or above us, 
and so on. Spatiality in auditory experience is an interesting case because it would 
appear to be as primitive and pre-conceptual to the contents of our experience as 
one would theoretically like. However, I will argue that spatiality enters into the 
contents of our auditory experience through a complex system of judgments and 
recognitional capacities such that we would not be willing to describe the property 
of spatiality as a mind-independent feature of the external world. Spatiality in 
auditory experience is not a primary quality-the question is whether it is a 
secondary or tertiary quality. I will argue for the latter. 
Finally, in Chapter Twelve I will return to the issue of musical understanding 
and state my conclusions. I will recap on how it is that the threat to DeBellis' 
nonconceptual strategy for the contents of music perception causes trouble for the 
phenomenological claim on both the strong and weak interpretations. If these 
conclusions are correct, then the problem of musical understanding seems to be 
thrown into crisis. If musical understanding cannot be based on the 
phenomenology of musical experience, then what can it be based on? I will argue 
that the debate over musical understanding can be saved from this crisis provided 
that we are willing to give up one of two desiderata. The problem of musical 
understanding arises because of these two desiderata: (1) that there is a correct way 
to understand a piece of music, and (2) that untrained listeners are at no 
disadvantage to trained listeners to correctly understand a piece of music. Clearly, 
if my attack on the phenomenological claim is correct, then one of these two 
desiderata cannot be met. Either (2) must be rejected, meaning that untrained 
listeners are at a disadvantage over trained listeners to correctly understand a piece 
of music, in which case untrained listeners cannot be attributed understanding; or 
(1) must be rejected, meaning that there can be no single correct understanding to 
be had. Rejecting one of these two desiderata would remove the crisis; however 
neither of these options is immediately appealing. 
Finally, I would like to offer an apology to the reader as throughout this 
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dissertation there will be some extended discussion of key concepts in music 
theory. I have attempted to write these sections in such a way that should be 
suitable for a reader with limited knowledge of music theory; however I cannot be 
sure that I have not assumed too much, or too little. In addition, I must also 
apologise to the reader who does know a good deal of music theory, as they will 
inevitably find my descriptions of these musical concepts to be tedious. I can only 
apologise to readers in both camps and ask for your patience. 
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CHAPTER Two: 
THE INTENTIONAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION 
DeBellis begins his book with the claim that `a hearing ascription [an attribution of a 
certain way in which a listener hears something] attributes a state with representational 
content, a state that represents a passage of music as being a certain way. " Before we 
examine what hearing ascriptions are, I should say briefly what DeBellis means by 
claiming that representational states have contents. What DeBellis has in mind is a 
version of the intentional theory of perception, a theory that claims that perceptual 
states represent the world as being a certain way and that these contents are assessable 
as being either true or false. It should be kept in mind, however, that nowhere to my 
knowledge does DeBellis explicitly argue in favour of the intentional theory over any 
other theory of perception. 2 It is therefore difficult to know which version of the theory 
he is in favour of DeBellis draws inspiration for his views on mind, perception and 
perceptual contents from Lewis, Armstrong, and Peacocke-he follows Lewis in 
defining properties as functions from possible worlds to sets of objects, 3 Armstrong in 
defining concepts as capacities for thought, 4 and sees his account of the contents of 
musical experience as being supplemental to Peacocke's theory of nonconceptual 
contents. 5 While the views of these philosophers are not incompatible-indeed, the 
view that DeBellis arrives at through cherry picking their views is plausible enough- 
the variety of DeBellis' sources does make it difficult to speculate on those issues that 
he does not explicitly argue for, like his motivation for accepting the intentional theory 
of perception. All that we get from DeBellis on theories of perception is the claim that 
perceptual states have a representational content (quoted above). He offers no further 
DeBellis (1995): 1. 
2 In his (1991) he does not compare the intentional theory to any other theory of perception; rather his 
concern there is to show how a strong intentionalist might account for the phenomenology of musical 
experience. The nearest DeBellis comes to defending intentionalism against any other rival theory of 
perception is in his (1995): 24. There he states that the intentional theory accommodates our intuition that 
the phenomenology of our musical experience is directly related to the music's being a certain way; the 
intentional theory provides us with a theoretical means for individuating and identifying hearing 
ascriptions; and finally experience and belief both have truth assessable contents on the intentional theory. 
Whether or not these are good reasons to hold an intentionalist theory of perceptual experience, these 
reasons are terribly insufficient to ward off other theories of perception. 
Ibid.: 30-31. 
4 Ibid.: 32. 
5 Ibid.: see especially §§2.7 and 3.5. 
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support for this claim. 
What DeBellis does explicitly argue for, however, is a strong version of the 
intentional theory-he argues that the phenomenal quality of perceptual experience can 
be fully accounted for by specifying the perceptual state's representational content. In 
this chapter I will quickly explain what the intentional theory is and what problem it is 
meant to solve. I will leave out some of the finer details of this theory, opting instead to 
offer a general overview of its central claims. In particular, I am not here concerned to 
compare this to other theories of perception-disjunctivism or naive realism for 
instance. It is not my concern here whether the intentional theory works or not, or 
whether the perception of music might be better served by some other theory. This is 
the theory that DeBellis endorses, and I wish to grant DeBellis this much in order to test 
his account of the contents of musical experience on his own terms. This chapter will 
be largely exegetical and uncritical. 
2.1 The Problem of Perception 
The intentional theory of perception (sometimes called either intentionalism or the 
representational theory6) is one answer to what is often called the `problem of 
perception', which, as Tim Crane puts it, is due to a tension between two seemingly 
intuitive thoughts: the thought that perception puts us in immediate contact with the 
objects and properties that we perceive, and the thought that if one perceives something 
as being, say, red, then there must be something perceptually present to one that actually 
is red. 7 These two thoughts taken together leave us with the question, when one 
perceives something as being red, just what is it that is perceptually present that is red? 
To offer a contrast with the intentional theory, one seemingly intuitive and 
straightforward answer to this question would be to say that what is made present in 
perceptual experience is the actual external object of one's perceptual awareness. This 
6 Confusingly, Tye (1995) uses the term `representationalism' to refer to the theory of mind which 
states that mental states exhibit intentionality while Jackson (1977) uses this term to refer to his theory of 
perception, which states that the object of perceptual experience is a mental intermediary-Jackson's is a 
version of the sense-data theory. In order to avoid confusion, I will use intentionalism to refer to theories 
like Tye's (and Crane's), and sense-data theory to refer to theories like Jackson's. However, in my usage 
the terms 'intentional contents' and `intentional properties' will be used interchangeably with 
`representational contents' and `representational properties' respectively. 
' Crane (2001): §40. While Crane is a leading defender of the intentional theory, DeBellis has strong 
disagreements with Crane on the notion of perceptual contents and on nonconceptual contents. Cf. 
DeBellis (1995), §3.5 with Crane (1992b). 
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is a rather unsophisticated form of the view known as Naive Realism the common 
sense intuition that perception puts us in direct perceptual contact with the objects and 
properties of the external world where those objects and properties just are as they 
appear in perceptual experience. 
However, the problem with this intuitive thought is that, in the case where when one 
suffers an hallucinatory experience, then there is no object that one is in direct 
perceptual contact with, or when one is subject to some illusion, then the properties that 
one seems to perceive are not really there. And yet, when one hallucinates, say, that a 
red ball is on the table, it is plausible that one's experience may be phenomenally 
indistinguishable from the case where one correctly perceives that a red ball is on the 
table. In such cases, a naive view of perception would be at a lost to explain the 
phenomenal similarity. 
Many philosophers once thought that when one hallucinates that a red ball is on the 
table, then one must be in direct perceptual acquaintance with some object or entity that 
is red in order for hallucinatory experience to have an indistinguishable phenomenal feel 
from veridical experience. The thought was that there must be something that a subject 
is in direct acquaintance with that explains the representational and phenomenal 
character of the perceptual experience. The answer that was proposed was that, in the 
cases of hallucination and illusion, the object of acquaintance must be some mental 
entity that accounts for the representational and phenomenal character of the perceptual 
experience. This mental entity is not an external object in the sense that it is an object 
that has an independent existence from its being perceived, rather this object could be 
thought of as a sense-datum-a non-physical mental object that instantiates the property 
red which is itself the object that one is directly in contact with in perceptual 
experience. This is the view, introduced by G. E. Moore, as the Sense-Data Theory, or 
alternatively, Indirect Realism. 8 
Notice how the sense-data theory may follow from the two thoughts given above, 
that perceptual experience puts us in direct contact with objects and properties and there 
must be some object that instantiates the properties that we perceive, with the addition 
of a third thought-that if two mental states are phenomenologically indistinguishable 
then they must be of the same kind, which could be called the sameness of kind 
8 This is the view defended at some time and in various forms by Ayer (1936), (1940), (1973); Jackson 
(1977); Moore (1905) and (1965); Robinson (1994) and at one time Russell (1912). 
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principle 9-then a logical inference to make is to think that in perceptual experience all 
that one is in contact with are sense-data, both in the hallucinatory case and in the 
veridical case. If this third thought is accepted, then it seems that, in perceptual 
experience, we are never in contact with the objects and properties of the external 
world, rather we are only ever in contact with an intermediary-a sense-datum-which 
for Russell were private internal mental entities, 10 while for Ayer these were neither 
mental nor physical. " On either view, sense-data are non-physical objects of immediate 
sensation. 
The key to the problem of perception, then, is to find a way of freeing ourselves from 
the unintuitive Sense-Data Theory while taking into consideration the problem of 
hallucinations. There have been many attempts at solving the problem-one could 
question whether hallucinations can ever be phenomenally indistinguishable from 
veridical perception; one could reject the sameness of kind principle; or one could reject 
either of the two thoughts that got this problem started in the first place. While much 
could be said about the problem of perception, I will focus on just one kind of response 
to the problem, namely the Intentional theory, and will pay specific attention to how the 
notion of nonconceptual content is meant to fit in with this view. The reader should 
keep in mind, however, that the notion of nonconceptual content is by no means 
exclusive to intentionalism. Other theories of mind posit some type of content that is 
also often described as nonconceptual. 12 It is not my aim here to examine all possible 
applications of nonconceptual content, but rather to examine it in relation to the 
intentional theory of mind. 
2.2 Intentionalism as an Answer to the Problem of Perception 
Intentionalism as a theory of mind argues that what is characteristic of mental states is 
9 This is a move that many theorists make in defending the sense-data theory. See for instance 
Robinson (1994): 32; and for discussion see Crane (2001): §41; Martin (2002); Smith (2002): Ch. 1. 
10 Russell (1912). 
11 Ayer (1936), (1940) and (1973). 
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that they are about something, that they exhibit intentionality. According to the 
intentional theory of mind, mental states have contents that represent objects, properties 
or states of affairs. 13 When one thinks `that p', one is in a particular mental state, 
namely a mental state that represents that p. Representations are mental states that have 
a particular content. Perceptual states-being one kind of mental state-can similarly 
be described as having contents in that they represent the external world as being some 
way or other when the contents of perceptual experience are appropriately related to the 
objects of the external world in the right way, however that way might be defined. 14 So, 
when an intentionalist talks of a perceptual state's representing that there is a red ball on 
the table, this means that a subject is in a particular mental state having a particular 
content, namely perceiving that there is a red ball on the table. Mental states-like 
believing, hoping, desiring, perceiving-have content such that one might believe that 
p, hope that p, desire that p, or perceive that p. If one believes that p and also hopes that 
p, then these two mental states have something in common-they are both mental states 
related to the content p-while also differing in their attitude-one is a belief-state the 
other is a hope-state. Mental states are then to be individuated in terms of what they are 
about, or what their content is, in addition to the particular attitude under which this 
content is thought. These contents can be called representational contents or 
intentional contents. I will use these terms interchangeably. Similarly, these mental 
contents can be described as having properties that can either be referred to as 
representational properties or intentional properties. 
A standard view of the contents of intentional states is to hold that these are 
propositional attitudes-that all mental states can be analysed in terms of their 
possessing a proposition that is assessable as either true or false. In his (1991), DeBellis 
says, `the content of an experience is a proposition-that such-and-such is the case- 
12 For instance, it is not clear to me that Bermudez idea of nonconceptual content is strictly like the sort 
of view I have in mind. Specifically, Bermudez seems to believe that, in addition to some perceptual 
states, sensations like pains, tickles or indigestion (his example) would also have a nonconceptual content. 
It is, however, questionable whether anything is represented by pains, and without representation it is not 
clear to me that the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual actually means anything. It would 
just be trivially true that sensations are nonconceptual-that one needn't possess the concept pain in my 
foot in order to feel a pain in one's foot. In this case, it seems that Bermudez might be using the notion of 
nonconceptual content to cover a much wider range of mental states than I would be willing to apply this 
notion to. 
13 Crane (2001), Tye (1995). For the notion of representation, see also Peacocke (1983). 
'4 See Crane (2006) over whether there is a perceptual relation between external objects of perceptual 
experience and perceptual states. 
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and that an experience is veridical just in case its content is a true proposition'. '5 
However closer examination will reveal instances where the propositional attitude thesis 
fails. An instance where this works is offered above: if a subject sees a red ball on the 
table, then the content of this mental state may be the proposition `there is a red ball on 
the table'. A sentence that ascribes a content to a subject typically is of the form `S 
that p' where `S' stands for the subject, `p' stands for the proposition, and the gap `' 
stands for a psychological verb such as `sees' or `hopes' or `believes'. Instances where 
this might fail would be those instances where the gap is filled by an `intentional 
transitive' verb-verbs such as `fear', or `seek', or `want'. If I want a red ball, then the 
content of my mental state would be described as `Chris wants a red ball'. In this 
content ascription, `Chris' is the subject, `wants' is the psychological verb, however `a 
red ball' is not a proposition-that is, it is not a sentence that is assessable as either 
being true or false, which propositions must be. The propositional attitude thesis is 
questionable even in the case of a content ascription such as `Chris sees that a red ball is 
on the table', for we needn't analyse this ascription in propositional terms. The 
ascription `Chris sees a red ball on the table' cuts out the proposition-it cuts out the 
need to use a that-sentence-and yet this seems to adequately describe the same type of 
mental state. The claim that all mental states are describable in propositional terms is 
controversial, however for the remainder of my dissertation I will assume that they are. 
I do this only for ease of exposition. Very little of what I will be arguing for hangs on 
whether or not the propositional attitude thesis is true. If the propositional attitude 
thesis is false, then I take it that the content ascriptions in question can easily be 
reformulated in non-propositional terms. 16 
Intentionalism seeks to address the problem of perception by arguing that what one is 
directly acquainted with in perceptual experience is the external world through one's 
mental representation of it, and that such representations do not instantiate properties, 
they simply represent them. When one perceives that there is a red ball on the table (in 
a veridical case) there is a causal, physiological process the result of which being that 
one is in a mental state that represents that a red ball is on the table. Intentionalism 
denies the second thought of the problematic pair, that when one perceives that x is red 
then there must be some object that is present to one in perception that is red-all that 
would be required is that there is a representation. The intentionalist claims that one 
15 DeBellis (1991): 304. 
16 For a defence of intensional transitive verbs, see Larson (2001). 
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might have a mental representation as of some object's being red even though there is 
no such object. Thus, the intentionalist denies that perception is a relation between a 
perceiver and some object; as Crane puts it, `perception is an intentional state, a relation 
to an intentional content' " 
17 Thus, representational states can have contents regardless 
of whether the state is veridical or not; the proximal object of experience is a 
representational state; and an experience is an act of perceiving if that state is caused by 
a distal object in the right way. Whether or not intentionalism does offer a plausible 
solution to the problem of perception is not my concern here. I only review this theory 
as the background to DeBellis' intentional theory of music perception, which we will 
examine in the next chapter. 
2.3 Contents 
The intentional theory of mind holds that mental states represent the world-they have 
contents. Contents represent something as being the case. A paradigmatic example of a 
mental state with content is a belief state. Beliefs have contents-they are about 
something. The content of a belief is that which typically follows a that clause. If 
Smith believes that p, then the content of Smith's belief is p. Contents can typically be 
expressed as sentences. If p is the sentence `Snow is white', then the claim that `Smith 
believes that p' is the claim that `Smith believes that snow is white'. Belief states are 
semantically evaluable in that they refer to objects, properties or states of affairs in the 
world, and knowing what it is that they refer to gives a way of knowing in principle 
how to judge the semantic value of the belief. 
Belief ascriptions are also assessable as true or false. The claim that `Smith believes 
that snow is white' is true just in case Smith does believe that snow is white. Thus one 
can give a third-person account of the contents of a subject's beliefs by ascribing to that 
subject a belief with a certain content. These are called belief ascriptions. The 
statement claiming that `Smith believes that snow is white' is a belief ascription, and it 
can be assessed as being either true or false depending on whether or not Smith actually 
does believe that snow is white. 
" Crane (2001): 137. See also Crane (2006). Crane's his account of perceptual contents follows from 
his commitments to internalism for mental contents. Thus, it is partly because of his internalist leanings 
that he denies that there is a relation between perceptual contents and external objects. However this is 
not necessary of all intentionalist theories of perception. Arguably Tye's version of intentionalism is not 
committed to internalism, as what gives perceptual experience its particular phenomenal quality on Tye's 
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In describing the content of a subject's belief state, it is sometimes possible to ascribe 
to a subject a belief that they themselves may not recognise as their own belief. 
'8 For 
instance, we ascribe beliefs de re to a subject where some term of the belief statement 
utilises a concept that the subject does not possess, as in the case where Smith, looking 
up at the stars, points out one star and says, `That's Hesperus'. Supposing that Smith 
does not know that the name `Hesperus' refers to the planet Venus, we might describe 
Smith's belief state by saying that `Smith beliefs that x is Venus'. This would be a true 
belief ascription at the level of the object that Smith refers to-at the level of 
reference-but this belief statement fails to capture exactly the sense in which Smith 
picks out the planet Venus. If, on the other hand, we are concerned to capture the 
subject's belief state in those terms which the subject themselves are thinking, then 
these are belief statements de dicto. De dicto ascriptions are concerned to offer a 
description of a subject's belief state at the level of sense for that subject. 19 
There are many positions one can take regarding what contents are-I will review 
these quickly and then offer DeBellis' view. 20 Some theorists defend a Russellian 
theory of contents whereby contents are constituted by just those very objects and 
properties that one is in direct perceptual acquaintance with. 21 On this view, when a 
subject sees a red ball, their experience represents a structured proposition that has as its 
constituents the object itself and the property of being a red ball. A weaker version of 
the Russellian view holds that contents do not represent objects themselves but rather 
they represent existentially quantified properties. 22 Other theorists offer a Fregean 
theory of contents. On this view contents are composed of modes of presentation of 
objects and properties rather than the objects and properties themselves. This view is 
motivated by the thought that objects and properties can be represented by various 
modes of presentation. In order to get the sense of these representational states right, 
some theorists posit modes of presentation as the constituents of perceptual contents. A 
third view would be to claim that the contents of experience are sets of possible worlds. 
On this view contents represent those possible worlds in which something appears to be 
the case. If one sees a red ball, then the contents of experience represent those possible 
view is the relation a perceiver stands in to external objects and properties. 
'g The following point is made in Crane (2001): §35. 
19 Cf. Crane (2001): §35. 
'" For an overview, see Chalmers (2004), Siegal (2005). 
'' Russell (1905). 
22 Tye (1995). For general discussion, see Chalmers (2004). 
See Tye (1995). 
31 
worlds in which a red ball (or perhaps that very red ball) is before the perceiver. 
23 
DeBellis rejects the possible worlds view of contents, arguing that the contents of 
musical experience are more fine-grained than a possible worlds view of contents would 
allow. 24 For instance, all those worlds in which an equilateral triangle is perceived by a 
subject are just those worlds in which an equiangular triangle is perceived by a subject. 
However, a subject might represent the triangle as an equilateral triangle-that is, the 
subject might believe of the triangle that it has equal sides-and this is a different sort 
of content from that where a subject represents the triangle as an equiangular triangle. 
If contents are sets of possible worlds, then the content would not be fine-grained 
enough to distinguish between these representational states. A more fine-grained 
account of contents would be the Fregean view, where the same object may be 
represented under different modes of presentation, where these modes of presentation 
are the means by which contents could be distinguished. 
DeBellis defines contents as `an object of belief and he says that there are `different 
levels of content, corresponding to different kinds of things one may take a belief to be 
directed toward' . 
25 By `different levels' of content, it seems that DeBellis has in mind a 
distinction between the contents of different propositional attitudes. When DeBellis 
discusses the contents of belief states, he seems to be employing a Fregean theory of 
content, 26 though in other places he talks about contents representing objects and 
properties in the form of a structured proposition suggesting a more Russellian account 
of contents. 27 The contents of perceptual states are the properties and objects that the 
subject is perceptually related to. 
2.4 Belief, Bel ief Ascription and Contents 
I will briefly examine some further theoretic constraints and background concerns that 
DeBellis places on his theory of perception and on perceptual contents. DeBellis is 
mainly concerned with the relation between perception and belief-hearing that G is the 
dominant of C-major and believing that G is the dominant of C-major. Taking on 
2; This view is associated with Lewis (1986) and Stalnaker (1984). 
24 DeBellis (1995): 53-54; see also his (1991): §3. 
25 DeBellis (1995): 32. 
26 Ibid.: 30-32. 
27 (1991): 315. 
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Armstrong's claim that perception is a matter of acquiring beliefs, 
28 he says it is at least 
plausible to suppose that hearing ascriptions ascribe beliefs acquired in musical 
perception'. 29 As a starting point, DeBellis considers what he calls the belief thesis: 
`that musical hearing is perceptual belief and hearing ascriptions are ascriptions of 
perceptual belief.... Hearing ascription is, on this hypothesis, not just analogous to 
belief ascription; it is one kind of belief ascription. '30 DeBellis offers the belief thesis 
as one way of understanding how perception relates to beliefs, however this thesis will 
be rejected when he offers his strong argument for nonconceptual content. I will return 
to this in Chapter Nine. We should now turn to what it is on DeBellis' account to be 
ascribed a belief. What follows will be a summary of DeBellis' view of beliefs and 
belief ascriptions as presented in §2.3 of his book. 
Belief is a relation to information; it is one psychological attitude among many that 
one can take towards some information, where `information' is characterised in Fregean 
terms of what a listener is willing to assert or deny. Some information is understood if a 
listener is able to `grasp' it, which I understand DeBellis as meaning that a listener 
grasps information when they are able to do something with it within some appropriate 
range of responses, which would be asserting or denying sentences or beliefs that 
express that information. 31 Information is presented in the form of sentences- 
presumably as Fregean thoughts-and sentences are composed of modes of 
presentation-roughly Fregean senses; modes of presentation are ways of thinking 
about some object or property. Content is an object of belief, which can be an 
information-bearing sentence or, in the case of perception, the objects and properties in 
the world themselves; 32 a concept is, as DeBellis puts it, `a certain psychological 
capacity, an ability to have beliefs (and thoughts generally) in which one grasps a 
particular mode of presentation. ' 33 
If I have understood DeBellis correctly on what it is to grasp some information- 
namely that a listener knows what to do with some piece of information within some 
appropriate range of responses, like asserting or denying sentences expressing this 
content-then, following this, I take it that a concept for DeBellis generally is the 
28 Armstrong (1961). It will not be my concern here to examine the plausibility of this view. lam 
willing to grant its plausibility in order to move on to the more substantial claims made by DeBellis. 
29 DeBellis (1995): 26. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.: 29-30. 
32 This point is not made clearly in DeBellis' account but is implied by his discussion of mode of 
presentation-preserving ascriptions, which I will turn to shortly. 
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possession of an ability to do something with a piece of information, or that a concept is 
that mode of presentation that a listener exercises when they grasp some piece of 
information. Notice that DeBellis' definition of a concept is formulated in terms of the 
psychological capacities that a listener might exercise in thought. I will discuss this in 
more detail in Chapter Five. 
Next, a belief ascription is a claim that a listener is in a belief-state of a certain type: 
`S believes that p' is a belief ascription. Belief ascriptions are true if S really does 
believe p. DeBellis claims that there are two sorts of belief ascriptions, those that 
preserve the mode of presentation and those that do not. An ascription is `mode-of- 
presentation-preserving' (or `m. p. -preserving') if one must have the belief expressed by 
the content sentence in order to satisfy the ascription, and ascriptions where the listener 
does not possess the belief are `non-m. p. -preserving' . 
Such would be the case for the 
ascription, e. g., that `Sam believes that Quine is wise', where to ascribe this belief to 
Sam requires that he possess a belief that contains the content `Quine is wise' and that 
he believes it (where, again, believing something is standing in a certain mental attitude 
toward some content). 34 The ascription `Sam believes that Quine is wise' captures the 
sense of the content of Sam's belief, so this belief ascription preserves the mode of 
presentation. 
By contrast non-m. p. -preserving belief ascriptions need not capture the sense in 
which a listener actually thinks some content. Imagine a listener who, when looking up 
at the sky at night, thinks `Hesperus is shining'. We could, on this basis, claim that `S 
believes that Venus is shining', which would be a true belief ascription at the non-m. p. - 
preserving level, as this would be a true ascription at the level of the referent of the 
listener's belief (de re), though it would be a false ascription at the level of thought (de 
dicto). The listener does not think `Venus is shining'-that is, they do not possess a 
belief with the content that `Venus is shining'. Furthermore, if we were to ask of the 
subject, `Do you believe that Venus is shining', it would be reasonable for them deny 
this, or to be in doubt (if they do not know that Hesperus refers to the planet Venus). 
For belief ascriptions that are m. p. -preserving to be true is for them to be correct 
descriptions of the listener's beliefs de dicto, as well as de re, while non-m. p. - 
preserving ascriptions needn't be true de dicto for them to be true de re. A listener may 
'; Ibid.: 32. 
4 This is DeBellis' example, (1995): 32. 
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therefore be in a non-m. p. -preserving belief-state and yet not be disposed to either assert 
or deny sentences that contain the content of their belief. 
What is of interest to DeBellis is the case of perceptual beliefs. On a weak 
interpretation of DeBellis' view, a listener might be ascribed a perceptual state 
representing that x is red even if the listener does not possess the belief that `x is red', 
which is to say that they either cannot possess such a belief because they lack just that 
very concept (modes of presentation) required of such a content sentence or it could 
mean that the subject does not presently happen to believe that `x is red' though they 
could believe this as they do possess the required concepts. 35 A strong interpretation of 
his view, on the other hand, would hold that a listener might be ascribed this perceptual 
content without possessing the cognitive capacity to possess any of the relevant 
concepts. 
In the case of perceptual beliefs, which DeBellis thinks are non-m. p. -preserving 
beliefs generally, DeBellis describes the relation of the belief ascription to the content 
being ascribed as 'transparent'. What he calls `referentially transparent' ascriptions- 
those typical of the non-m. p. -preserving cases-specify their content at the level of `an 
ordinary object (person, planet) or, more generally, an intension. '36 Thus in the case of 
perception, perception is a relation to informational content at the level of the objects 
and properties that are actually perceived as holding in the external world. 
So, in the case of musical perception, DeBellis argues that musical ascriptions are 
non-m. p. -preserving-that is, that the listener need not possess that belief or those very 
modes of presentation (presumably music-theoretic concepts) in order to be ascribed 
perceptual beliefs with musical contents. We, from a third-person point of view, might 
describe a listener's perceptual experience as representing that G is the dominant of C- 
major even though the listener is not themselves in a belief-state having this content, 
perhaps because the listener lacks that very concept, or they do not happen to be 
presenting thinking this, or they are incapable of possessing any such concept. 
35 It should be noted that the second of these alternatives is very close to the notion of Evans' belief- 
independence-that a subject's holding some belief (or not) does not interfere with their being in a 
perceptual state with a certain content. 
6 Ibid.: 34. Also, DeBellis is using Quine's notion of referentially transparent ascriptions. See Quine 
(1956 [19661): Ch. 15. See also Quine (1953), Ch. 8. 
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2.5 Strong and Weak Intentionalism 
Finally, there is a further distinction to consider regarding the strength of a theorist's 
commitment to intentionalism. A subject can believe `that p' and a subject can perceive 
`that p', and while we would think that these are two mental states that represent the 
same intentional content-'that p'-there are clearly many differences between 
believing `that p' and perceiving `that p', not least of which being that these two mental 
state will have very different phenomenal qualities. Believing that p, where p is the 
proposition that there is a red ball on the table, is phenomenally quite different from 
seeing that p-it is a very different sort of experience. Perceiving that p is accompanied 
by a certain phenomenal feel-it feels a certain way to perceive, say, that a red ball is 
on the table-and this feels very different from believing that p. Belief-states and 
perceptual-states are in this respect thought to differ in respect to their phenomenology. 
The question, then, is how we are to describe this difference. 
There seem to be at least two possible ways for an intentionalist to go about this. 
First, one could argue that there is more to the phenomenology of perceptual experience 
than can be represented intentionally. The thought here is that there are two kinds of 
properties that constitute perceptual experience, those that contribute to the intentional 
content of the perceptual state, called intentional properties, and those that contribute to 
the phenomenal feel of the perceptual state, called either phenomenal properties or 
3T sensational properties or qualia. ' The phenomenological difference between belief 
and perception, on this view, would be accounted for by saying that both the belief state 
and the perceptual state have the same intentional content, but that the perceptual state 
has an additional property that contributes to the phenomenology of the perceptual 
experience. Phenomenal properties are not intentional properties-they lack 
intentionality-rather they are higher-order properties of mental states. 38 It is 
characteristic of this view to claim that the phenomenal properties of experience cannot 
be reduced to the intentional properties, and that the contents of a belief state cannot 
capture the phenomenal quality of experience. Remember, beliefs are thought to be 
propositional, so the idea here is that the propositional content of beliefs cannot 
adequately capture the phenomenal feel of perceptual experience. 
The above view could be described as weak intentionalism: all mental states are 
Peacocke (1983). 
38 Crane (2001): §25. 
36 
intentional, though some mental states also possess phenomenal properties. 
39 Thus, 
phenomenal properties contribute to the way in which perceptual experience feels, but it 
does not contribute to what perceptual experience represents. On this view, it would be 
possible for two mental states to have the same intentional content and yet be 
phenomenally distinct. Peacocke once defended a form of this when he argued that the 
difference between perceiving the dots in Figure 2 (below) as being arranged in 
columns rather than as being arranged in rows is a difference in the phenomenal feel of 
each representational state. 40 







The argument for weak intentionalism is that in either state what is represented is 
exactly the same pattern of dots-both states have the same intentional content-though 
perceiving the alignment of the dots as being one way is phenomenally distinct from 
perceiving the alignment of dots as being the other way. And, it is argued, this 
phenomenal distinction is not due to any distinction of the intentionality of the two 
mental states, rather all that has changed is the way in which one experiences the 
arrangement of the dots as being, and this is a difference in the phenomenal character of 
the representational state. 
Opposed to this is what could be called strong intentionalism. This is the view that 
all mental states have intentionality and that all difference between any two mental 
39 1 am following Crane on the use of the terms weak intentionalism and strong intentionalism. 
40 Peacocke (1983): Ch. 1. Peacocke's views have changed since then. I presume that he would now 
regard the difference between seeing the dots as organised into columns rather than as rows as a 
difference in the representation of protopropositional contents. Also see his (1992a). For criticisms of 
Peacocke's view, see DeBellis (1991) and Tye (1992). 
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states is due to a difference in their intentional content. 
41 Considering Figure 2 again, 
the difference between seeing the dots as being arranged in columns and seeing the dots 
as being arranged in rows would, on this view, amount to a difference in what is seen- 
that is, a difference in what is represented. These two states represent different things: 
one represents an arrangement dots in columns, the other represents an arrangement of 
dots in rows. The difference between these mental states, it is argued, is due to a 
difference in their intentional contents. Thus, there is no need to ascribe different 
phenomenal properties to each mental state as they would be intentionally distinct 
mental states. The task for any theorist who defends a strong account of intentionalism 
is to show how all phenomenal differences between any two mental states can always be 
reduced to a difference in their intentional content. 
2.6 Intentionalism and Musical Experience 
The intentional theory of perception is the starting point for DeBellis' theory of the 
contents of musical experience. While my explication of this theory has been rather 
quick here, further details will be examined in subsequent chapters. Before concluding 
this chapter I will examine how the intentional theory of perception is thought by 
DeBellis to offer a means of explaining musical understanding. 
DeBellis' thought is that the contents of perceptual experience give us a means of 
characterising the way in which a listener's experience of some music is for them (as we 
will see in Chapter Four, DeBellis defends a version of the strong intentionalist view). 
Musical experience has a certain phenomenal quality. That phenomenal quality can be 
accounted for by attributing to the listener a certain perceptual experience with 
intentional content. These contents are veridical if and only if the music is the way that 
the content represents it as being. Understanding music, for DeBellis, is just hearing the 
music as being a certain way, which would involve hearing certain features of the 
melody, harmony and rhythm and perhaps hearing large-scale relations between these. 
The contents of experience are assessable as true or false, so that it would be meaningful 
to ask of a listener whether the music really is the way in which their perceptual state 
represents the music as being. So all there is to understanding a piece of music is for a 
listener to be in a certain intentional state that has the right kind of content, where that 
41 For defences of strong intentionalism, see Crane (2001): §25 and Tye (1992). 1 will review DeBellis' 
arguments for strong intentionalism regarding musical experience in Chapter Three. 
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content captures the way in which the music is. A listener who understands some piece 
of music is one who correctly represents it as being a certain way. 
The intentional theory of perception gives DeBellis the means by which he might 
reasonably ask whether a listener hears the music correctly. The benefit of DeBellis' 
intentionalistic approach is possibility that the mysterious notion of musical 
understanding could be analysed in the relatively more familiar surroundings of a theory 
of intentional contents. In the next chapter I will review the way in which DeBellis uses 
the intentional theory regarding musical experience. The problem we will examine 
there will be what sort of musical properties are thought to be represented in perceptual 




THE CONTENTS OF MUSICAL PERCEPTION 
`What do we hear when we listen to music? ' This, the opening question of DeBellis' 
book, we're told, is a question about what sort of psychological states can be ascribed to 
a listener when they listen to music. DeBellis' strategy is to analyse what it is to ascribe 
listeners with a certain musical experience in terms of how experiences of this sort are 
represented in the listener's perceptual awareness. DeBellis' holds an intentionalistic 
view of perceptual experience according to which, when a listener undergoes a musical 
experience, they can be attributed a certain psychological state with a representational 
content, called a `hearing ascription', ' which represents sound-events as being a certain 
way. This `way' that auditory experience is represented as being could broadly be 
described as that way that is salient to the listener's experiencing the sounds as their 
being music: when a listener hears music, they hear the music as having many different 
auditory qualities; some of these qualities will have great musical significance and some 
will not. Examples of those auditory qualities that have musical significance would be 
the timbre, pitch and rhythm of the sound, while examples of those auditory qualities 
that have no specifically musical significance would be loudness (or intensity) and 
directionality (if it has any). DeBellis' primary concern is to explain how one's 
judgment and understanding of music is grounded in perceptual experience. Towards 
this end he offers an account of how one's experience of listening to music results in a 
perceptual state with representational content. In the previous chapter I briefly sketched 
the background of what I take DeBellis' theory of perception to be. In this chapter I 
will examine DeBellis' claim that musical experience has a representational content. 
One difficulty that such a view must overcome is in explaining how it is that 
something as complex and seemingly ineffable as music could be represented in 
experience. Much of this is due to the theoretical difficulty of describing such 
contents-that is, it is one thing to claim that musical experience has a representational 
content and it is another thing to be able to identify what that content is. By contrast, 
visual experience is just as complex as musical experience, however our theoretical 
vocabulary for capturing the contents of visual experience is seemingly richer (if only 
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slightly) than our vocabulary for capturing the contents of musical experience. For 
example, if a listener sees a red ball on a table, we might be able to capture the content 
of this perceptual state by saying that the state represents that `a red ball is on the 
table'-that is, the content of this perceptual state may be identified by the proposition 
that `a red ball is on the table'. Granting that this proposition is rather coarse-grained, 
and certainly is infinitely more coarse-grained than the actual perceptual experience, the 
point is that we can at least begin to identify the contents of visual experience by 
offering propositions such as `a red ball is on the table'. 
What proposition could we offer to identify the contents of musical experience? Is 
the content of musical experience propositional at all? If we describe a subject's 
perceptual state by saying that `S sees that p', where that subject sees that a red ball is 
on the table, `p' is replaced by the sentence `a red ball is on the table'. But in the case 
where a subject hears, say, a perfect cadence in the key of G-major, then what fills in 
the `p' place? DeBellis' concern in his (1991) is to explain what the content of musical 
perception would look like, and this is what I will examine in this second exegetical 
chapter. The central point of this chapter will be to explain how DeBellis thinks that 
these musical qualities come to be represented in a listener's auditory experience. The 
idea that musical content is nonconceptual only makes sense if the contents of musical 
experience can fit the intentional theory of perception. In this chapter I will explain 
how a representational theory of perception can handle music. However, explaining 
DeBellis' claim will require much clarification of what sort of properties are thought to 
be represented in musical experience. In the next chapter I will present DeBellis' 
argument for a strong intentionalist account of musical experience. 
3.1 Properties of Musical Experience 
Understanding how the contents of musical experience relate to perception is 
particularly intriguing, at least in part because the auditory stimuli that a listener 
perceives is arguably much impoverished when compared to the range and richness of 
musical experience. In auditory experience we are presented with sounds that can be 
described in terms of their frequency, intensity and duration, but this is not all that 
musical experience amounts to. When listening to music, we hear melodies, rhythms, 
DeBellis (1995): Ch. 1. 
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cadences, and resolutions; sometimes we might hear the music as representing the 
sound of a battle, or of traffic, or the engine of a train; and controversially we may even 
hear an expression of grief, or joy, or regret. It is strange that we should hear all of this, 
considering the poverty of the stimulus. It cannot be that there is something special 
about tones resonating at a certain frequency that causes one to hear regret, or the sound 
of battle. Interesting as this is, I will not linger here on how it is that a listener comes to 
hear the music as representing something or as expressing some emotion, because 
whatever it is to hear these things must be founded on a level of hearing that is more 
basic to musical experience, namely the hearing of specific musical qualities, like 
melody, harmony and rhythm. How does one come to hear those things given the 
poverty of the auditory stimulus? 
It would be premature to attempt to answer this question here; rather I will return to 
this in Chapters Seven and Ten. For the moment, however, it would suffice to say that 
hearing a sound as having a melody is very different from simply hearing a sequence of 
sounds that alternate in pitch. Hearing a sequence of sounds that alternate in pitch is not 
the same as hearing a melody as, for one thing, a sequence of sounds that alternate in 
pitch need not sound resolved, or tense, or incomplete, while melodies typically do have 
these properties. Perhaps it would be objected that it is not the case that all melodies 
have these properties, nor do all non-musical sounds lack these properties. This may be 
granted, but the general point would remain: musical sounds typically possess certain 
properties that non-musical sounds do not, and we might apply certain evaluative terms 
to musical sounds that would appear awkward when applied to non-musical sounds. 
This distinction between musical and non-musical sounds is one that many in cognitive 
science have long argued for and some philosophers acknowledge as well. 2 Scruton, for 
instance, remarks in his (1983) that musical sounds are discontinuous with non-musical 
sounds-that is, that one cannot trace a genealogical relationship from non-musical 
sounds to musical ones within subjective experience. There is no vague area between 
musical and non-musical sounds. Scruton distinguishes between `scientific 
understanding' and `intentional understanding' where the former aims to describe the 
physical basis for auditory experience and the latter requires that the listener conceives 
their auditory experience in a certain way (in this case, a way that is salient to 
experiencing the sound as music). Scruton explains this by saying that a listener must 
2 See, for instance, Helmholtz (1885). Krumhansl (1990) and Sloboda (1985). 
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extend certain concepts into their auditory experience by metaphorical transference. 3 I 
wish to take up the challenge of finding the distinction between musical and non- 
musical sounds in Chapter Seven but will do so without relying on any mysterious 
notions such as metaphorical transference. Rather I think a good psychological 
explanation has already been made available by cognitive science, but saying more 
about this here would be getting ahead of myself. 
Our present concern is to explain how, on DeBellis' view, musical qualities such as 
melody, rhythm, and harmony come to be represented in perceptual experience. What I 
would like to start with is the observation that the claim that these musical qualities 
(melody, rhythm, harmony, etc. ) are represented in experience rather than just the 
objective properties of auditory experience (frequency, intensity, duration) is a 
significantly weighty issue not explicitly argued for in DeBellis' account of hearing 
ascriptions. When a listener hears sounds as being music, they hear a sound as being a 
certain way, i. e. musically, but it seems to be DeBellis' assumption that hearing this 
musicality is just a constitutive part of auditory experience. Rather than make this 
assumption, the question we should be asking is, `Are these musical properties 
perceptible properties like frequency, intensity and duration? ' Clearly if perceptual 
experience is to have a specifically musical content, then the properties of melody, 
rhythm, harmony, etc. play some role in the contents of experience; however the 
musical properties cannot be reduced to the objective properties of auditory experience. 
I take it that this is not DeBellis' concern-he is not interested in how the physical 
stimulus that is presented in auditory experience comes to be represented as having 
certain musically salient qualities, rather he assumes that those qualities salient to the 
representation of music are presented in experience at the level of the perception of 
auditory events. Later in this dissertation, I will go on to argue that DeBellis' claim that 
musical experience has a nonconceptual content is false, and I think that the reason that 
DeBellis' claim fails is because he overlooks this problem of the poverty of the 
stimulus. But, again, I am jumping too far ahead. 
What sort of musically salient qualities are represented in perceptual experience? 
What are musically salient qualities? In addition to the three basic objective qualities of 
sound-frequency, intensity and duration-the qualities that are salient to our 
Scruton (1983). For criticism of this view, see also Budd (1985). Though, Budd also seems to 
acknowledge the distinction between hearing a sound as a musical event and hearing a sound as a non- 
musical event. 
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perception of music would include things such as rhythm, melodic dominance, 
harmonic function, and overall structural qualities, such as the structure of musical 
phrases, measures and movements and their relations to each other. It should be noticed 
that all of these qualities are relations between sounds. A melody is not simply a 
sequence of sounds that alternate in pitch; rather the distinct notes of a melody are heard 
as being related to each other in some way. Similarly, rhythm does not simply describe 
the temporal ordering of sounds, rather for a sequence of sounds to be a rhythm is for a 
listener to hear that particular relational quality holds between the sounds. If auditory 
experience is to have a specifically musical content, then it would not be enough for a 
listener to hear a series of auditory events having certain frequency, intensity and 
temporal properties; in addition, the listener must also hear certain relations holding 
between these events, relations that define some events as more dominant, or musically 
significant, than others. 4 To clarify what is meant here, I will say a bit more about what 
is meant by describing musical hearing as the hearing of certain relations. 
The constituent elements of musical experience could be thought of as falling into 
two basic classes, (1) the purely objective auditory properties of frequency, intensity 
and duration, and (2) the particular sort of relations that hold between sound-events. 
Those properties that fall into (1) are not special to music, these are just the basic 
common properties of acoustics-frequency, intensity and duration are fundamental 
properties of all sound-events. Sound-events are just the regular propagation of air 
pressure waves, which can be measured in terms of the frequency, intensity and 
duration of compression and rarefaction. However these alone are not sufficient for a 
sound-event to be a musical event. Musical events are not constituted by some special 
class of acoustical properties. Another way of putting the point is that the musical 
qualities of a sound cannot be exhaustively described simply in terms of frequency, 
intensity and duration-musical properties cannot be reduced to acoustics. 
As for the relational properties that fall into (2), many music theorists and 
psychologists have argued that what is salient to a sound's being perceived as music is 
that certain relations are perceived as holding between otherwise distinct sound-events. 
4 For examples of the kind of claims music analysts make about what can be heard in a piece of music, 
see DeBellis (1995): 10. Also, while it is the purpose of this dissertation to consider whether these 
perceived musical relations are represented in the contents of experience, I should here point out that 
there is an analogous debate in the philosophy of science about whether perception is theory-laden. 
While this debate has clear parallels to my discussion, I will not comment on that debate here. DeBellis 
does comment on that debate in his book. See his (1995), Ch. Four. For an overview of the debate in 
philosophy of science, see Siegel (2005). 
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As Sloboda puts it, `[the] principle characteristic of music is that sounds stand in 
significant relation to one another, not in isolation. For music perception to "get off the 
ground" listeners must start to notice relationships and identify significant groupings [of 
sound-events]. '5 Sounds can be heard as having the kind of musical significance they 
do only when heard against the backdrop of sound-events that have come before. In the 
introduction to Krumhansl's book, she also notes the relationality of perceiving sounds 
as having musically salient qualities: 
Listening to music, we hear the sounds not as isolated, disconnected units, but integrated into 
patterns. Our perceptual experience goes beyond sensory registration of single musical events. 
Sound elements are heard in context, organized in pitch and time, and are understood in terms of 
their functions within that context.... In taking context into account, the listener apprehends 
increasingly larger temporal groupings. The listener appreciates the organization of a musical 
work by assigning significance to the sounded elements according to their roles in the musical 
context, and by integrating them into the broader pattern. 6 
Krumhansl's point here is that the representation of those musically salient qualities in a 
listener's auditory experience is just the representation of certain relations holding 
between individual sound-events or groups of sound-events. These are built up in part 
out of the physical properties of acoustics, but are not reducible to acoustics. 
While it may be rather obvious that rhythm, harmony and melodic structure are 
relational, there may be some doubt as to why we should think of melodic function as a 
relation. I will explain. By `melodic function' I mean the melodic position a note falls 
in within a particular key. Certain tones will sound more or less stable within a given 
context; the melodic function of a tone describes its relative degree of stability. Tonic, 
dominant, sub-dominant and mediant are all examples of melodic functions. Each note 
will have a different melodic function in different key contexts-for the note A, in A- 
major it is the tonic; in D-major it is the dominant; and in F-major it is the mediant. The 
major-key melodic functions in diatonic harmony are illustrated in Figure 3.1 below in 
the key of C-major. 
Tonic Supertonic Mediant Sub-dominant Dominant Sub-mediant Leading Tone Tonic 
Figure 3.1 
Notice that the first C and the last C in Figure 3.1 are both the tonic. That is because 
5 Sloboda (1985): 154. 
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those two notes are both members of the same `pitch class', they are both instances of 
C, and all tones within a given context that sound to be equally stable tones have the 
same melodic function. Pitch class can be defined in terms of melodic function in this 
way: any two notes that have the same melodic function are members of the same pitch 
class. 
Melodic function is one quality that is represented in musical experience. To say that 
some listener represents a tone as being, say, the tonic is to say that the listener hears the 
tone as having a certain melodic function-the listener hears the tone as having a certain 
degree of stability within that context that can be described as its being the tonic. So, 
why should we think that this musical quality is a relational quality? For a listener to 
represent some tone as the tonic is for the listener to represent that tone in relation to 
some tonal context. If the tone heard is an A, and it is represented as being the tonic, 
then this would be for the listener to hear the tone as have certain stability relations to 
the other tones in that context. Thus, melodic function is a relational quality. Of 
course, one might question how it is that something like melodic function could be a 
relational quality when a tone is heard in isolation. Imagine pressing a single key on a 
piano and listening to the resounding tone-doesn't one hear the tone as having some 
melodic function even though one does not hear the tone in relation to any other tone? 
Yes, it does, but I would like to leave this question aside for now and examine it in more 
detail in Chapter Ten. 
3.2 Musical Experience and Representational Contents 
So, how might these musical relations be represented in experience, what would the 
structure of such contents look like, and how are these contents to be individuated? 
Luckily for DeBellis an explanation of this has been attempted by many psychologists 
and music theorists in recent years. These recent attempts to individuate the contents of 
musical experiences could be classified into two broad veins, namely as music-analytic 
accounts and as psychological accounts. Music-analytic accounts of hearing ascription 
typically seek to explain how listeners who are moderately acquainted with some 
musical background understand what they hear, one notable example being Fred 
Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's Generative Theory of Tonal Music (or GTTM for short). 7 
6 Krumhansl (1990): 3. Her book is very instructive and highly recommended. 
7 See Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983). 
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Alternatively, similar sorts of music-analytic accounts could be made to work using 
other styles of musical analysis, such as Schenkerian analysis. What these theories 
attempt to do is to explain in music-theoretic terms exactly what relations the listener 
hears in the music-these seek to explain how the music sounds to the listener. These 
theories attempt to do this by offering an analysis of the music in the form of a musical 
graph with their own developed notational system that indicates the relations between 
the note-groupings in the music. 
While GTTM and Schenkerian analysis attempt to offer music-analytic accounts of 
the way in which a listener hears a piece of music, a different kind of account of musical 
hearing could be given purely in psychological terms-that is, in terms of a listener's 
behavioural abilities and responses to things such as melody recognition, incomplete 
musical phrases or incorrect phrases. It is this sort of description that might best 
describe the auditory states of listeners who could be thought of as `ordinary listeners', 
or those listeners with little or no musical background. 
One further difference between the music-analytic and psychological accounts of 
hearing ascriptions are that the former tend to be mainly concerned with the `deeper' 
structural qualities of music-harmonic relations between chords or structural relations 
between larger segments of a melody-while the psychological theories tend to be more 
concerned with the actual sequences of notes that a listener hears, called the `musical 
surface'. The notes heard on the musical surface each have their own distinctive 
melodic function, and these contribute to the deeper structural or harmonic properties of 
a piece of music. The important point, however, is that what is common to both music- 
analytical or psychological hearing ascriptions is that the way in which a listener hears a 
certain musical figure-that is, either the particular sort of musically salient qualities 
and relations that a listener purportedly hears in musical perception, or the sort of 
auditory features that figure in a listener's behavioural responses to some musical 
stimulus-can be expressed by hypothesising a symbolic representation of the content 
of the listener's experience. DeBellis supports the claim that the contents of a listener's 
musical experience would correspond to one of these graphs. 8 
To illustrate this I will present a simple example of psychological hearing ascriptions 
by summarising DeBellis' presentation of the `relative chroma model' of representation 
8 Defending this claim is the subject of DeBellis (1991) and (1995), Ch. 1. 
A'7 It i 
(we will examine music-analytic hearing ascriptions in the next chapter). 
9 According to 
the relative chroma model, what is of interest is the way in which listeners represent the 
actual sequence of auditory events and the tonal relations between these. The most 
basic account of what a listener hears in musical perception must take into account the 
succession of auditory events that is presented and the basic properties of pitch, duration 
and amplitude. This is what is called the `musical surface'. To simplify the discussion 
here, I will stick with the representation of musical pitch, leaving out rhythmic qualities 
and perceived loudness. 
Let us take a simple example. The opening two measures of `Mary Had a Little 
Lamb', in musical notation, would look like this: 
Figure 3.2 
This sequence of notes is written here in the key of C-major, where the notes heard are 
E-D-C-D-E-E-E. On the relative chroma model of mental representation, this sequence 
of notes could be expressed as a sequence of pitch events that sound to be related to 
each other relative to some reference point or tonal context. This reference point, which 
could be thought of as the `tonal centre', is typical the tonic. In Figure 3.2 above the 
reference point would be the key of C-major. Under the relative chroma model, each 
note that has the same letter name can be represented by the same chroma value. ' 0 The 
tonic is expressed numerically as 1.11 In the example above, C (the third note) is the 
tonic, and so is expressed as 1. D is the second pitch in the key of C-major, expressed 
by the chroma value 2, and E, being the third pitch, is expressed as 3. So for the 
example above, on the relative chroma model, the representation of this melody in the 
listener's perceptual experience could be expressed as: 
9 The relative chroma model is just one psychological theory of representation among many. I would 
refer the reader interested in these theories to the works cited by DeBellis, p. 12-13, in footnotes 24-26. 
Unfortunately, it would just take us too far afield for me to explore these other theories here in any detail. 
'o On this view, there are eight chroma values corresponding to the eight notes in a natural key. 
However the difference between major and minor keys on the relative chroma model cannot be 
represented. This is not an oversight, but rather is one point of the theory - that the third degree of a 
scale is represented to the listener as 3 regardless of whether it is a natural-3 or a flat-3. In either case, it 
is still the third degree relative to 1. 
" Due to the limitations of the notational system that I am using, in this paper I will use italicised 
numerals for chroma. This breaks with convention where chroma is usually represented as a numeral 




One of the benefits of this model is that the same melody played in any other key 
would correspond to the same relative chroma sequence. For instance, the same melody 
played in the key of D-major would have as its sequence the note names F#-E-D-E-F#- 
F#-F#. This is a different set of notes from that of the melody played in C-major, 
however, as the tonic has shifted to D, then D would become 1, thus the relative chroma 
sequence would still be expressed as 3-2-1-2-3-3-3. Psychologists hypothesize that this 
model explains, for instance, how listeners are able to recognise some sequence of notes 
as being the `same melody' as some previously heard sequence of notes even when the 
second sequence is played in a different key-thus, recognising two melodies as being 
the same on this view just amounts to recognising that both melodies fit the same 
relative chroma sequence. 12 
The relative chroma model does provide a plausible account of how a listener 
represents surface relations such as melodic function. However, while relative chroma 
model might be helpful for explaining simple recognitional capacities of melodies or 
behavioural responses to the auditory events represented on the musical surface, it is 
incapable of saying anything about those `deeper' qualities of musical experience 
treated by GTTM or Schenkerian analysis that seem to be salient to the experience of a 
piece of music. For instance the relative chroma model would be inadequate to say 
anything about delayed resolutions: the relative chroma model simply illustrates the 
way in which a listener hears the sounds on the musical surface, though it is not able to 
explain why a listener hears a certain note as resolving to a note that does not follow in 
immediate succession. Nor can the relative chroma model explain harmonic movement 
or melodic force. Our experiential response to hearing a piece of music cannot seem to 
be captured solely by what can be heard on the musical surface. To explain these 
deeper structures we need something like GTTM or Schenkerian analysis. We will 
examine these in the next chapter. 
12 Dowling and Harwood (1986). 
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3.3 Conclusions 
DeBellis' view, following the psychological accounts offered by the proponents of 
GTTM, Schenkerian analysis and the relative chroma model, is that the contents of 
experience that represent those musical qualities that are taken to be salient to musical 
experience must correspond to some kind of graph. So, in the sentence `S hears that p", 
what fills the `p' place in DeBellis' view is a graph illustrating the salient musical 
relations between the notes on the surface and the deeper structural relations of larger 
sections of the piece. As DeBellis says, `music theory and analysis can be looked upon 
as musical phenomenology ... 
because their descriptions of musical works coincide 
with the content of musical perception'. 13 While music-analytical graphs of the GTTM 
or Schenkerian style would suffice to represent `deep' structural relations between 
groups of notes or sections of music separated by some temporal distance, something 
like the relative chroma model of musical representation would suffice to capture the 
content of musical experience at the more `surface' level. DeBellis leaves it open 
exactly which type of graph would be the correct one-perhaps GTTM is sufficient to 
fully capture the representational content of musical experience, or perhaps it would be 
some combination of these views. Presumably it would be an empirical matter to 
discover exactly which theory is best. 
My intention has been to explain what it would mean on DeBellis' account for 
musical experience to have a representational content, to find some candidate for what 
that content would look like. The discussion above is meant to illustrate how 
psychological theories of musical representation ascribe perceptual states with musical 
contents to listeners. In the next chapter, I will present DeBellis' argument for the claim 
that an intentionalist theory of the contents of musical experience can successfully 
account for the phenomenal feel of a piece of music. By presenting DeBellis' argument 
for strong intentionalism, I will thereby also examine why we should think that those 
non-physical musical properties do play a role in the contents of experience and will 
cover how large-scale structural qualities are represented in the contents of musical 
experience. We will examine the representational graphs posited by GTTM and 
Schenkerian analysis. 
13 DeBellis (1991): 310. 
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CHAPTER FouR: 
WEAK INTENTIONALISM REJECTED 
In the previous two chapters I offered an account of the intentional theory of perception 
and offered DeBellis' account of what the intentional content of musical experience 
would be. One of the central points of DeBellis' account that interests me is his claim 
that the phenomenal character of musical experience can be reduced to the intentional 
contents of the experience. ' I believe that this is something DeBellis is right about, and 
take this to be his most important contribution to the debate over perceptual contents. 
His claim is that a listener hears the tonal relations on the musical surface as well as 
those relations that hold at the deeper structural levels. If this is correct, then DeBellis 
claims that a fully intentionalist account of the contents of experience can capture 
differences in the phenomenology of musical experience: provided that such musical 
graphs are capable of capturing the subtle differences in the phenomenology of musical 
experience, then such graphs would count as fully intentional descriptions of the content 
of a listener's musical experience. 
In this chapter I will examine DeBellis' argument for strong intentionalism regarding 
musical experience. DeBellis worries that, if it can be shown for cases of musical 
experience that two mental states can have the same intentional content while being 
phenomenally distinct, then this would undermine his explanation of musical 
understanding. Remember that for DeBellis, understanding music is just hearing the 
music as being a certain way, which would allow one's understanding of music to be 
analysed in terms of a listener's being in a certain intentional state. But if these states 
are phenomenally distinct, then there can be no sure way of identifying the content of a 
listener's experience. To defend strong intentionalism, DeBellis must construct a 
plausible musical case where some content-bearing mental state may exhibit different 
phenomenal properties and then show how these cases can be handled by his theory of 
content in purely intentionalistic terms. By examining DeBellis' arguments for this, we 
will examine in more detail how large-scale structural qualities of a piece of music are 
represented in experience. 
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4.1 The Puzzle Cases 
To quickly remind the reader, intentionalism is the view that all mental states have an 
intentional content-indeed, that the defining characteristic of a mental state is that it 
exhibits intentionality. When applied to perception, the thought is that perceptual 
experience is a kind of intentional state that is characterised by an intentional content 
(typically some proposition that fills the p-place in the statement `S perceives that p') 
presented under some perceptual propositional attitude (sees p, hears p, smells p, etc. ). 
Strong intentionalism is the further claim that any difference in the phenomenology of 
two mental states is due to a difference in their intentionality, or that any two mental 
states that are intentionally identical must be phenomenally identical as well. 
Alternatively, one might argue that those qualities that are salient to a listener's 
experience of music cannot be captured by a description of the content's intentionality, 
but must rather be explained in terms of a representational state's also possessing 
`sensational properties', or `phenomenal properties' or `qualia'. On this sort of view, 
what is represented intentionally in perceptual experience is distinct from the 
phenomenal feel of the experience the phenomenal feel of perceptual experience 
cannot then be reduced to the intentional content of the experience. Someone who 
accepts weak intentionalism holds that the phenomenology of perceptual experience 
cannot be reduced to the intentional contents of experience. If this is correct, then 
DeBellis' project would fail to get going: if the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience is to play the foundational role in musical understanding that DeBellis 
claims it does, then there must be a strong link (whether causal or reliable or whatever) 
between how the experience is for the listener and what the listener can know. The 
phenomenological claim holds that a listener must experience the music (phenomenally) 
as being a certain way, and on the basis of this experience is able to know, for instance, 
that the ending is a perfect cadence. However, if the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience is not tied closely to the contents of experience, then the link to knowing 
something about the music that DeBellis is after would appear to be severed. For this 
reason DeBellis defends strong intentionalism, which we can define as the view that 
also accepts that perceptual states have intentional contents, but claims that a complete 
description of the intentional contents of perceptual experience is all one needs to 
See DeBellis (1991): 314-322, and (1995): Ch. 
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capture the phenomenal character of that experience. 
On a weak intentionalist theory of perceptual contents, it would be possible for two 
perceptual experiences to be identical as to their representational content and yet to be 
phenomenally distinguishable. Such a case would be demonstrated by the figure of dots 
that we discussed in Chapter Two, which could be perceived as either being aligned in 
columns or in rows (Figure 2.1, p. 37). The weak intentionalist would claim that the 
difference between representing the dots as being aligned in columns or as being 
aligned in rows is a difference between the phenomenal properties of the experiences 
while these states represent the same intentional contents. On this view the perceptual 
experience that accompanies the representation of the dots as being aligned into 
columns has a different `phenomenal feel' from the perceptual experience that 
represents the dots as being aligned in rows. 
Applying this to the case of musical perception, the suggestion would then be that 
hearing, for instance, the C-B tonal sequence in the key of G-major is an experience 
phenomenally distinct from that of hearing the same sequence of tones in the key of C- 
major (to remind, in G-major this sequence would sound resolved whereas in C-major it 
would sound very unstable-see Figure 1.2, p. 19), though both experiences should 
possess the same representational content-they would both represent a C-B tonal 
sequence. Looking a little further afield than the present discussion, the claims of weak 
intentionalism seem to present one possible solution to the problem of aesthetic 
disagreement. Aestheticians have long struggled over the problem of differences of 
taste; perhaps the answer is just that, when two listeners listen to the same musical 
performance where one listener finds the music interesting and rich and the other finds 
it difficult and discordant, though the contents of their experiences could both be 
thought of as possessing similar representational contents, each listener may be 
conscious of different phenomenal qualities. I don't believe that weak intentionalism is 
as plausible as it might seem in either the musical case or the aesthetic case; however I 
only mention the possibility of applying this to aesthetic cases in passing and would not 
wish to comment on it further. 
The challenge for DeBellis, then, would be to show that a strong version of the 
intentional theory can account for the phenomenal differences between two otherwise 
similar musical events. A point on which DeBellis and I agree is the repleteness with 
which a strong intentionalist account of perceptual experience can handle such 
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phenomenal differences. DeBellis offers two arguments in two different sources2 
against the sort of view of sensational properties that Peacocke defends in Sense and 
Content. While Peacocke's defence of sensational properties is widely rejected, and 
that Peacocke himself has changed his mind on this point, my discussion of it here is 
more than a straw man. DeBellis' rejection of Peacocke's weak intentionalism is the 
setting within which DeBellis sets out many of the details of his representational theory 
of music. It is by showing how Peacocke's view of sensational properties can be 
countered that DeBellis sets out his nonconceptualist view of the contents of musical 
experience. It would then be helpful to examine DeBellis' arguments against Peacocke 
here as this will help to set up my disagreement with DeBellis. 
In his (1983), Peacocke seeks to reject a claim that he calls the Adequacy Thesis: the 
claim that all the intrinsic qualities of a sensory experience are intentional qualities. ' 
The Adequacy Thesis states that whenever two experiences are similar in regard to their 
subjective character, then they must be similar in regard to their intentional content, or 
that any difference as to the subjective character between two experiences is due to a 
difference found in their intentional content. Thus all there is to the subjective character 
of an experience can be given by a complete description of the intentional content of the 
experience. The rejection of the Adequacy Thesis is what distinguishes weak 
intentionalism from strong intentionalism. In his earlier works, Peacocke had rejected 
the Adequacy Thesis on the grounds that phenomenally distinct perceptual experiences 
can have the same representational contents. 
Peacocke presented a number of now well-known examples that he claims prove the 
falsehood of the Adequacy Thesis. 4 In addition to these, Peacocke offers three more 
difficult examples that he claims offer a stronger challenge to the Adequacy Thesis, 
which DeBellis calls the `puzzle cases'. 5 The first of the puzzle cases that DeBellis 
presents, again, is Figure 2.1 from page 37 above. In the second case cited by DeBellis, 
audible clicks or beats that last for an identical duration, have gaps of silence between 
2 DeBellis (1991) and DeBellis (1995), Chapter 2. My exegesis in this section will draw from both of 
these. 
3 Peacocke (1983): 9. 
4 The first example is where one sees two trees that are the same height though the second tree is twice 
the distance from the viewer as the first. In one sense both trees look to be the same height, though the 
second tree takes up less space in the viewers visual field. The second example is where a visual scene 
looks different to a subject who views it with only one eye rather than two. The third example is of the 
experience of aspect shift that one finds in the case of the Necker cube. Peacocke lays out these examples 
in his (1983): 12-17. For DeBellis' criticism of these examples, see his (1991): 306-308. 
5 Set out in DeBellis (1991): 308-309. 
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them of an equal duration and no identifying differences of pitch or emphasis can sound 
to be grouped in either triple (a) or duple (b): 
)n)n -L -L -L (a) 
Figure 4.1 
(b) 
In Figure 4.1 above, the six beats are heard to be grouped in either of two ways. It is 
Peacocke's supposition that hearing the beats as being grouped in (a) is an experience 
that is phenomenally distinct from hearing the beats as being grouped in (b), however 
perceptual states representing either (a) or (b) may possess the same intentional 
contents. That (a) and (b) are indeed phenomenally distinct is quite obvious. The 
difference between these rhythmic groupings could be illustrated by imagining how a 
listener would attempt to count the rhythm. A listener who counts, `One-Two-Three- 
One-Two-Three' is counting in two sets of triplets (a), whereas the listener who counts, 
`One-Two-One-Two-One-Two' is counting three sets of duplets (b). The listener hears 
(a) as having different rhythmic accent or stresses. However, the individuate beats may 
be in all other respects indistinguishable-they may be the same temporal distance 
apart-in which case (a) and (b) may be represented by the same intentional content. In 
such a case, Peacocke argued that there is a representational similarity (six beats evenly 
spaced) with a phenomenal difference (hearing two triplets as opposed to hearing three 
duplets). 
The final case, and the one that will occupy the remainder of this discussion, is that 
of hearing the tonality of a tritone when the interval is heard in isolation. This example 
will take some explaining. A tritone is an interval between two notes that is exactly the 
distance of half an octave. The interval of a tritone is one semitone wider than a perfect 
fourth and one semitone narrower than a perfect fifth. The tritone sounds to have the 
greatest tension within the even-tempered Western tonal system. 6 Because of the 
tritone's tense quality, it has a central function in diatonic harmony-a tritone must 
6 One caveat: my discussion, as well as DeBellis', is concerned solely with the even-tempered 
chromatic scale in Western harmony. Many of the music-theoretic claims made here would not apply to 
other harmonic systems, such as the tonal systems used in Indian and Malaysian music. 
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always resolve to the tonic. ' However, because the tritone is exactly half the distance of 
an octave, when a tritone is heard in isolation, it could be heard as correctly resolving to 
either of two keys. So, for instance, a tritone consisting of the notes C and F-sharp (G- 
flat) could either resolve to G major or D-flat major: 
(c) (d) 
Figure 4.2 8 
For the non-musician, this example is meant to illustrate a potential ambiguity in 
two-part harmony. In (c) above, there are three sets of `dyads' or two note chords. The 
first dyad and third dyad are identical types, being constituted by the notes B and G 
(reading from the bottom up), which typically implies a G-major chord in first 
inversion. The second dyad in (c) is constituted by the notes C and F-sharp. The tonal 
`distance' or interval between the notes C and F-sharp is exactly half of one octave-a 
tritone-which in Western harmony is a very unusual interval. Each major key 
naturally contains only one tritone. 
Within the harmonic context of the key of G-major, the note C (sub-dominant) has a 
strong tendency to resolve to the note B (mediant), and the note F-sharp (leading tone) 
has a strong tendency to resolve to G (tonic), and this is exactly what happens between 
the second and third dyads of (c). The key of G-major naturally contains the notes C 
and F-sharp, and these two notes partly constitute the chord D7, which is the dominant 
chord in G-major. When C and F-sharp are played as a dyad, the resultant harmony is 
described as being very tense, as if it is `pulling' towards the B-G resolution. So when a 
normative listener hears the series of dyads in (c) correctly, she would hear the notes as 
implying aG- D7- G progression. 
Now, in (d) above we again have a series of three dyads, where the first and third are 
identical and the second is a tritone. In (d) the first and third dyads are constituted by 
' This is true in major-key diatonic harmony where there is only one naturally occurring tritone- 
between the 4 and 7 as in the V7 chord-which must resolve to the tonic. In other harmonic systems it is 
not always the case that a tritone must resolve to the tonic. In jazz, for instance, seventh chords are used 
quite widely, often resulting in the music's having a moving, vibrant or active feel. Blues also uses 
seventh chords freely to achieve its characteristically rough `bluesy' feeling. In these instances the tritone 
need not resolve to the tonic. 
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the notes D-flat and F, which imply a D-flat-major chord, while the second dyad is C 
and G-flat. In the context of the key of D-flat-major, the tritone between C and G-flat 
naturally occurs, and this triton partly constitutes the chord A-flat7, which is the 
dominant chord of D-flat-major. So, when a normative listener hears the series of dyads 
in (d) correctly, then she would hear this series as implying the harmonic progression D- 
flat - A-flat7- D-flat. 
What is interesting about this example for DeBellis' argument is that the second dyad 
in (c) is type-identical to the second dyad in (d)-that is, the tones that the note names C 
and F-sharp refer to are exactly the same tones that C and G-flat refer to forming exactly 
the same tritone interval. The non-musician might find this somewhat confusing, so to 
clarify: between the notes F and G is a third note, which can be referred to as either F- 
sharp or G-flat. The note names `F-sharp' and `G-flat' refer to exactly the same musical 
tone, like `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' refer to exactly the same planet under different 
descriptions. The use of the different note names is partly a matter of convention, but 
mainly the different note names reflect the different harmonic functions that the same 
note can play in different harmonic contexts. On the one hand, it is a matter of 
convention as the key of G-major naturally contains the note G and the note one 
semitone below it, whereas the key of D-flat-major naturally contains the note F and the 
note one semitone above it. It would be very confusing if the key of D-flat-major 
contained both an F and an F-sharp, or if the key of G-major contained both aG and a 
G-flat. On the other hand, and more importantly, the different note names reflect 
something about the melodic function of the note indicated. `F-sharp' refers not only to 
the note just below G in the key of G-major, but also reflects that that note has the 
harmonic function of being the leading tone in the key of G-major. If the same note 
(still in G-major) were referred to as `G-flat', then this would refer to the first degree of 
the scale, the G, rather than referring to the seventh degree, the F-sharp. If the name `G- 
flat' were used in the key of G, then this would indicate that something unusual has 
happened to the first degree of the scale. In music theory, when one tone can be 
referred to under two different names, this is known as `enharmonic spelling'-the 
notes are tonally equivalent while the difference in spelling indicates something about 
the note's harmonic function. 
The tritone example in Figure 4.2 is of interest for our discussion because of what 
8 This figure is the example DeBellis presents at (1991): 309. 
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happens when a listener hears a tritone played in isolation-that is, if a listener hears the 
second dyad in (c) alone, without hearing either the first or third dyads. In this case, the 
listener would hear a very tense chord, one that sounds as if it is pulling towards a 
resolution-but which resolution? The listener could represent that dyad as being the 
tritone either of G major or of D-flat major due to the harmonic ambiguity. The 
important part, however, is that the listener would hear the tritone as being part of some 
harmonic context-indeed, this is required if the tone is to sound tense. The listener 
hears the tritone as being some way, but considering that the tone is heard in isolation, 
the listener could hear the tritone as being situated within either harmonic context. And 
hearing the tritone resolving to G-major is phenomenally different from hearing the 
tritone resolve to D-flat-major. To show that these mental states associated with these 
two ways of hearing the tritone are phenomenally distinct, consider this: suppose a 
listener hears a piece of music in G-major and at some point in that piece of music they 
hear the C/F-sharp dyad. If this is a normative listener, then they would hear that dyad 
as `pulling' towards or anticipating the G-major resolution. Now, if the chord that 
followed the tritone was actually a D-flat-major (remembering that, up until now, the 
piece of music had been in G-major), then this would have a very unexpected quality, 
perhaps it would even sound wrong, though in the key of D-flat-major one might hear 
the very same dyad. That the perceptual state that represents the tritone as resolving to 
D-flat-major is phenomenally distinct from the state that represents the tritone as 
resolving to G-major can be shown by noting that the two mental states cannot be 
swapped in midstream. A listener has different expectations when they hear the tritone 
as resolving to G-major than when they hear the same tritone as resolving to D-flat- 
major. 
How do we describe the way in which the listener hears the tritone? The listener 
hears the tritone as being tense relative to some tonal context; the question of course is 
which tonal context the listener hears the tritone as being related to. This question 
really is about what the correctness conditions are for hearing ascriptions. By saying 
that the listener hears the tritone as being related to some tonal context, we are thereby 
attributing the listener with an auditory experience having a certain content. Must the 
correctness conditions for hearing ascriptions capture the sense in which the listener 
hears the music? Of course it must, if the hearing ascription is to be an accurate 
description of how the listener experiences the music, and this is what a musical graph 
of the kind DeBellis describes is meant to do. If the listener hears the tritone as 
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resolving to G-major, then it would be incorrect to attribute to that listener a content that 
represents the tritone as resolving to D-flat-major (though such a hearing ascription may 
be correct de re). It would be incorrect because such a content ascription would fail to 
capture the sense in which the listener expects the tritone to resolve (that is, it would be 
incorrect de dicto). Again, it is for this reason that DeBellis requires an account of 
content that is more fine-grained than the possible worlds theory of content. The 
musical graphs postulated by GTTM and Schenkerian analysis are sufficiently fine- 
grained to distinguish between hearing the tritone as resolving to G-major or as 
resolving to D-flat-major. 
Someone defending strong intentionalism must show how the phenomenology of the 
experience is reducible to or exhausted by the intentional content of the listener's 
auditory experience. Opposed to this, the weak intentionalist may argue that both 
mental states have the same intentional content-they both represent the same two-note 
interval-and any phenomenal difference between the two perceptual experiences is 
independent of their intentional content. If this were the case, then this would bolster 
Peacocke's rejection of the Adequacy Thesis. The challenge for the strong 
intentionalist, then, is to offer an adequate account of such phenomenal differences as in 
the tritone example in purely intentional terms. 
4.2 GTTM as Representational Content 
What DeBellis offers is an account of the tritone example through the GTTM style of 
music analysis, claiming that this provides a plausible strong intentionalist account of 
the contents of musical experience. He argues that such styles of musical analysis 
might adequately capture the phenomenal differences between the two hearing 
ascriptions and might stand as a model of the intentional content of musical experience. 
His claim is that the content of musical experience `corresponds' to some music- 
analytic graph. 9 As he says, `A graph of GTTM is thus ... a kind of mental map. But it 
is not a map of a mental representation-of its intrinsic features involving neurons and 
synapses-so much as a map that specifies the mental representation's content, what 
that representation represents. ' 10 Furthermore, one of DeBellis' claims is that, in 
addition to what can be heard on the musical surface, other large-scale structural 
9 DeBellis (1991): 312. 
10 DeBellis (1995): 25. DeBellis' discussion in §1.2 is the relevant section of his book. 
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qualities also make a phenomenological contribution to musical experience. Indeed, it 
is by accounting for these `deeper' structural qualities that we would be able to explain 
the tritone case in purely intentional terms. To illustrate this, I will give a quick sketch 
of GTTM analysis. " 
GTTM analysis is a means of explaining structural and harmonic relationships 
between segments of a piece of music at increasingly more abstract levels. It does so by 
abstracting from the `surface level' or `foreground' of auditory experience-the level 
that is directly perceived, that of the succession of individual sound-events 
themselves-by a set of `prolongational operations' to the increasingly abstract 
`background' structural levels, where the harmonic and structural relations between 
musical phrases may become more apparent. Under this style of analysis, the music 
theorist might simplify a musical motif to a single note or pair of notes that symbolises 
the harmonic function of that motif. By simplifying the surface level into its overall 
harmonic function, the deep structure of the piece may be slowly revealed. So, for 
example, the musical surface of the first measure of Mozart's Piano Sonata in A-major 
(K. 331) looks like this'2: 
On DeBellis' account, the above measure could roughly stand as an expression of the 
intentional content of the `surface level' or `foreground' of a listener's auditory 
experience, this level of experience representing what is actually heard at the level of 
the auditory event. 
However, the surface level is not all that plays a phenomenological role in musical 
experience. What also plays this role are those larger-scale relational qualities like 
harmony, rhythmic grouping, melodic tendency and overall structure. These qualities 
are represented in increasingly deeper levels. To make these structural qualities more 
obvious, we begin by simplifying the phrase by removing those elements that make 
little harmonic contribution to the whole piece. For instance, the second note of the 
above measure has a mainly melodic function-it functions as an ornamentation thus 
making the melody more interesting. In order to reveal the underlying harmony of the 
" DeBellis does not labour over the fine details of GTTM analysis, and neither will I. For more on this. 
DeBellis directs the reader to Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983). 
12 The following four examples and exegesis are adapted from DeBellis (1991): 310-311, where he 
attributes the example to Westergaard (1975): 37. 
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`intermediate structural levels' or `middle ground' more clearly, the second note could 
be removed, which would leave the measure looking like this: 
After having cleared away the ornamental note, this variation on the measure leaves us 
with the underlying harmony and primary rhythmic pulses. Of course, if it is the 
underlying harmony that we are interested in, then the rhythmic organisation is 
irrelevant, and we can remove the repeated notes leaving us with this: 
This variation, however, can be simplified further. Combining these two notes into one 
chord shows us precisely what is the underlying harmonic structure of this passage, it is 
a C-minor dyad: 
Having abstracted away from the surface level through the intermediate levels, what we 
are left with here is the final `background' harmonic-structural quality of the Mozart 
measure, which in Chomskian-style could also be described as the measure's `deep 
structure' . 
13 Breaking down an entire piece of music in this way, GTTM analysts hold, 
would make the macro-structure of a piece of music more apparent, as a means of 
bringing out the harmonic relations between the individual motifs, measures or whole 
sections of a piece. DeBellis' idea is to employ this technique of analysising music to 
claim that `an auditory experience might, in its content, correspond to a [GTTM] graph. 
This means that one would hear the musical surface as bearing relations of a [GTTM] 
sort to the indicated passages on higher structural levels'. 14 1 will explain. 
13 Throughout their book, Lerdahl and Jackendoff draw parallels between their generative theory of tonal 
music and Chomsky's generative theory of language. See especially (1983): §§1.2,11.4 and 12.3. For a 
very interesting discussion of the influence of Chomsky and its relation to GTTM, see Raffman (1993): 
15-27. 
14 DeBellis (1991): 312. It should be noted that in DeBellis (1991) essay, he is discussing Schenkerian 
analysis rather than GTTM, and that my demonstration of the Mozart Piano Sonata is taken from 
DeBellis' (1991) illustration of Schenkerian analysis, however the main point DeBellis is pushing is 
applicable on either view. Officially, DeBellis is neutral about which system should be preferred. The 
argument that DeBellis makes here could be given equally well for Schenkerian analysis. DeBellis' 
(1995) focuses more attention on GTTM. 
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As discussed previously, what a listener hears in musical experience are sequences of 
sound-events-the notes of a tune. Each note contributes to the phenomenology of the 
experience by virtue of its tonal quality. So, on the surface level, the contents of 
musical experience would present us with a sequence of tones each making its own 
contribution to the ever-changing phenomenology of the experience. But this 
concatenation of changing tones on the surface level is not all that contributes to the 
phenomenal quality of the experience-that is, the notes of the tune is not all that a 
listener hears. The listener also hears large-scale relations holding between groups of 
tones-perhaps the listener hears certain groupings of tones being repeated, or unstable 
tones resolving after a long delay, or changes in character over large segments of the 
music. These large-scale qualities also make contributions to the phenomenology of the 
experience, and these cannot be reduced simply to the effects of the notes on the 
surface. So, DeBellis claims, the contents of musical experience must represent 
qualities that are deeper than the surface level to accurately characterise how a piece of 
music sounds to a listener. What a GTTM graph intends to do is to simplify musical 
phrases down to certain large-scale relations in order to make this deeper level more 
apparent. A GTTM graph typically has five staves running together, the top stave 
showing the musical surface and the lower staves increasingly becoming more abstract, 
illustrating what Lerdahl and Jackendoff describe as the five distinct levels of musical 
organisation: the musical surface, the grouping level, the metrical level, the time-span 
reduction level, and the prolongational reduction level. ' 5 GTTM graphs also employ a 
tree notation for the various reductions to deeper levels above the top stave to illustrate 
the hierarchical structure of the phrases. Each break in the tree indicates that some 
phrase at a higher level is an elaboration of a phrase at the level below. 16 
When analysing a piece of music, at each stage in a GTTM graph, the music analyst 
must make a decision about how to interpret a particular passage. Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff offer some guidelines for analysing a piece-prolongational operations- 
however despite these guides, when complicated musical works are analysed using 
these devices one finds that it may be possible for two theorists to disagree as to how a 
piece of music is to be analysed, each arriving at incompatible background analyses 
15 The reader will notice that my demonstration of Mozart's Piano Sonata above only has four levels. 
This is again because my demonstration of this one measure is adapted from DeBellis' illustration of 
Schenkerian analysis, and on that the third level is identical to the fourth level. Cf. DeBellis (1991): 311; 
and for an example of a GTTM analysis of this measure, see DeBellis (1995): 3. 
16 Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983): §5.3. 
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while both correctly following the GTTM method. And this is the stuff of debate 
among music analysts: just what is the correct way to `hear' a piece of music. This, 
incidentally, illustrates a point DeBellis makes in arguing for his claim. Music analysts 
do not just argue over how a piece of music is to be analysed in some abstract academic 
way. Rather the debate is over how the music is actually heard. Music sounds to be a 
certain way, and it is the analyst's job to uncover how it is heard by constructing an 
illustrative graph. A graph of this kind is meant to capture the content of the listener's 
experience-it illustrates exactly how it is that the music sounds to the listener. 
Thinking of the demonstration of Mozart's Piano Sonata above, the claim is that the 
listener hears all of the musical relations on the musical surface as well as those 
relations that hold at the more abstract levels and that an accurate account of the content 
of the listener's musical experience must take these `deeper' relations into account. If 
this is correct, then DeBellis claims we have our way of defending strong 
intentionalism: provided that such musical graphs are capable of capturing the subtle 
differences in the phenomenology of musical experience, then such graphs would count 
as fully intentional descriptions of the content of a listener's musical experience. 
4.3 Explaining Away the Tritone Case 
Returning to the triton example in Figure 4.2, DeBellis' account of the contents of 
musical experience would allow that a strong intentionalist can account the difference 
between (c) and (d) as the phenomenal differences between these mental states can be 
expressed by different GTTM (or Schenkerian) graphs. On DeBellis' view, the content 
of the musical experience for a listener who hears the triton C and F-sharp played in 
isolation as the dominant chord of G-major can be described by the graph in Figure 4.3 
(e), whereas the experience of the listener who hears the same tritone as the dominant 




To explain, the first dyad in each measure is, again, the tritone C/F-sharp(G-flat). This 
is the interval that the listener hears in isolation. The second dyad in brackets is not 
actually heard but is what the listener anticipates hearing. The key to explaining the 
phenomenal difference between hearing the tritone as resolving to G-major rather than 
as resolving to D-flat-major, on DeBellis' account, is to take into account what the 
listener anticipates hearing next. The listener who hears the tritone as resolving to G- 
major is in a mental state that has a different content from the listener who hears the 
tritone as resolving to D-flat-major. These two mental states are phenomenally 
distinct-anticipating a G-major resolution is phenomenally distinct from anticipating a 
D-flat-major resolution-and this phenomenal distinction can be captured by a GTTM 
graph. The strong intentionalist may then claim that the mental states represented by (e) 
and (f) above have different intentional contents as each mental state represents 
different resolutions. In a footnote, DeBellis says that, strictly speaking, the tritone in 
isolation is heard as being `incomplete'-as he says, `the relevant relation [represented 
as being heard in perceptual experience] is that of neighbour motion; when the tritone is 
heard in the absence of musical context, it is incomplete neighbour motion'. 17 I have 
tried to capture the feeling of incompleteness in Figure 4.3 by notating the chord that the 
tritone is being heard as resolving to in brackets (J )-this is intended to indicate an 
incomplete but implied resolution. As the G-major in (e) is not actually heard, the 
content of the perceptual experience must represent the tritone as sounding incomplete. 
This would then account for the listeners' hearing the tritone as anticipating a certain 
resolution. The use of the brackets to mark the incompleteness of what is heard might 
also be used to distinguish these cases of hearing the tritone in isolation from cases 
where the tritone is heard with the resolution as well. 
I find this defence of intentionalism for musical perception quite compelling. 
Indeed, I think that DeBellis' defence of intentionalism is his most important 
contribution to this debate. The virtue of this conception of content is that, as well as 
offering a plausible defence of an intentional theory of musical perception, it offers an 
means of explaining how the harmonic relations of a piece of music can form part of the 
content of a listener's auditory experience though what the listener hears is, strictly 
speaking, not a simple auditory event. Often what can be heard is, on the surface level, 
quite confusing, ambiguous, and highly complex. DeBellis' account would allow that, 
17 DeBellis (1991): 313, n. 23. 
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despite these complexities, listener's often grasp the deeper levels of harmonic 
simplicity and unity pervading a piece of music, and that this level of musical 
experience plays an integral role in defining the character of a listener's auditory 
experience. On this view, `one hears the passage as being related in certain ways to 
passages that ... 
do not sound', ' 8 or in other words, the listener represents a musical 
passage as having some relation to another musical passage that is not (strictly 
speaking) part of what is heard. Systems of musical analysis such as GTTM bring out 
the way in which the listener hears relations that are not given by the surface level of the 
auditory experience in a more explicit way, and DeBellis' use of these systems of 
musical analysis as offering a means of describing the contents of musical experience 
would allow a strong intentionalist account of those contents. 
DeBellis' defence of strong intentionalism also illustrates how large-scale structural 
qualities of a piece of music may be represented in experience, and what it means for 
`musically salient qualities' to be represented in the contents of experience. To 
represent those large-scale structural qualities of a musical piece requires a theory of 
musical content like that offered by GTTM that can accommodate deeper levels of 
musical complexity that go below the musical surface. As it is the business of these 
graphs to map out the underlying relational qualities that are heard in the music more 
explicitly, then if the representational content of experience does correspond to some 
graph of music analysis, then these systems of music analysis allow us a way of 
expressing how these `deep-structure' relational qualities may be represented in 
experience. 
However, it is left open in DeBellis' discussion exactly which large-scale structural 
properties would be represented. A theory of the contents of musical experience should 
account for things such as delayed resolution, or incomplete resolution, or modulation. 
But what should we think about more challenging structural properties? For instance, is 
retrograde inversion a salient musical relation that would figure in the contents of a 
listener's musical experience? And how large-scale could these structural properties 
be? Would musical salience include things like sonata form? DeBellis does not 
satisfactorily settle these questions, though some answers are needed as these are not 
idle questions. 19 There is much debate in the area of musical understanding as to what 
18 Ibid.: 312. 
19 DeBellis (1995), Ch. 6 is devoted to understanding musical structure, however he does not provide 
reasons for thinking that large-scale structures do figure in the contents of experience. 
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structural qualities a listener must attend to. 20 Is it necessary for a listener's 
understanding of a piece of music that they should be able to recognise the sonata form? 
Or should they be able to recognise retrograde inversions? In terms of DeBellis' 
project, if a listener's understanding of some music can be analysed in terms of the 
content of the listener's intentional states, then it is a meaningful question to ask of 
DeBellis' theory whether structural qualities such as sonata form and retrograde 
inversion do enter into the content of the listener's experience. 
Providing an answer to these questions is within the range of DeBellis' theory 
already-the phenomenological claim for musical understanding might give us one way 
of answering this question. A general claim could be made that those features of a 
musical composition that matter to a listener's intentional content would be restricted to 
those features that make an appropriate phenomenological contribution to the listener's 
experience. By `appropriate phenomenological contribution' I mean that, for example, 
if a listener were to hear an inverted melody, then hearing the melody as an inversion 
must make a phenomenological contribution to the listener's experience that would be 
absent if the listener were to hear the same sequence of notes that was not part of an 
inversion. It can be shown empirically that, for instance, medium-scale musical 
structures like cadences do make a phenomenal difference to the listener's experience. 
However, I sincerely doubt whether musical devices such as retrograde inversion would 
make such a difference. (I hold the same doubt about the phenomenological 
contribution of sonata form, though less strongly. ) Rather, my intuition is that a 
listener's ability to notice these complex musical devices is an intellectual exercise, and 
carries an intellectual enjoyment. Retrograde inversion is simply not 
phenomenologically salient to a listener's experience of the music. While I have strong 
doubts about the relevance of retrograde inversion or sonata form being 
phenomenologically salient, I would be happy to be proved wrong-that is, I would 
accept that retrograde inversion could be a musical quality that should be part of the 
representational content of a listener's perceptual experience if it could be shown that 
melodic inversion does make the appropriate phenomenological difference to the 
listener's experience. 
20 See Kivy (1990), Levinson (1997) and Scruton (1983). 
66 
4.4 An A Priori Argument for Strong Intentionalism? 
Before leaving this topic, however, I wonder if an argument for strong intentionalism 
for musical experience can be made on different grounds. The argument that DeBellis 
gives for defending strong intentionalism relies on his being able to offer an account of 
the contents of musical experience that can explain the phenomenological differences 
between two seemingly identical representational states, as in the tritone case. But 
perhaps a reason for favouring strong intentionalism could be found that does not rely 
on our ability to handle those `puzzle cases'. 
Our motivation in this dissertation for examining the contents of musical experience 
were to find if there is some basis in perceptual experience that holds in common 
between trained and untrained listeners that would ground musical understanding-to 
determine whether the phenomenological claim for musical understanding is correct. 
To remind the reader, the phenomenological claim states that musical understanding is 
based on the phenomenology of the perceptual experience such that, for a listener to 
understand a piece of music, all they need attend to is the phenomenal character of their 
perceptual experience-they must attend to the way in which the music sounds to them. 
It is their experience of the music that the listener wishes to understand, and they 
attempt to do so by attending to the phenomenology of their perceptual experience. 
Indeed, this is the only resource that the untrained listener has at their disposal, lacking 
any specific musical knowledge. However, the important point of the 
phenomenological claim is that the untrained listener's lacking any musical training 
does not put them at a disadvantage as the way that the music sounds is common ground 
to all who possess the right perceptual sensitivity. This would be a wholly unintelligible 
way of proceeding unless it were thought that the phenomenal quality of perceptual 
experience was tied to how the music is in some law-like way-that is, it would be an 
unintelligible way of proceeding unless one believed that a listener's musical experience 
has that particular phenomenological quality specifically because it is that very 
sequence of notes that the listener hears in the music. If the music consisted of some 
other sequence of notes, then the experience would feel differently. 21 
Now, the weak intentionalist's claim is that the phenomenal quality of perceptual 
21 This would seem to imply some kind of inferential account of musical understanding where the 
listener infers facts about how the music is from the way that their perceptual experience feels. Though I 
am doubtful of the possibility of such inferential accounts succeeding-indeed, I will later argue that the 
phenomenological claim fails partly because it relies on this inferential point-I ask the reader to grant 
this for the moment. 
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experience is not tied to what it is an experience of-that is, there is more to the 
phenomenal quality of experience than can be given by a complete description of the 
intentionality of the perceptual state. But there seems to be an incompatibility between 
this and the phenomenological claim. On the view of musical understanding we are 
considering, a listener comes to know something about the music, or understand 
something about the music, by attending to the phenomenology of their experience. 
Thus the counterfactual assertion above-that if the music consisted of some other 
sequence of notes, the experience would feel differently-seems to be all we need to 
have a fully intentionalistic account of the contents of musical experience. I will 
explain. If the intentional content of a listener's musical experience can be fully 
captured by some kind of musical graph as DeBellis argues, and if the phenomenology 
of the perceptual experience feels the way that it is because it is that very sequence of 
notes that the listener hears, then the phenomenology of the perceptual experience just is 
what the musical graph describes. Remember that the musical graph that DeBellis 
describes is meant to capture the way in which the listener hears the music as being-if 
the music had sounded some other way to the listener, then the content of the graph 
would have been different. If the phenomenology of the perceptual experience is 
thought to be a good guide to understanding the music (the phenomenological claim) 
and this way that the music is experienced can be captured in a musical graph 
(DeBellis' claim), then what more would be needed to defend strong intentionalism? 
This argument, however, does not work as it gets the theoretical dependence 
backwards. The reason why the phenomenological claim seems so intuitively appealing 
only is because we have an independent means of rejecting weak intentionalism. We 
cannot take the acceptance of the phenomenological claim for musical understanding as 
being prior to our rejection of weak intentionalism. Some one who holds a weak 
intentionalist theory of content would not accept the phenomenological claim as the 
weak intentionalist holds that the phenomenology of experience is a property of a 
mental state, not a property of the music. The phenomenological claim cannot provide 
an a priori argument for the rejection of weak intentionalism, rather it is only by the 
rejection of weak intentionalism that the phenomenological claim becomes plausible. 




In this chapter, I examined DeBellis' defence of strong intentionalism. He argues that 
music-analytic theories such as GTTM or Schenkerian analysis could provide a 
satisfactory account of the contents of musical experience. His claim is that the content 
of musical experience corresponds to some music-analytic graph. The content of a 
listener's musical experience represents certain properties and relations as holding 
between individual sound-events heard in auditory experience. Some of these relations 
cannot be specified at the `surface level' of auditory experience; rather they require the 
postulation of a `deep structure'. An important feature of DeBellis' overall 
intentionalistic account of musical experience is his claim that the contents of musical 
experience are nonconceptual. DeBellis needs this claim in order to explain how it is 
that an untrained listener might represent musical events as having certain properties or 
as standing in certain relations to other musical events even though the listener lacks 
any conceptual understanding of these properties and relations. However, before 
reviewing DeBellis' argument for this, it would be helpful to say something about what 
nonconceptual content is. In the next chapter I will look at the notion of nonconceptual 
content and its role in the intentional theory of perception. In Chapter Six I will offer 
one constraint on the application of nonconceptual content. In Chapters Eight and Nine 




CONCEPTS, CONCEPTUAL ABILITIES AND 
THE CLAIMS OF NONCONCEPTUALISM 
DeBellis argues that the contents of musical experience are nonconceptual. ' This fits 
into his overall goal of explaining musical understanding in this way: the contents of 
musical experience capture the way in which a listener hears a piece of music; these 
contents can be expressed in music-theoretic terms; however there is no constraint on 
the listener that she must possess a music-theoretic understanding of these concepts in 
order for her to be in a mental state with a certain content. A listener may hear a 
musical phrase as a perfect cadence even though she does not possess the concept 
perfect cadence. For DeBellis, experiencing the music as being a certain way is all that 
there is to understanding it, therefore DeBellis must accept some version of 
nonconceptualism if these contents are meant to be available to untrained listeners. We 
should therefore review the notion of nonconceptual content. 
In this chapter I will examine the standard positions that theorists take in this debate 
regarding concepts, will offer my own theoretical commitments in this area and will 
offer a quick sketch of the notion of nonconceptual content. Tom Crowther has 
suggested that the debate over nonconceptual content can actually be seen as two 
separate debates-one about whether contents are composed of concepts and the other 
about whether the attribution of some representational states to a subject requires that 
that subject possess the concepts that constitute that content. Following from this, I will 
argue that the debate over the attribution of nonconceptual representational contents 
turns on whether some content-bearing mental state requires that the subject possess a 
certain conceptual ability in order for the subject to be in that representational state. 
Next, I will argue that the possession of a conceptual ability is independent of the 
possession of linguistic abilities. Finally, I will turn to the debate over nonconceptual 
content and offer three possible ways of understanding this debate. The notion of 
DeBellis (1991), (1995), (1999), (2002) and (2005). The notion of nonconceptual content is quite 
widely debated. For some other defences of nonconceptual content, see Bermudez (2003b); Bermudez 
and Macpherson (1998); Crane (1992b), (2003); Cussins (2003); Evans (1982); Kelly (2001 b); Martin 
(2003); Peacocke (1992a), (2001); Stalnaker (2003); and Tye (1995). For criticisms of nonconceptual 
content, see Brewer (1999); McDowell (1994), (1998a); and Sedivy (1996). 
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nonconceptual content that I think is most interesting in the debate over perceptual 
contents is the notion of content that characterises the conscious level of experience for 
a subject that does not require the subject's possession of any conceptual abilities. I 
will contrast this notion of nonconceptual content with the other alternatives and show 
why this is the notion of nonconceptual content that is most pressing in debates over 
perceptual contents. 
5.1 Crowther's Distinction 
In his Ph. D. dissertation, Tom Crowther noted that within the debate over perceptual 
contents, there seem to be two competing notions of how some content may be 
nonconceptual. 2 On some accounts, the debate over nonconceptual content is a debate 
about the ontological status of contents-whether they are constituted out of concepts. 
For some content to be conceptual in this way would be for that content to be 
constituted entirely of concepts, as in the case of Fregean Thoughts, for instance; 
whereas to be nonconceptual would be for that content to not be constituted of concepts, 
as in the case of Russellian propositions. Some content is compositionally 
nonconceptual if it is not fully constituted of concepts. ' 
Alternatively, one could view the debate over nonconceptual content as a debate over 
whether a subject needs to possess a certain psychological capacity in order to be in a 
mental state with a certain content. When the debate is understood in these terms, then 
it is a debate over whether the attribution of some content-bearing mental state requires 
that the subject possess some kind of conceptual ability. For instance, the subject may 
require the possession of a conceptual ability to recognise dogs in order for the subject 
to be attributed the thought `that is a dog'. This debate centres on whether some 
contentful mental states that a subject can be in do require some kind of conceptual 
abilities and other contentful mental states that do not. The question here is what sort of 
psychological abilities must be required of a subject in order for them to be attributed a 
contentful mental state of some kind. Within this debate, some content is attributionally 
nonconceptual if a subject can be in a mental state that represents some content without 
requiring that the subject possess some conceptual ability for the representation of that 
2 Crowther (2001). 
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content. 4 
This distinction between compositional and attributional arguments for 
nonconceptual content was developed in Tom Crowther's Ph. D. dissertation. There he 
argues that these two notions of nonconceptual content can be bracketed off such that 
one could claim, for instance, that contents are compositionally nonconceptual and yet 
also hold that they are attributionally conceptual. Whether contents are compositionally 
nonconceptual and whether mental states are attributionally nonconceptual are two 
separate debates that are characterised by different problems and concerns. The debate 
over compositionality is mainly concerned with what is meant by `concepts'; and while 
this question will clearly play some role in the debate over content attributions, the real 
concern here is what is meant by `conceptual abilities', or what is to count as a 
conceptual ability. 
To get a better view of the debate over the compositionality of contents, we could 
examine the distinction between Fregean and Russellian contents. As discussed 
previously in Chapter Two, representational contents are mental entities-referring is 
something that a mind does. There is a question of how the mind refers, or what the 
mental act of referring consists of, and this is where disagreement about the 
compositionality of contents begins. It begins with a question about whether the mind 
puts us in direct contact with the objects and properties of the external world that are the 
objects of our mental acts, or whether the contents of a mental act are some sort of 
abstract entities that stand for the objects and properties of the external world. The 
Russellian view of contents holds that a content is a proposition that has as its 
constituents the very objects and properties that are the content of the mental act. So, 
the thought that `the cat is black' has as its constituents both the cat and the property 
blackness. 
In opposition to this, the Fregean view of contents holds that a mental content grasps 
a Thought. Thoughts have as their constituents concepts-senses or modes of 
presentation, which pick out some way for the world to be. These could be thought of 
as individuated intensionally. A classical Fregean would hold that a Thought is an 
abstract entity that exists independently of its being the object of a mental act; neo- 
Fregeans, on the other hand, would reject Frege's Platonic view of Thoughts opting 
Evans is often ambiguous about whether it is contents that are nonconceptual or mental states. Evans 
seems to claim that nonconceptual contents are compositionally different from conceptual contents in his 
(1982): 227. 
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instead to claim that a Thought is a property of a mental state to refer to objects and 
properties of the external worlds I believe that the difference between classical Fregean 
and neo-Fregean view of Thoughts is reflected in the general distinction between the 
compositionality of contents and the attribution of contents. For a classical Fregean it 
matters what Thoughts-as-abstracta are composed of-if contents were thought to be 
compositionally nonconceptual, then the classical Fregean would worry that Thoughts 
are not composed of Fregean senses. The neo-Fregean, on the other hand, may set this 
worry aside. If Thoughts are properties of mental states, then the neo-Fregean should 
not worry about what Thoughts are composed of, simply because properties are not 
composed of anything. The neo-Fregean's claim would simply be that some contentful 
mental state is conceptual if it is required of the subject that they must possess some 
conceptual capacity in order to be in a mental state with that content. And this is just 
what the debate about the attribution of nonconceptual contents is concerned with. I 
will now briefly review the standard Fregean view of concepts before considering a 
neo-Fregean view of conceptual abilities. 
There is a fundamental distinction between Russellian contents that are thought to be 
composed of objects and properties of the external world and Fregean contents that are 
composed of concepts-'6 The standard view of concepts follows in the service of the 
(classical) Fregean view of contents. This view of concepts is that a concept is an 
abstract entity that can be the constituent of a Fregean Thought (which I will discuss 
further in the next section). On the classical Fregean view, if a subject believes that 
`snow is white', that person grasps a Thought, which is an abstract entity that is either 
true or false and is composed of concepts. The belief that `Snow is white' includes the 
concepts snow and white as constituents of that belief. On Russell's view, on the other 
hand, contents are not composed of concepts, rather they are constituted by the objects 
and properties that they represent. One might then argue that Russellian contents are 
compositionally nonconceptual, meaning that they are not composed of concepts, while 
See, for instance, Crane (2001): §45; McDowell (1994); and Stalnaker (2003). 
1 owe much of this and the following discussion to Keith Hossack. 
6 This contrast between Russellian and Fregean contents is not meant as an exhaustive account of 
contents, but rather as an illustration of a general distinction between theories of contents. Other theories 
of contents hold that contents are composed of sets of possible worlds, while still others hold that 
indexical contents may form yet another type of content. The distinction that I am pointing to would 
quantify over these theories of contents as, on the one hand, possible world's theories would be 
compositionally nonconceptual like the Russellian view, while on the other hand indexicality would need 
to be accounted for on any theory of content. For more on general theories of content, see Siegel (2005). 
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Fregean contents are. 7 
This, however, is orthogonal to DeBellis' discussion. DeBellis' claim that the 
contents of musical perception are nonconceptual would best be understood as part of 
the attributional debate. His argument (broadly) is that a subject does not need to 
possess any music-theoretic concepts in order to be in a mental state with a certain 
musical content. To put this argument in the language of the compositional- 
attributional distinction, we must read this as the claim that a subject does not need to 
possess any music-theoretic conceptual abilities. DeBellis seems unconcerned about the 
compositionality of mental states. Rather he is concerned about whether a subject needs 
to possess a certain psychological capacity in order to be in a mental state with a certain 
content. Indeed, DeBellis defines a concept as a `certain psychological capacity, an 
ability to have beliefs (and thoughts generally) in which one grasps a particular mode of 
presentation'. 8 It seems clear that DeBellis is making an attributional argument about 
the contents of musical perception. 
My discussion of arguments for nonconceptual contents in the following chapters 
will then be concerned with how contents can be attributionally nonconceptual. I will 
have little to say about compositional questions about contents. In this chapter I will 
first try to make explicit the contrast between concepts and conceptual abilities that I 
think underwrites the compositional-attributional distinction. I will start by giving a 
standard account of what concepts are, and from this vantage point will offer a 
suggestion for how we should think about conceptual abilities. As said above, the 
central question in the attributional debate is to decide what is to count as a conceptual 
ability. 
5.2 Concepts 
If contents can be nonconceptual, then it would be helpful to know what is meant by 
`concept' such that some content can seemingly lack this. On neo-Fregean accounts, 
concepts are abilities to think certain thoughts such that, if a subject has the belief or 
' Incidentally, one could similarly claim that the possible worlds view of contents is compositionally 
nonconceptual-possible worlds are simply not constituted by concepts. For a discussion of the 
constitutive elements of possible worlds contents, see Lewis (1986) and Stalnaker (1984). 
8 DeBellis (1995): 32. 
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makes the judgment that x is F, then typically they must possess the concept for F. 9 A 
subject who possesses the concept F should then be able to employ this concept in a 
wide variety of thoughts about F. A subject should be able to think that a is F, that b is 
F, and perhaps even that c is not-F. 1° It has been argued by some that a subject cannot 
be thought to possess a concept unless some degree of generality can be shown to hold 
for their use of that concept, which is what Evans calls the Generality Constraint: `if a 
subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual 
resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of 
which he has a conception'. " Insofar as two beliefs have the same truth value, those 
beliefs must employ the same concepts. 
Concepts can then be individuated in terms of their cognitive value. The common 
Fregean way of putting this thought is to say that, if it is possible to know that a is F 
while also doubting that b is F, then a and b do not have the same cognitive value, thus 
a and b would be different concepts. So, for instance, if a subject uses two words to 
refer to the same thing-as when a subject understands that the names `Cicero' and 
`Tully' refer to the same person-then the subject will not acquire any new piece of 
information if the name `Cicero' is used in a sentence to replace the name `Tully'. If I 
were to say, `Cicero likes ice cream, and Tully does, too, ' then the subject who 
understands that `Cicero' and `Tully' refer to the same person will believe that I have 
uttered nonsense-in effect, the subject would understand me as having said that `a 
likes F and a likes F, too'. On the other hand, a subject who does not know that 
`Cicero' and `Tully' refer to the same person would think that I have said something 
informative-they would have believed themselves to have learned that something 
holds in common between Cicero and Tully. 
The debate over the compositionality of contents would then be concerned to show 
whether or not some mental state must have concepts as its constituents. However, as 
9 See for instance Evans (1982); Geach (1957) and Peacocke (1992a). The reader will notice that it is 
here that the standard account starts to slide from a question of compositionality to attribution. 
`Possessing a concept' may be read as having a certain conceptual ability. 
10 There is some debate over whether the possession of a concept necessarily entails the understanding 
of that concept's negation. While I do not have the space to examine this debate in any detail, I will 
assume that the possession of the concept F does entail some understanding of the negation of this 
concept in that a subject should, on the basis of possessing F, be capable of thinking, in regard to F, that 
some object x fails to be F. Cf. Geach (1957): §7. 
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suggested above, the compositionality of contents is a different issue from the 
attribution of contents. The question of whether some content is composed of concepts 
or not is independent of whether or not a subject must possess some conceptual ability 
in order for that subject to be in a mental state with that content. Consider the thought 
that `snow is white'. In order for a subject to believe that snow is white they must 
possess the ability to think that snow is white, and this is a requirement that is 
independent of whether or not the content of this mental state should be described as a 
relation to a (conceptually composed) Fregean Thought or a (nonconceptually 
composed) Russellian proposition. Before we can consider what it would mean for 
some content to be attributionally nonconceptual, we should consider what is meant by 
a `conceptual ability'. I will return to the attributional arguments for nonconceptual 
content in the following chapter. 
5.3 Are Conceptual Abilities Linked with Linguistic Abilities? 
Some philosophers claim that conceptual abilities are closely linked with linguistic 
abilities. Consider a claim that Bermudez argues for, which he calls the Priority Thesis: 
`conceptual abilities are constitutively linked with linguistic abilities in such a way that 
conceptual abilities cannot be possessed by non-linguistic creatures'. 12 This could 
either mean that what it is to have mastered the use of a particular concept is exhausted 
by mastering the use of a particular linguistic term, or it could mean that the possession 
of some linguistic ability is an essential condition of the mastery of some concept. 13 His 
reason for accepting this thesis is that one thing that concept-using creatures are (in 
principle) able to do is to provide justifications for inferential transitions used in 
thought, but, he claims, the ability to provide such justifications is a paradigmatically 
linguistic ability. 14 Creatures that lack any ability to think propositional thoughts, and 
therefore lack the ability to provide justifications for inferential transitions, must also 
" Evans (1982): 104. Failure to meet this constraint may still result in the subject's being in a mental 
state with content, however whatever content this mental state might be said to express does not, on 
Evans' view, amount to the subject's being in a belief state, where to have a belief is dependent upon 
having concepts. Rather than having a belief, the subject might be described as possessing `tacit 
knowledge'. See Evans (1981) for more on the distinction between belief and tacit knowledge. 
'' See Bermudez and Macpherson (1998): §7; see also Bermudez (1998), (2003a) and (2003c). The 
Priority Thesis is a general principle linking conceptual abilities with language possession, which may be 
formulated in ways differently than Bermudez and Macpherson formulate it. Philosophers who do link 
conceptual abilities with language possession will accept some version of the Priority Thesis. 
13 Cf. Bermudez (2003b): § 1.4. 
14 See Bermudez and Macpherson (1998). 
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lack concepts. McDowell also defends a very strong link between conceptual abilities 
and language possession in his (1994). As he says: `It is essential to conceptual 
capacities ... that they can be exploited 
in active thinking, thinking that is open to 
reflection about its own rational credentials'. 15 
Why should we accept this link between conceptual abilities and linguistic abilities? 
While some philosophers do accept this strongly linguistic notion of conceptual 
abilities, I find that when taken in this way the debate over nonconceptual content 
becomes rather uninformative. If conceptual abilities are understood in this largely 
linguistic way, then the claim that the contents of perceptual experience are 
nonconceptual is just the claim that these contents are not linguistic. And this is 
unsurprising-subjects are not required to possess linguistic abilities in order to be in a 
certain contentful mental state because perceiving is not a linguistic activity. It would 
be more interesting and informative if it could be shown that the contents of perceptual 
experience are nonconceptual in a more robust sense, one where the notion of a 
conceptual ability is not so limited. While no right-minded philosopher would deny that 
there is some link between linguistic abilities and conceptual abilities, on my view 
conceptual abilities need not be linked with linguistic abilities. A subject's possession 
of a linguistic ability surely counts as strong (indeed, undeniable) evidence for that 
subject's possession of some conceptual ability, but we should resist the thought that a 
subject's lack of a linguistic ability should count as evidence for their lack of a 
conceptual ability. That is surely too strong. As Margolis and Laurence point out, there 
are more kinds of concepts than just the lexical concepts. 16 The Priority Thesis bothers 
me, so I will spend a bit more time on it here. I will briefly examine two possible 
interpretations of the Priority Thesis-offering both a strong and a weak 
interpretation-and will provide reasons for rejecting both. 
On a strong interpretation of the Priority Thesis, to have a conceptual ability is 
essentially to have the use of a word in a language. 17 But this would just be too strong 
as there must surely be some content-bearing states of mind that subjects can be in that 
require the subject's possession of a conceptual ability but does not require the 
possession of a linguistic ability. Consider, for example, the sort of non-linguistic 
conceptual abilities that seem to be demonstrated by a subject's skill in spatial 
15 McDowell (1994): 47. See also Crane's criticisms of this strong view in his (2001): 153-154. 
16 Margolis and Laurence (1999b). See also their (2005) for an overview of the debates surrounding 
concepts. 
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reasoning. The sort of mental abilities that a subject must employ in order to place, say, 
differently shaped blocks into their appropriately shaped slots can be demonstrated by 
children at an age where the reasoning process required for this task greatly outstrips 
their possession of linguistic skills. 18 If spatial reasoning is truly a case of reasoning, 
rather than simply a misnomer, then it must be conceptual. And yet there do not seem 
to be any specifically linguistic abilities that a subject must possess in order to be 
attributed spatial reasoning skills. If spatial reasoning is conceptual, then, again, the 
conceptual abilities employed in spatial reasoning must be available to a subject non- 
linguistically. If this is correct, then the strong interpretation of the Priority Thesis 
cannot be right as there must be some sort of conceptual abilities that do not require 
language. ' 9 
Another case of a subject's possession of some non-linguistic conceptual ability that 
we might consider would be a musician's ability to perform a piece of music. Musical 
performances are certainly highly refined skills that require much physical dexterity and 
years of training. But they are also very intellectual feats. Throughout a performance, 
musicians are faced with many choices and decisions-on how to interpret a certain 
melody in order to anticipate a modulation, or how to articulate a melody, or exactly 
how to time a rhythm to achieve the greatest effect. Performance requires much 
thought, planning and deliberation. These are decisions that a musician must often 
make while performing `in the moment', as it were. Musicians often describe what they 
are thinking as simply `hearing in my head what I ought to do', and the options 
available to a musician will be limited by what has come before. Crucially, these are 
very thoughtful activities, but musicians do not think in language. It is not necessary to 
formulate a decision in a linguistic expression before one translates it into the action of 
performing. Indeed, the sort of decisions that musicians make appear to be 
'7 This appears to be the interpretation that Bermudez favours. See his (1998) and footnote 3 below. 
18 For an opposing view, see Bermudez (1998) and (2003a). Also, there is an objection lingering here 
that spatial reasoning is simply a case of knowing how, where what is required for some conceptual 
ability is knowing that. I will consider this objection shortly. 
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untranslatable into language. If musical thinking were to count as conceptual thought, 
then clearly thought of this kind must require the subject's possession of conceptual 
abilities that are not exhausted by or reducible to some linguistic ability. 20 
A weaker interpretation of the Priority Thesis might hold that only creatures that are 
capable of possessing linguistic abilities are capable of possessing conceptual abilities. 
On this view, spatial reasoning could well be a conceptual ability, but it is one that only 
a linguistically able creature could have. This still seems unfounded. Consider the case 
where two creatures are able to do similar things, where one creature is a language-user, 
call her L, and the other creature is not, call it N. If L and N are both able to do x, and 
L's ability to do x would normally count as evidence for L's possession of a conceptual 
ability for doing X, then why should we think that N's ability to do exactly the same 
thing, x, does not count as evidence for N's possession of X (or some conceptual ability 
like X) as well? Some animals can exhibit rudimentary forms of spatial reasoning. If 
some kind of conceptual ability is required to explain spatial reasoning for language- 
using subjects, where this is a distinctly non-linguistic conceptual ability, then why 
should we think that a non-language-using creature's spatial reasoning abilities would 
require some different explanation? Sameness of ability must act as evidence for 
sameness of kind of thought. 21 
The question is, in what cases should conceptual abilities be attributed? If we accept 
19 Similarly Crane (2001: 153) argues that a strong conception of the link between concepts and language 
would seem to deny any sort of rational thought to non-linguistic creatures. While I think this is right, 
and while I too think that this would be a reason to reject a strong conception, I find it more worrying that 
such a conception could not account for the sort of non-linguistic thought exhibited by subjects engaged 
in spatial reasoning. Someone who was moved by the thought that we must account for the rational skills 
of non-linguistic creatures should equally be moved by the thought that we should also seek to account 
for the non-linguistic skills of language-using creatures as being within the scope of rational thought. 
Furthermore, even if one disagreed with Crane's assumption that non-linguistic creatures have rational 
thoughts-one would still need to account for spatial reasoning in a way that does put it within the scope 
of rationality. Also, certain passages from Geach (1957) suggest that he too would have rejected the 
strong interpretation of the Priority Thesis. See for instance §§5,7 and 11. 
20 For more on what musical thought might consist of, see my (2006). 
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that the possession of some conceptual abilities are independent of a subject's 
possession of an accompanying linguistic ability, then this seems to open the door for 
non-language-users to be concept-users. Language-users are able to demonstrate 
abilities to perform actions ranging from the simple to the extraordinarily complex- 
from simple instances of spatial reasoning to performing Stravinsky's Rite of Spring. 
As argued above, some of these abilities seem to require thought, planning and 
deliberation, and this seems to require that the subject possess some (non-linguistic) 
conceptual ability. If a language-user's demonstration of some ability were to count as 
evidence for their possession of some non-linguistic conceptual ability, then what are 
we to say about non-language-using creatures that may be able to demonstrate the same 
abilities? Clearly a creature's possession of some language certainly is the best 
evidence for that creature's being a concept-user, but it cannot be enough to say that 
some creature is not a concept-user simply because they lack a language. 
Perhaps it would be objected that the cases I am describing are simply cases of 
`knowing how' versus `knowing that'. 22 While my ability to demonstrate spatial 
reasoning might act as evidence for my possession of some conceptual ability-as my 
behaviour demonstrates a knowledge that can be expressed and justified in propositional 
thought-then I can be said to `know that ... ' while an animal's spatial reasoning skills 
simply affords them some knowledge-how. Gilbert Ryle formulated the knowing how- 
knowing that distinction to argue against what he referred to as the `intellectualist 
legend'. Ryle's objection is that when a subject does something skilful, they do not do 
two things the physical act of executing the skill and a mental act of deliberation. As 
Ryle says, "`thinking what I am doing" does not connote "both thinking what to do and 
doing it"'. 23 
21 Of course, this would not be to argue that L and N could be attributed the possession of the same 
conceptual ability. For, if L's possession of the ability to do x is accompanied by some linguistic ability, 
then to that extent it may be arguable that L and N do not possess the same conceptual ability, or perhaps 
do not possess the conceptual ability to the same degree. In addition, perhaps N's ability to do x also does 
not allow N to make certain inferences that L is able to make. Either way, what is important is that there 
is, at the very bottom, some conceptual ability that is common to both subjects which is evidenced by 
their ability to do x. Geach (1957) seems to think that conceptual abilities are tied to linguistic abilities, 
but that they cannot be possessed by degrees. Rather, as he says, `a man who can do different things with 
his concept has a concept that is to that extent different from the other fellow's' (36). So if a language- 
user's ability to do x is accompanied by a linguistic ability and a non-language-user's ability to do x is 
not, then on Geach's account, to that extent these subjects must possess different conceptual abilities. 
The important point, however, is that if L's ability to do x counts as evidence for her possession of a non- 
linguistic conceptual ability, then there should be no reason in principle why non-linguistic creatures 
could not also possess non-linguistic conceptual abilities. 
22 On the distinction between knowing how and knowing that, see Ryle (1949), Ch. 2. 
'3 Ryle (1949): 32. 
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However, Ryle was not concerned with what it is to possess a conceptual ability. 
Rather, Ryle's use of the knowing how-knowing that distinction was to argue against 
the thought that some propositional knowledge could be attributed to a subject on the 
basis of their knowing how to do something. Ryle attempted to draw a distinction 
between the demonstration of the possession of some propositional knowledge and what 
could be called `practical knowledge'. Someone who knows how to ride a bicycle may 
possess some knowledge-how-specifically how to ride a bicycle-but, as Ryle argued, 
the possession of this knowledge-how does not afford the subject any sort of 
knowledge-that, which is just to say that there is no propositional knowledge that a 
subject has just by virtue of their knowing how to do something. This may be true-I 
do not wish to question it here-but Ryle's argument itself does not show that 
conceptual abilities are restricted to cases of knowing that. If one wanted to use Ryle's 
argument to show this, then one would have to accept the strong interpretation of the 
Priority Thesis: if one accepted the claim that conceptual abilities are strongly linked 
with linguistic abilities, then there would be no need to attribute conceptual abilities to 
subjects that possess some knowledge-how. The reason being that the knowing how- 
knowing that distinction claims that a subject who knows how without knowing that 
does not thereby possess any propositional knowledge; on the strong interpretation of 
the Priority Thesis, conceptual abilities may only be exercised in propositional thought; 
therefore a subject who knows how without knowing that does not do anything 
conceptual. If only propositional thought is conceptual, and knowing how is not a case 
of propositional thought, then knowing how is not a case of conceptual thought. So 
there would be no need to attribute any conceptual abilities to a subject in order to 
account for their knowledge-how. 24 But I have already given reasons above for 
rejecting the strong interpretation of the Priority Thesis. Unless one accepts the strong 
view of the Priority Thesis, the knowing how-knowing that distinction does not show 
anything about the possession of conceptual abilities. 
Once we reject the strong interpretation, then we are open to question whether a 
subject's knowing how indeed is sufficient for that subject to be attributed the 
possession of some (non-linguistic) conceptual ability. I would suggest that we can: a 
subject's knowing how to do something might be described as a very complex ability 
that would need to tie in many different sorts of abilities, some recognitional and some 
24 Whether Ryle held this view or not is not my concern here, however I have found no textual evidence 
to support this. 
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practical, and that we should think of this very complex network of abilities as itself 
being a conceptual ability. 
5.4 Conceptual Abilities 
So, what is a conceptual ability on this view? By widening the scope of conceptual 
abilities to allow for subjects to possess these non-linguistically, we can account for 
those abilities that a subject may demonstrate that seem to require some thought, 
reasoning or judgment though that subject lacks any special linguistic ability associated 
with these cognitive tasks. Tim Crane also defends a non-linguistic account of 
concepts, about which he says, 
To have a concept, on this view, depends on the kinds of recognitional, inferential, and other 
capacities one can exercise in one's thinking. Not all these capacities depend on one's mastery of 
a language. The suggestion is that one could have, for example, a capacity for recognising a 
certain kind of animal X, and this capacity is something one also employs in reasoning about 
animals about this kind. One need not have a word for the kind of animal in question, but one has 
enough of an idea of what the thing is to qualify as having a concept of X. 25 
A conceptual ability is a power to think thoughts of a certain kind. To borrow a 
definition from Crane, on this view, a conceptual ability is a `recognitional or inferential 
ability that a subject can exercise in thought-). 26 These may be constituted of a complex 
network of other inferential or recognitional abilities that the subject may also possess. 
A conceptual ability is a specific set of inferential or recognitional abilities that act 
together and are exercised in thinking thoughts of a certain kind. The ability to think 
the thought that `snow is white' requires a conceptual ability for the thinking of 
thoughts about snow and about whiteness. Conceptual abilities can be individuated by 
slightly modifying the standard account-the conceptual abilities F and G are identical 
if any thought the thinking of which requires the conceptual ability F can be replaced by 
the conceptual ability G with no loss of cognitive value. More specifically, conceptual 
abilities would be individuated by referring to the sort of inferences or recognitional 
abilities that the subject is able to demonstrate using that ability. One way of 
illustrating what would be considered a conceptual ability on my view would be to 
examine what constitutes a real case of knowing how. Our discussion of the knowing 
how-knowing that distinction is instructive-one kind of conceptual ability would be 
25 Crane (2001): 153. 
'° Cf. Crane (2001): 153. 
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the sort of things that a subject must be able to do in order to be attributed a case of 
knowing how. I will explain. 
It seems reasonable to me that knowing how to x requires an additional piece of 
knowledge, namely knowing when to x, or put it another way, knowing how to x 
requires knowing when doing x is appropriate for the situation-it requires knowing 
that `now is a good time to x', or `now is the appropriate time to x'. Think of it this 
way: we would not attribute to a subject any sense of knowing how to x if they simply 
did x all the time, indiscriminately, like the way a small child always says 'No'. 
Though the child's actions might sometimes succeed-sometimes the child is in the 
right situation where `No' is the correct answer-we would think that such success was 
merely accidental. We would not ascribe to the child any real sense of knowing how to 
use the word `No' on this basis. 
Attributing knowledge-how to a subject requires attributing to them a tacit 
understanding of knowledge-when. The child knows how to use the word `No' only if 
they know when the use of the word is appropriate. At least part of what it is for a child 
to be attributed some understanding of the use of `No' must be for them to recognise 
when they are in a situation where saying `No' is within the range of actions appropriate 
for the situation. For a child to know how to use `No' must require their knowing when 
`No' is appropriate, and this must in turn require their knowing that they are in the 
appropriate situation. 2 And the important point about knowing when is that these have 
correctness conditions. 28 In order to be attributed a real case of knowing when, the 
subject must understand the conditions of correctness or appropriateness of their action. 
For this reason, it would seem that knowing when must require that the subject possess 
some recognitional capacity for these situations. My point is that the sort of thing that 
constitutes knowing when is just what constitutes one kind of conceptual ability. 
Ryle offers the example of a parrot that has learned to utter a certain phrase. That 
phrase when uttered at the right moment might be quite humorous. When a person 
makes this utterance in the right moment and their use of the utterance is humorous, we 
may ascribe to that person a sense of humour, but were the parrot to make the same 
utterance, even in the right situation, we would not attribute to the parrot a sense of 
27 However, the child who has learned to use `No' in this way could not be attributed understanding that 
`No' means No-the child may not know what `No' means. Perhaps it may be the case that the child has 
learned to recognise that they are being asked a question, and that such circumstances are the appropriate 
times where one might say `No', but this does not show that the child has learned the use of `No'. 
Knowing that 'No' means No requires something more. 
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humour. 29 Of course this is right, but importantly we would not attribute a sense of 
humour to the parrot because it does not know when-the parrot lacks the ability to 
recognise when it would be appropriate to make the utterance. We attribute a sense of 
humour to the person who uses the utterance because their use of the utterance in the 
right moment acts as evidence for their being witty. Unfortunately for Ryle, it does 
look like an intelligent agent does two things: they make a judgment of the 
appropriateness of their actions and then execute the action. Both the parrot that has 
learned to utter a phrase and the child that indiscriminately says `No' have learned to do 
something-they have learned how to make an utterance, which is just to say that they 
have learned how to execute an action-but they have not learned how to use the 
utterance. It is this further knowledge that must be required if the child (or the parrot) 
is to be attributed with a real case of knowing how. 
This way of characterising conceptual abilities then gives us a way of understanding 
how contents can be nonconceptual in this sense. Some mental state is (attributionally) 
conceptual if a subject cannot be in an intentional state of a certain kind unless they 
possess some conceptual ability that characterises the content of that mental state. On 
the other hand, some mental state is nonconceptual if a subject can be attributed an 
intentional state of a certain kind that does not require the subject's possession of any 
special conceptual ability. Applying this to the case of colour perception, the claim 
would be that there are no specific inferential or recognitional abilities that a subject 
must possess in order to be in a mental state that represents some object as being some 
specific shade of colour. The debate over nonconceptual content becomes an interesting 
and substantive debate when one understands concepts as the sort of non-linguistic 
recognitional abilities that I have described above. It is a debate about what is required 
in order to be in a certain content-bearing mental state that is, whether a subject must 
possess some non-linguistic conceptual ability in order to be attributed some contentful 
mental state. 
One thing to notice about the attributional debate is that this is a debate about 
whether being in a certain representational state requires that the subject possess some 
special conceptual ability. We might interchangeable describe these as states with 
nonconceptual content or as nonconceptual mental states. As Crane says, the distinction 
between conceptual and nonconceptual really is `a distinction between kinds of 
28 1 owe this suggestion to Era Gavrielides. 
Ryle (1949): 33. 
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intentional states or acts'. 30 A conceptual mental state is one where a certain 
(conceptual) condition must be fulfilled in order for a subject to be in that mental state, 
whereas nonconceptual mental states carry no such restrictions. These nonconceptual 
mental states are representational states-mental states having a representational 
content-so can also be thought of as states with a nonconceptual content. Crane 
comments that the term `nonconceptual content' might fit more naturally in the debate 
over the compositionality of contents, while the term `nonconceptual state' more 
accurately captures the sense in which this is a debate about the attribution of mental 
states. However, Crane does use these terms interchangeable to apply to the 
attributional debate, and I will follow him in this usage. 
5.5 The Claims of Nonconceptualism 
What sort of role can nonconceptual content play in perceptual experience? Existing 
literature makes different sorts of claims on this point. There seem to be three main 
differences in the way that a theorist will argue for nonconceptual content. Some argue 
that contents are nonconceptual only subpersonally; some argue that contents are 
nonconceptual only when they can be contrasted with conceptual contents; and some 
argue that nonconceptual contents are autonomous of conceptual contents. These three 
claims might be seen as differing as to their degree of commitment to 
nonconceptualism, or as describing three independent claims about nonconceptual 
content. As discussed above, Crowther suggests that debate over nonconceptual content 
often gets in a muddle when claims about the compositionality of contents are mistaken 
for claims about the attribution of contents. 31 Similarly, I suggest that this debate can 
also get into a muddle when arguments about one kind of claim are mistaken for 
arguments for some other kind of claim. It may be helpful to distinguish between these 
three distinct claims-in the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to make clear the 
differences between these. 
The first sort of nonconceptualist claim that some philosophers defend is what has 
30 Crane (2001): 152. 
See his (2001): 21-24. 
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been called informational or subpersonal contents. 32 The claim here is that a subject's 
perceptual system can be described as having contents at varying stages along the causal 
process of that system, and that these subpersonal informational states carry content 
nonconceptually. For instance, light splashed across the retina is encoded into a neural 
signal-this neural signal can be described as having informational content. 
Informational contents are contents that hold at the level of the subpersonal operations 
of a subject's perceptual system. These contents are nonconceptual in that there are no 
concepts that the subject must possess in order for their visual system to encode the 
visual information in a neural signal. The second sort of claim of nonconceptual 
content is what I call singular personal contents. On this view, some features of 
experience are represented nonconceptually, but this requires some conceptualisation. 
This is a view that Peacocke once held, though he has since retracted it. 33 The 
distinguishing features of this claim are that a mental state could only have a 
nonconceptual content if the subject is generally able to be in mental states with 
conceptual contents, and that a description of a subject's mental state captures the way 
in which experience is for the subject at a personal level. On the second point, these 
contents describe the conscious level of experience-they are not subpersonal in the 
way that informational contents are. On the first point, it is claimed that it would be 
pointless to describe a creature as being in a mental state with nonconceptual content if 
that creatures is not able to be in mental states with conceptual contents. Only creatures 
that are capable of conceptual thought can be attributed contents on this view. Theorists 
who take this view reject the Autonomy Thesis-the claim that nonconceptual content 
is autonomous of conceptual contents. (I will say more about this shortly. ) It is thought 
that, at the very least, the possession of the first-person concept is required in order to 
be attributed nonconceptual contents. The final claim to consider is what I call the 
claim for autonomous personal contents. Here, the claim is that a subject can be 
attributed being in a purely nonconceptual belief (or belief-like) state, which is in no 
way dependent on the subject's possession of any conceptual ability or conceptual 
contents. Claims of this sort would then be an acceptance of the Autonomy Thesis. 34 
32 Evans (1982). McDowell (1994: 121-123) also seems to accept this when he comments on contents 
that may hold in common between humans and animals. So strictly speaking McDowell does accept 
some kind of nonconceptual content (informational states) but for him all consciously accessible mental 
states must be conceptual, or `within the realm of spontaneity'. 
33 Peacocke held this view in his (1992a). Peacocke retracted this view in his (2003) as a result of 
criticisms made by Berm6de7 (2003c). 
34 See Bermudez (1998), (2003a), (2003b), and (2003c); and Bermudez and Macpherson (1998). 
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Theorists defending this claim also hold that these contents describe the way in which 
experience is for a subject at the conscious level. 
These represent three different kinds of claims about content that the defenders of 
these views all describe as nonconceptual. The main difference between claims about 
singular-personal contents and autonomous-personal contents is that these views differ 
on their acceptance of the Autonomy Thesis. There is one general distinction that can 
be made between claims about informational states on the one hand and claims about 
both the singular-personal and autonomous-personal states on the other: theories of 
nonconceptual content that make claims of the latter sort are thought to be referring to 
the contents of introspectible states. When one reflects introspectively on one's 
perceptual experience, what one finds are the everyday objects that one perceives in the 
world; what one does not find are informational states. So theorists who generally make 
claims about the contents of introspectible states are either making claims of the 
singular-personal kind or autonomous-personal kind. That being the case, it is possible 
to combine a theory of informational contents with either of the other two views. The 
table below illustrates the way in which these views differ. 
Conscious Experience Autonomous 
Informational Contents No Yes 





5.6 The Contents of Informational States 
This is the notion of content that can be ascribed to the operations of a subject's 
perceptual system. The task of, say, a subject's visual system could be described as a 
computational system whereby information about the external world is retrieved and 
encoded into an electro-chemical signal that is then sent to the brain's visual cortex for 
decoding. At various stages within the visual system-between the encoding of 
information that goes on in the eye and the decoding of that information that goes on in 
the visual cortex-the visual system can be described as possessing representational 
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contents. Specifically, the electro-chemical signal could be described as representing 
the objects and properties of the external world that it is the visual system's task to 
make available to the perceiver. If it is the job of the visual system to track certain 
changes in the external world that are visually available to a subject, then it is via these 
informational states that the visual system operates. 
On this model, the content of perception is constituted by an internal informational 
state that represents the world as being a certain way. The question then is, what is an 
informational state? In Evans' writing on this point, what he seems to have in mind 
regarding informational states is a fairly mechanical function that happens somewhere 
early on in the perceptual system: 
A certain mechanism produces things which have a certain informational content.... The 
mechanism is a mechanism of information storage, because the properties that figure in the content 
of its output are (to a degree determined by the accuracy of the mechanism) the properties 
possessed by the objects which are the input to it. And we can say that the product of such a 
mechanism is of the objects that were the input to the mechanism when the product was produced. 
Correspondingly, the output is of those objects with which we have to compare it in order to judge 
the accuracy of the mechanism at the time the output was produced. 35 
For an illustration of such a mechanical informational state, think of the particular 
pattern of electrical signals sent from the eye to the brain when a subject is looking at a 
cherry tree. This electrical signal, with all its intricate fluctuations, stands for or 
represents the visual properties of the tree that the visual system is properly sensitive to. 
If the tree were a different size, shape, or colour-say, if it was a beech-then the signal 
too would differ in proportion to encode the information of looking at a beech. All that 
is needed for this to act as the input to an experiential state is for the signal to be 
decoded in the right way. 
Such content is truth-assessable-'it permits of a non-derivative classification as true 
or false'36-and functions as both the input to the motor system as well as the reasoning 
system. Perceptual experience represents correctly when the products of the 
mechanism-the encoded informational signal-are of the object that serve as input 
when that object is presented to the visual system, which is a causal relation, and when 
the properties of the informational state co-vary with the properties of the object. 
It should be noted, however, that these informational states are not the sort of mental 
intermediaries that would be the objects of direct perceptual awareness on a sense- 
35 Evans (1982): 124-5. 
36 I bid.: 226. 
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datum account of perception. Evans is emphatic that informational states are not the 
direct object of perceptual experience on his view, rather the world is: ... 
in a state of 
information on the basis of which a subject may ascribe to himself an experience as of 
seeing, say, a tree, what he observes (if anything) is only the tree, not his own 
informational state'. 37 One key feature of this sort of content is that it is `subpersonal'. 
If the end result of a perceptual system is to make the objects and properties of the 
external world available to a subject in perceptual experience, and the operations of the 
visual system causally precede first-person perceptual experience, then whatever 
content can be attributed to these informational states, that content could be described as 
`pre-experiential' or, as Crane says, as not `phenomenologically salient'. 38 When we 
introspectively reflect on our perceptual experience and recognise that what is presented 
before us are tables, chairs, trees and so on, we find that the content of our perceptual 
experience is not populated by informational states, but rather by tables, chairs, trees 
and so on. However, such subpersonal informational states must be working, as it were, 
in the background to first-person experience already. 
In line with what has been presented above, contents on Evans' view are 
representational in that there is a mental state that represents the world as being a certain 
way. These states are nonconceptual in that conceptual abilities simply do not play any 
role in the encoding of, say, the electrical signal in the optic nerve. To understand this 
better, we should consider how Evans thought of the relation between perceptual 
experience and judgment-between nonconceptual informational states and 
conceptualised beliefs-where he says: 
Judgments based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualisation: in moving from a 
perceptual experience to a judgment about the world..., one will be exercising basic conceptual 
skills.... Although the subject's judgments are based upon his [nonconceptual] experience..., his 
judgments are not about the informational state. The process of conceptualisation or judgment 
takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state.. . to 
his being in another kind of 
cognitive state.... So when the subject wishes to make absolutely sure that his judgment is correct, 
he gazes again at the world... ; he does not in any sense gaze at, or concentrate upon, his internal 
state. His internal state cannot in any sense become an object to him. (He is in it. )39 
Informational states are the internal states upon which judgments are based-they are 
bits of encoded information that track features of the external world. They are not 
themselves open to self-scrutiny, rather they are the medium which brings a subject into 
37 Ibid.: 230. 
38 Crane (I 992b): 139. In reference to this description, Crane also cites Evans (1982): 104 fn. 22; 
Cussins (1990); and McGinn (1989). See also Dretske (2003). 
39 Evans (1982): 227. 
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perceptual contact with the world, though a medium of representational content that is 
transparent to the subject. It is this level of informational content that any adult human 
would share with any other creature whose perceptual system is similarly constituted. 
However, to say that informational states of this sort are nonconceptual seems rather 
trivial-this is just to say that the process of encoding, e. g., the electrical visual signal is 
not a concept-using system, which is hardly a surprising claim. If the claim is that 
informational content does not require that a subject should possess any conceptual 
ability for the representation of p in order to be in an informational state that represents 
that p, then this appears to be little more than the claim that some perceptual system 
does not represent its contents by means of concepts. A subject simply does not possess 
any conceptual abilities at this primitive informational level. Furthermore, we could say 
the same regarding the compositional arguments for nonconceptual content, that, if 
concepts are the constituent elements of thought, then it is a simple observation that 
thought does not occur at this primitive informational-level, so contents at this level 
need not be constituted out of concepts. This is the weakest form of the 
nonconceptualist's claim-Claim l. What would be a stronger claim would be that 
these informational states partly constitute a subject's conscious level of experience. 
The question, then, is whether Evans can be interpreted as making a stronger claim 
(Claim 2 or 3). 
On my reading of Evans, this point is somewhat unclear. Much of Evans' discussion 
of nonconceptual content is in reference to these informational states, states which he 
adamantly says are not the objects of a subject's personal-level experience. As Evans 
says, the contents of informational states `are not ipso facto perceptual experiences- 
that is, states of a conscious subject. '40 However, contradicting this, Evans also often 
talks of subject's being aware of perceptible differences in experience nonconceptually, 
as when he offers the argument for belief-independence .41 However, examining this 
point further would take us too far afield. Evans is at least making a claim about the 
contents of informational states, and we can leave the discussion at that. 
ao Ibid.: 157. McDowell (1994: 47-49) makes much of this. 
41 Ibid.: §5.2. Bermudez and Macpherson (1998) note a similar tension within Evans' work, which they 
claim pulls Evans between a naturalist and a neo-Kantian view of perception. 
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5.7 Singular-Personal Contents 
Mental states, on this view, could essentially be thought of as `mixed'-part of the 
mental state is nonconceptual, but some degree of conceptualizing is also required. The 
claim here might either be that there are some mental states that are fully nonconceptual 
and some that are fully conceptual, or the claim might be that there is some mental state 
such that it is partly conceptual and partly nonconceptual. On the first alternative, a 
subject is being attributed two separate content-bearing states, one a conceptual belief 
state the other some kind of nonconceptual state. On the second, a subject is being 
attributed one content-bearing state, and that state may be conceptual or it may not, 
depending on the cognitive abilities of the subject. Between these alternatives, the point 
would be to decide whether conceptual contents and nonconceptual contents are 
different in kind (as it would be for Evans) or the same in kind (McDowell). 42 
However contents are envisioned as being divided up, a general remark that holds for 
either claim is that theorists who hold that mental states can be nonconceptual in this 
way argue that, while there can be content-bearing states that are largely independent of 
a subject's conceptual capacities, these nonconceptual states can only exist in creatures 
that are generally concept-users. Thus, it would only make sense to talk about mental 
states that are nonconceptual for a subject who is able to be in mental states that are 
conceptual. 43 And this amounts to a rejection of the Autonomy Thesis. The Autonomy 
Thesis, as defined by Bermudez, is the claim that `it is possible for a creature to be in 
states with nonconceptual content, even though that creature possesses no concepts at 
all' . 
44 While Bermudez's way of putting this argument sounds as though it is meant as a 
claim about the compositionality of contents, we could modify his argument to be a 
claim about the attribution of mental states in this way: creatures that possess no 
conceptual abilities can still be attributed perceptual experiences with some kind of 
representational content as they seem to exhibit the same sort of discriminative 
perceptual abilities as concept-using creatures. If concept-using creatures and non- 
concept-using creatures can both be attributed content-bearing representational states, 
and these representational states are nonconceptual in concept-using creatures, then it is 
42 Evans (1982: §7.4) talks of nonconceptual contents becoming conceptualised and by conceptualising a 
subject thereby goes from being in one kind of mental state to another. See McDowell's criticisms (1994: 
Lecture 3). Also, Stalnaker (2003) talks about contents being nonconceptual `all the way up', meaning 
that contents that are conceptualised retain some element that is nonconceptual, and so being the same in 
kind. 
43 McDowell (1994) 
-' Bermudez (2003b): 295. 
91 
plausible that they are also nonconceptual in the non-concept-using creatures. 
Therefore the attribution of nonconceptual mental states need not be reserved only for 
concept-using creatures. Peacocke upheld the rejection of the Autonomy Thesis in his 
(1992). There he argued that, in order for a creature to build a mental map of its spatial 
environment, that creature must be able to conceive of itself as occupying some position 
within that spatial environment, and therefore requires that that creature possess at least 
some primitive form of the first-person [conceptual ability]'. 45 It was Peacocke's view 
at that time that the first-person concept was one requirement on a subject's being in 
any sort of mental state that represented spatiality, thus in order to be in the sort of 
nonconceptual state that represents spatiality one must possess some conceptual 
abilities. 46 
I call this sort of view the singular-personal claim because of the restriction on the 
Autonomy Thesis. Subjects may on this view be attributed a nonconceptual mental 
state on account of their lacking some particular conceptual ability that would normally 
be required for a subject to be in a belief state having the same content, though this 
perceptual state is understood within a network of other conceptualised belief states 
(states that require the first-person concept for instance). And I call this the singular- 
personal claim because these contents are thought to be what constitutes the content of 
first-person perceptual experience. In this way, the singular-personal claim can be 
contrasted to the informational level of content in that the latter is not thought to be 
available to a subject in perceptual experience. 
Finally, the rejection of the Autonomy Thesis means that a subject can only be in a 
nonconceptual representational state if they can otherwise be in conceptual states-thus 
only concept-using creatures can be in nonconceptual representational states. However 
it is not necessary to reject the Autonomy Thesis in order to defend some other mixed 
view of contents. It would be possible, for instance, to accept the Autonomy Thesis and 
still hold that perceptual contents retain some nonconceptual element even after they are 
conceptualised. I believe Stalnaker's (2003) view is something like this as he is not 
committed to rejecting the Autonomy Thesis and he holds that conceptualised contents 
retain something nonconceptual. 
a5 Peacocke (1992a): 90. See also Bermudez (2003b) for discussion of Peacocke's argument. 
46 In the postscript to his (2003), Peacocke explains why he was forced to change his mind on the 
Autonomy Thesis. I would refer the reader to that. 
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5.8 Autonomous-Personal Contents 
The main difference between the arguments for singular-personal nonconceptual 
contents and autonomous-personal nonconceptual contents is that the latter accepts the 
Autonomy Thesis. On this view, there would be no restriction that a subject must 
possess some conceptual abilities in order for them to be attributed a nonconceptual 
perceptual state. Such contents would be available to non-concept-using creatures. One 
theorist who holds such a view is Jose Luis Bermudez. 47 On his account, nonconceptual 
content is that content of perceptual experience that holds in common between concept- 
using creatures and non-concept-using creatures. Bermudez takes some such notion of 
nonconceptual mental states to underwrite what he calls the `developmental 
explanation' : `the acquisition of the capacity for being in states with conceptual content 
is explained in terms of a developmental progression over time from being in states 
possessing nonconceptual content. '48 For such development to work, it must be 
assumed that the subject is consciously aware of the representational contents of their 
perceptual experience. Subjects develop conceptual abilities-like developing the 
concept red-on the back of perceptual experiences that represent red things. A subject 
must then be able to represent red in their perceptual experience before they have 
acquired the concept red. 
The developmental explanation is one motivation for defending some notion of 
nonconceptual mental states and is a version of a more general motivation for 
nonconceptualism, which I call `the argument from perceptual learning'. In its most 
basic form, the argument from perceptual learning claims that subjects do not possess 
perceptual concepts innately, but must acquire them on the basis of perceptual 
experience; in order for a subject to acquire a perceptual concept on the basis of their 
experience, the feature of the external world to be conceptualised over must play a role 
in the subject's conscious perceptual experience in advance of their having acquired the 
concept; therefore, the content of perceptual experience must be represented 
nonconceptually in order to facilitate perceptual learning. Something like the argument 
from perceptual learning must form the background of any concept that is thought to be 
47 However, Bermudez refers to this as the `Autonomy Principle'. See Bermudez and Macpherson 
(1998). 
48 Bermudez (2003c): 294. A form of this argument also appears in Peacocke's motivations for 
defending his notion of nonconceptual content. I will return to this in § 1.7. 
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learned empirically. 49 
Bermudez takes the connection between the Autonomy Thesis and the 
developmental explanation to be inseparable-if all concepts are to be learned 
empirically, then there must be a point early on in a subject's mental life where all 
mental states were pre-conceptual. On Bermudez's view, the claims of cognitive 
scientists studying animal cognition would be meaningless without the Autonomy 
Thesis. To explain animal cognition, he claims, cognitive science must attribute some 
sort of content-bearing states to animals. Cognitive science would also be at a loss to 
explain how human infants can begin as non-concept-using creatures (as Bermudez 
assumes that infants are) and yet grow up to have developed quite sophisticated 
linguistic abilities without endorsing the Autonomy Thesis. The rejection of the 
Autonomy Thesis, Bermudez claims, would leave us with two options: either some sort 
of primitive conceptual abilities must be innate, or we could not attribute 
representational mental states to non-concept-using creatures-two options that 
Bermudez finds highly implausible. 50 
One question to consider would be in what way the Autonomy Thesis might be 
related to the Priority Thesis. To remind the reader, the Autonomy Thesis is the claim 
that a creature can be in states with nonconceptual content independently of whether 
they can or cannot be in states with conceptual content, while the Priority Thesis is the 
claim that non-linguistic creatures have no conceptual abilities. As discussed in the 
previously, Bermudez claims that the possession of a concept is closely tied with the 
possession of some linguistic ability. Indeed, Bermudez is a staunch defender of the 
Priority Thesis, the claim that `conceptual abilities are not available to non-linguistic 
creatures. )5 1 Are these two claims related in some way? For Bermudez, these are quite 
closely related. On his account, we must be able to attribute perceptual contents to non- 
linguistic creatures in order to explain their behaviour. However, as these creatures do 
not possess any linguistic abilities, then these creatures cannot possess concepts. The 
result being that whatever content we can attribute to a non-linguistic creature must be 
nonconceptual. Bermudez must defend the Autonomy Thesis because of his acceptance 
of the Priority Thesis. 
49 As remarked previously, DeBellis' example of the intermediate ear-training student is one such 
example of this kind of argument. Also, Peacocke's requirement that concepts must be grounded in 
perceptual experience in a non-circular way is often grounded in some form of the argument from 
perceptual learning. 
° Cf. his (1998), (2003a), (2003b) and (2003c). 
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However, this is not a necessary move. It would not be inconsistent to reject the 
Autonomy Thesis while accepting the Priority Thesis. It is arguable that Evans does 
precisely this. 52 Someone might think that some conceptual capacities are requisite for 
being in a nonconceptual mental state (rejection of the Autonomy Thesis) while also 
holding that non-linguistic creatures have no conceptual capacities. In this case, the 
theorist must think that animals simply do not have conscious experiences. This is not 
inconsistent in itself, though it may be a bad view to hold for other reasons. 53 
Nor would it be inconsistent to accept the Autonomy Thesis while rejecting the 
Priority Thesis. One might think that there is no restriction in principle on non- 
linguistic creatures from being concept-users while also holding that it is possible for a 
creature to be in a nonconceptual mental state independently of their being in any 
conceptualised mental state. Other combinations of accepting both (or denying both) 
the Autonomy Thesis and the Priority Thesis are of course available as well. 54 
5.9 Conclusion 
In §4.1 I reviewed Crowther's distinction between the compositional and attributional 
debates over nonconceptual content. Drawing on this, I argued that the correct way of 
understanding the attributional debate would put conceptual abilities at the heart of the 
issue. Conceptual abilities, I argued, are not tied to linguistic abilities. Rather 
conceptual abilities are inferential or recognitional abilities that a subject must possess 
in order to be in some representational states. The sort of mental abilities that a subject 
must possess in order to be attributed a true case of knowing how would count as a 
51 Bermudez (2003b): 192. 
52 Bermudez and Macpherson (1998) make this claim. 
5' See Bermudez and Macpherson (1998) for criticisms of this point. 
sa Incidentally, it is difficult to see where both Peacocke and McDowell stand on these issues. In 
Peacocke's (1992a), he certainly rejects the Autonomy Thesis but he says nothing explicitly about the 
Priority Thesis. One might presume that he would accept the Priority Thesis on the grounds that he seems 
to present a strongly linguistic view of concepts. However, his discussion of perceptual concepts throws 
this point into doubt (see his 1992a, Ch. 3). Peacocke's possession conditions for the concept red, for 
instance, never mention that a subject must possess any sort of linguistic ability. 
Similarly, in McDowell's (1994), he clearly accepts the Priority Thesis, however it is unclear what he 
would say about the Autonomy Thesis. In Lecture VI, he does seem to allow that some level of content 
could be attributed to animals, but that they do not have conscious experiences in the way that concept- 
users do. Presumably whatever content can be attributed to animals must be nonconceptual. On his view, 
animals are not concept-users, and the contents of their informational states, like ours, are nonconceptual. 
What is clear on McDowell's view is that perceptual experience must have a conceptual content. If the 
Autonomy Thesis is understood as a claim about the contents of informational states, then his acceptance 
of the Autonomy Thesis would merely allow that animals can be in nonconceptual informational states. It 
is open for him to accept the existence of nonconceptual informational states because these would not 
threaten his view of perceptual experience. Alternatively, if the Autonomy Thesis is understood as a 
claim about the contents of conscious experience, then it would make no difference whether he rejected it 
or not as he rejects that the contents of conscious experience can be nonconceptual. 
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conceptual ability, though this is just one kind of conceptual ability. In Chapter Seven I 
will review a psychological capacity that subjects must possess in order to represent 
musical pitch and will argue that this too counts as a conceptual ability. Finally, I 
presented three ways of understanding nonconceptual content-as subpersonal 
informational contents, as a singular-personal contents or as autonomous-personal 
contents. Informational contents are nonconceptual though these operate at a 
subpersonal level and so would not characterise the way that conscious level experience 
is for a subject. To describe the contents of consciously available perceptual states we 
must either look at singular-personal contents or autonomous-personal contents. 
Which of these conceptions should we prefer in the case of music? Musical 
experience appears to be meaningful only for humans, and as we are concept-using 
creatures, the contents of musical experience clearly get at least as far as the singular- 
personal contents. Whether the contents of musical experience are autonomous- 
personal contents depends on whether non-concept-using creatures can have musical 
experiences. Speaking for DeBellis, he gives no reason to think that non-concept-using 
creatures cannot have musical experiences, though this is not something he addresses. 
DeBellis' strong argument for nonconceptual content does claim that the contents of 
musical experience are available to a subject who possesses no music-theoretic 
concepts, as we shall see in Chapter Nine. However it is unclear whether that argument 
can be taken as an endorsement of autonomous-personal contents. Again, DeBellis is 
talking about musical experience in humans. He claims that subjects need not possess 
any music-theoretic concepts in order to experience music, but that is very different 
from saying that such contents are available to non-concept-using creatures as would be 
the case for autonomous-personal contents. (Incidentally, as I will argue that the 
perception of music does require a subject to possess a special conceptual ability for the 
representation of musical pitch, I would therefore be arguing that the contents of 
musical experience cannot be autonomous-personal contents-indeed, I will be arguing 
that they must be conceptual. On my account non-concept-using creatures cannot have 
musical experiences. The reason for this is simple: the representation of musical pitch 
requires a special conceptual ability; non-concept-using creatures possess no conceptual 
abilities; so non-concept-using creatures cannot have musical experiences. However, it 
would be very premature for me to discuss this further here-this will emerge more 
clearly in Chapter Ten. ) 
96 
CHAPTER SIX: 
THE MIND-INDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINT 
A common motivation among theorists who defend some notion of nonconceptual 
mental states is that experience represents objects and properties of the mind- 
independent world that what are represented in perceptual experience are mind- 
independent features of the external world. ' It is difficult to find an explicit argument 
for the mind-independence of the represented objects and properties; rather this notion 
is just bound up in the way that perceptual experience is understood. It is through 
perceptual experience that we come to have contact with the objects and properties of 
the external world as they are in themselves. Perceptual experience reveals to us the 
way that the world is. 2 And this understanding of the aim of perception is central to the 
intentionalist's account of contents: contents are assessable as true or false in their 
representation of the way that the world is. This is a view often called `externalism', 
which claims that part of what makes some mental content true is some conditions that 
are external to the perceiver. 3 By drawing attention to the mind-independence of the 
objects of representational contents I hope to offer one constraint on nonconceptual 
contents. 
Standardly, mind-independence is often described as the claim that some perceivable 
thing does not depend upon its being perceived for its existence. Applying this thought 
to the contents of perceptual experience, a minimum interpretation of this claim would 
be that if some content represents mind-independent features of the external world, then 
the objects and properties that this content represents do not depend on their being 
represented by some perceiver for their existence. Indeed, this is a claim that must 
follow from the notion of nonconceptual content-that certain features (properties, 
qualities or states of affairs) of the external world can be represented in perceptual 
' For instance, M. G. F. Martin in citing the transparency of experience as a motivation for intentional 
theories of perception says of the intentionalist that `the character of one's experience involves in some 
sense, or is directed on or of the mind-independent objects and their features which we take to be around 
us in our environment' (forthcoming): 31. See also Armstrong (1961): Chs. 5&6; Crane (2001): §41; 
Martin (2002); and Peacocke (1983): Ch. 1. 
2 See for instance Armstrong (1961), Ch. 9. 
3 See Kripke (1972), McGinn (1989). For criticisms of externalist theories of perception specifically, 
see Alston (1990). 1 should also note that a theorist who accepts the intentional theory of perception is 
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experience without making any demands upon the conceptual abilities of the perceiving 
subject. Any theorist who holds that some perceptual state is nonconceptual must hold 
some kind of mind-independence claim for the properties that that mental state 
represents. 
This could be seen as one of the conditions of nonconceptual content, that contents 
that are thought to be nonconceptual must represent mind-independent features of the 
external world. This is a point that I will develop and defend in this chapter, that 
perceptual states can be nonconceptual only if the properties that these states represent 
are mind-independent in the right way. Much of this chapter will be spent explaining 
what `in the right way' amounts to. The purpose of this constraint is to offer a way of 
distinguishing between contents that require of the subject that they possess some 
conceptual ability for that content's representation and those contents that do not. In the 
last chapter, I argued that some mental state is attributionally nonconceptual iff a subject 
can be attributed an intentional state of a certain kind that does not require the subject's 
possession of any special conceptual ability. The Mind-Independence Constraint is 
meant to be a theoretical tool that should help us to determine whether a mental state is 
attributionally nonconceptual or not. Mental states that are attributionally 
nonconceptual are those that would satisfy the Mind-Independence Constraint. 
6.1 Statement of the Mind-Independence Constraint 
This is what concerns me: When we perceive a change in our perceptual environment, 
how do we account for that change? Specifically, how do we account for changes in the 
way that objects appear represented to us? Suppose one looks and sees a red ball, and 
as one is looking, one notices the ball changing colour-the colour of the ball gradually 
changes from pillar-box red to crimson. Our explanation of this perceived change in 
colour might take into account some story about, say, a change in the lighting 
conditions, or perhaps the change in colour is due to some change in the subvening 
properties of the object that are involved in its being coloured. These would be 
explanations of how the change in colour came about, or what caused the colour to 
change. But my concern is about how we account for this change in the contents of 
perceptual experience. When one perceives the ball as being pillar-box red (and 
not committed to externalism. For instance, Crane argues against externalism for mental contents 
generally in his (2001): §§36-37. 
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assuming that one's experience is veridical), one could be described as being in a 
certain perceptual state, one that represents that `x is pillar-box red'. After the change 
has occurred, one may no longer be in the `pillar-box' state, instead one is now in a 
perceptual state that represents that `x is crimson' (assuming that the experience is still 
veridical). I am mainly concerned with how we account for the difference between 
these two representational states, so we could refine the question we started with to: 
How do we account for changes in a subject's perceptual consciousness? My feeling is 
that some changes in a subject's representational content will have a sufficiently mind- 
independent explanation, and some will not. It will then be of particular interest to 
examine how these changes in representational content can fail at mind-independence. 
But first, I will offer a definition of mind-independence. 
The basic idea of mind-independence that I wish to defend is that the content of some 
perceptual state represents a mind-independent feature of the external world (an object, 
property or state of affairs) if that feature is represented in experience without needing 
to refer to any conceptual ability of the perceiving subject. In such cases, the 
correctness conditions for the attribution of these mental contents need not call upon the 
subject's employment of any special conceptual ability. This is what I call the Mind- 
Independence Constraint (MIC): 
some perceptual content represents a mind-independent feature of the external 
world if that representational content can be distinguished from other contents of a 
subject's perceptual experience in a way that does not rely upon the subject's 
possession of any special conceptual ability. 
This idea of mind-independence is consistent with the attributional definition of 
nonconceptual mental states that I discussed in the previous two chapters-that some 
mental state is nonconceptual if a subject can be attributed an intentional state of a 
certain kind that does not require the subject's possession of any special conceptual 
ability. The MIC just makes the relation between the mind-independent properties of 
perceptual experience and their mental representations more explicit-if some 
perceptual state is nonconceptual, then it must represent some mind-independent feature 
of the external world. Mind-dependent contents are either not nonconceptual or they are 
not perceptual-by 'not perceptual' I am referring to those contents that do not 
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represent features of the external world at all, of which pains might be one candidate. ` 
We will find that often the best way of testing whether some mental content does 
require the subject's possession of a conceptual ability will be to compare the 
correctness conditions for some attribution of content between two mental states. The 
correctness conditions for those perceptual contents that would satisfy the MIC need 
only take into account the way that the external world is physically constituted and the 
way that the perceiving subject is physiologically constituted. Opposed to this, I will 
argue that there are some perceptual states that require that the subject must also possess 
a conceptual ability of a certain kind in order to be attributed a certain content-bearing 
perceptual state-that is, in addition to the physical conditions of the external world and 
the physiological conditions of the perceiving subject being constituted in the right way, 
the correctness conditions for these content attributions must also take into account the 
subject's possession of a certain conceptual capacity for the representation of certain 
kinds of perceptual properties. In such cases, if some conceptual ability is required in 
order to attribute some content-bearing perceptual state to a subject, then the content of 
this perceptual state cannot satisfy the MIC. Thus, mental states that fail to satisfy the 
MIC cannot be nonconceptual mental states. 
Also, I should state that the MIC is not intended to handle cases of perceptual 
indiscriminability-those cases where the contents of experience are introspectibly 
identical. Rather the MIC is intended to handle cases of perceptual discrimination, 
where the representational contents of a subject's perceptual experience are distinct 
contents. So, the MIC is not threatened by the observation that type-identical perceptual 
contents may have different distal causes. In debates over colour experience, for 
instance, it is often asserted that the same type of colour experience may be caused by 
objects that possess different physical properties. This is often expressed by saying that 
4 Contrary to this, Michael Tye (1995) argues that pains are representational, that they represent tissue 
damage sustained by the body. I am not concerned with whether or not Tye's representational theory of 
pains works. Rather I am concerned with perceptual experience and I am understanding perceptual 
experience in such a way that excludes pains. Headaches, tickles, feelings of nausea and the like are not 
cases of perception as the latter require some immediate relation to objects, properties or states of affairs 
that are external to the perceiver. Debatable cases of perception would perhaps include proprioception or 
kinaesthesia. Are these properly perception? Is proprioception an `inner sense' like pains or does it relate 
us to something in the external world? Additionally, visual memories may also seem to thwart this 
distinction. Clearly memories are mind-dependent, but are they cases of perception? Intuitively I would 
think that they are not. Memory would fail to be a case of perception because the external properties that 
they represent are not immediate to the perceiver. Like hallucinations, memories lack the appropriate 
perceptual relation to distal causes-whatever the relation is between the contents of memories and the 
objects they represent, it is not the perceptual relation. As such memories may count as instances of 
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supervenient properties may have a wide subvening base. This does not threaten the 
MIC as it can be acknowledged that different external physical properties might cause 
identical perceptual experiences in a subject. All that is required to satisfy the MIC is 
that these perceptual experiences should be caused by some external property. 
Additionally, the MIC is not meant as a way of explaining hallucinations. In order to 
explain hallucinations, we would first need to understand how these experiential states 
come to have their contents in the first place. 
In what follows, I will first consider cases where mind-independence clearly holds, 
as in the perception of shape. Perceiving that some object is, say, square only requires 
that the world is a certain way (that some object actually is square) and that the 
perceiver has a visual system that is constituted in the right physiological way (that they 
possess a visual system that is constituted such that it can perceive edges and sides). 
Then, I will consider more difficult and subtle cases where the MIC is also satisfied, 
such as the perception of colour. I will finally move on to compare these to cases where 
I claim that mind-independence fails. Examples of such cases, I will claim, would be 
the representation of tertiary qualities as in the case of ambiguous figures that allow for 
the phenomenon of aspect shift. 
6.2 Mind-Independence and Shape Perception 
The simplest case to demonstrate the MIC would be the perception of shape properties, 
or indeed any of those properties that the Empiricists called primary qualities. Of 
course objects have their shape independently of their being represented in perceptual 
experience, and a mental state that represents an object as being a certain shape is 
veridical if the object really is that shape. This is a very simple way of putting the 
point, and clearly we must say much more in order to account for the many ways in 
which the perceived shape of an object can look from a different perspective. A 
tabletop may be perfectly square when looking down upon from above, but this is not a 
very common perspective from which one normally views a table. Rather its shape in 
the two-dimensional visual array would typically appear to be more oblong. Providing 
the correctness conditions for the shape of objects in visual experience must then take 
perspective into account. But providing such an account is more than what I want to do 
nonconceptual mental states that are mind-dependent. See Martin (2003) on memory and nonconceptual 
contents. 
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here. Rather, it would suffice for my purposes to show that, for a subject's shape- 
experience to be veridical, all that is required of the subject is that, when viewing an 
object that really is square under optimal viewing conditions, 5 they possess a visual 
system that is physiologically constituted in such a way that is appropriately sensitive to 
shape properties-perhaps it is necessary for their visual system to have surface and 
edge detectors, for instance. What is important for the satisfaction of the MIC in this 
case is simply that the perceptual state has the particular representational content it does 
independently of the subject's possession of any conceptual ability-it does not take 
any mental work to perceive a square as a square. All that is required to account for the 
representation of shape in visual experience is for the right sort of perceptual relation to 
hold between a subject with a visual system that is physiologically constituted in the 
right way and an object that in fact possesses the appropriate shape property. 
Of course, I am making certain assumptions here about the causes of perceptual 
experience-that perceptual states have as a part of their causes some property or state 
of affairs in the external world, and that different external causes will result in different 
perceptual states. If some perceptual state represents 4) (and assuming that this 
perceptual state is veridical), then I take it there must be some external object or state of 
affairs that can be described in terms of its having 4 (or the disposition to appear 4) to 
appropriate subjects) that accounts for this property's being represented in experience. 
This is just an extension of the intuitive thought that the purpose of perceptual 
experience is to track objects and properties of the external world. If some perceptual 
state represents an object as being square, then that object must actually be square, 
which means that the object possesses a property or disposition necessary for an 
appropriately placed subject to perceive that object as being square. If the object in 
question does not possess that property or disposition that perceptual experience 
represents the object as having, then either the experience is an hallucination (or an 
illusion), or the mental state must fail to satisfy the MIC. In this latter case the 
experience is neither an hallucination nor an illusion, rather the property that is 
represented is not an actual property of the external world, instead it is some kind of 
representational property. 
5 By `optimal conditions' I mean that the subject is facing the object, has their eyes open, is not 
suffering from an hallucination, and so forth. The optimal conditions are whatever conditions must hold 
in cases of actual, successful perceiving. 
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6.3 Mind-Independence and Colour Perception 
Appreciating how the MIC holds in the case of colour perception requires a bit more 
delicacy and would be very instructive to examine closely. The case of colour 
perception is made difficult partly because colour perception suffers from subjectivity 
and partly because of the wide philosophical disagreement about the metaphysics of 
colour. I will address the first concern first. 
Some readers might be confused by my claim that colour perception satisfies mind- 
independence when many theories of colour claim that colour perception is dependent 
upon creatures having minds with certain kinds of visual systems. The visual 
experience that I have when looking at a flower has a content of a different type from 
the visual experience that, say, a bee would have if it were looking at the same flower 
from the same perspective. The difference in the contents of our visual experiences is 
due to my having a visual system with a different physiological constitution from the 
bee's, as bees are sensitive to colours in the ultraviolet spectrum and I am not. So, 
when I look at, say, a daffodil, the content of my visual experience represents its colour 
as being a brilliant yellow, but the content of the bee's visual experience would instead 
represent the colours in the ultraviolet spectrum that the daffodil happens to reflect. 
Similar problems of subjectivity arise when we consider colour blind subjects or 
inverted spectrum cases. 6 
In cases such as these, many would be tempted to describe the difference in the 
subjects' visual experiences as a mind-dependent difference. Subjectivity of colour 
experience may result in wide disagreement between subjects over the content of their 
respective experiences. However, this use of `mind-dependence' is much broader than 
that required by the MIC. On my view, colour experience may still satisfy the MIC 
while acknowledging the point about subjectivity. I will explain. 
6 The idea of the inverted spectrum goes back at least as far as Locke, who remarked that it is 
conceivable to imagine a subject for whom their colour experience is systematically inverted to the colour 
experience of a normal perceiver. When this subject is presented with a marigold, she represents the 
flower as being violet, and when she is presented with a violet, she represents this flower as being a 
brilliant yellow. (Locke, 1689 [1975]: II, xxxii, 15) For discussion, see also Hilbert and Kalderon (2000) 
and Tye (1992). 
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In colour perception, again the only two things that would be required to satisfy the 
MIC are that the conditions of external world be a certain way (which would include a 
description of the way that the object of the visual experience is constituted as well as, 
say, the lighting conditions of the environment) and that the perceiver is physiologically 
constituted in such a way that they are sensitive to those colour properties and lighting 
conditions in optimal viewing conditions. Differences in the physiological constitution 
of a subject's visual system will certainly play a role in accounting for differences 
between the contents of two subjects' visual experiences-two physiologically 
dissimilar subjects may have token visual experiences of completely different types- 
but that does not alter the fact that their visual experiences are tracking mind- 
independent properties of the external world. On the other hand, suppose that two 
subjects are physiologically constituted in the same way: then if they were to view the 
same object under the same lighting conditions, we would expect that their visual 
experiences would be of the same type. The MIC would be in trouble if the contents of 
these two subjects' visual experiences are not identical when all of the viewing 
conditions are saliently similar and the visual systems of the subjects are 
physiologically constituted in the same way. If this were the case, then colour 
experience would not be mind-independent. 
The concern about subjectivity can be dealt with, first, by pointing out that my 
claims about mind-independence are meant to say something about what is required to 
explain those changes in representational content for a single subject. The MIC has 
nothing to say about the differences in perceptual ability between any two subjects, 
either inter-species or intra-species, and so the MIC is perfectly compatible with the 
subjectivity of colour experience. Second, it would be worth pointing out again that the 
MIC is not intended to handle cases of perceptual indiscriminability, and this is just the 
problem that colour blind subject's pose. Due to some physiological limitation of the 
colour blind subject's visual system, for a colour blind subject, objects that would look 
to a normal viewer to be differently coloured look to be the same colour. This would be 
unproblematic for the MIC provided that the colour blind subject's visual experience 
Regarding how the MIC would handle the inverted spectrum case, my intuition is that the inverted 
spectrum case is merely a special case of the problem of inter-species subjectivity. so we could treat this 
case as being closely analogous to the bee case, however I am less sure of this. The intuition is that the 
inverted spectrum sufferer could be thought of as forming their own `sub-species' where subjects who are 
physiologically constituted in the way that they are would normally perceive colours as they do. If this is 
accepted, then the general point still holds, that the MIC would be secure provided that a subject's ability 
to discriminate colours is due to their tracking some state of affairs that is external to the perceiver. 
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does stand in the appropriate perceptual relation to some property of the external world 
that is the cause of their visual experience. 
The second concern about the mind-independence of colour experience is about 
which metaphysical theory of colours might the defender of the MIC be committed to. 
There is wide disagreement about the metaphysics of colour-it would take me too far 
afield to review all of these fully here. To summarise, some theories hold that colours 
are dispositions that objects have to induce experiences of a certain kind in certain 
perceivers; others claim that colour properties are reducible to the physical 
microstructural level of objects; and some other theories claim that colours are 
objectively real properties that are irreducible to any physical property of the object. 
Against all of these views, some hold that colours are not part of the real world at all- 
that is, they are not part of a public three-dimensional world-but rather are some 
mental properties that are projected onto the world. 
What theory of colour does the MIC hold me to? My claims about mind- 
independence would be satisfied by any theory of colour that acknowledges that colour 
experience is tied in some way to external causes such as reflectance properties or 
dispositions or the physical microstructure of an object. This would just be to 
acknowledge that part of what individuates colours must be some external facts about 
the world. The contents of colour experience would satisfy the MIC if it were held that 
the perceived differences in a single subject's colour experience are due to perceptual 
experience tracking changes in the external conditions of the world that there is some 
perceptible difference between two shades of colour because there is either some 
difference between the two differently shaded objects in the subvening properties that 
are the cause of colour experience or there is some difference in the lighting conditions. 
On the other hand, it would not be wholly inconsistent for a theorist who held an 
idealist or projectivist account of colours to also accept the MIC. In this case all it 
would mean is that the theorist would hold that the contents of colour experience would 
fail to satisfy the MIC, but this is just what the idealist or projectivist view is anyway. 
On these accounts, colour experience is tied to the mind-it is mind-dependent. There 
would be no inconsistency for a theorist to be an idealist about colour experience and 
also accept the MIC. It would just mean that such a theorist would think that colour 
experience does not represent some mind-independent feature of the external world. 
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6.4 Aspect Shift and Failure of the Mind-Independence Constraint 
Now I will consider a case where I will claim that mind-independence fails. Cases that 
fail the MIC are generally those that involve some ambiguity such as the representation 
of patterns or the representation of ambiguous shapes. One such case would be the 
difference between representing the same object as being a square or as being a regular 
diamond. In such cases I claim it would be wrong to think that an explanation of these 
differences in perceptual content ought to be sought after in the underlying physical 
properties of the external world. There is no mind-independent difference between 
either description of the shape, so any perceptual difference is not something provided 
by the external world. Thus, such cases would fail to satisfy the MIC. 7 
Consider the case of the shapes in Figure 6: 
Figure 6 
Many would find it natural to perceive the object on the left as a square and the object 
on the right as a regular diamond. These are in one sense the same shape (indeed, in 
this particular case, one is a digital copy of the other) though they differ as to their 
relative orientation. However, it is equally possible to see both as squares, or to see 
both as regular diamonds, and subjects who are suitably familiar with both squares and 
regular diamonds can perform the aspect shift between the two. Either object could 
conceivably be represented by either content that is, representing an object as a square 
is not unassailably tied to its orientation. What interests me about this example is the 
way in which one can seem to shift one's attention between seeing either object as a 
square or as a regular diamond. When one is able to perform this shift, the content of 
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one's mental state changes. I will refer to the mental state that represents the shape in 
Figure 6 as a square as having content `s' and the mental state that represents the shape 
as a regular diamond as having content `r'. 
We might hold that there is some mind-independent property or state of affairs that 
fixes the content of s that obtains in the external world, and that it is this property or 
state of affairs which the subject perceives when they are in state s. In this case, s 
represents the property of being s (square-ness, perhaps, or a symmetry of sides). And 
if we thought that these mental states were nonconceptual, then we must also hold that 
the external state of affairs that s represents is mind-independently distinct from that 
state of affairs that obtains when a perceptual state represents the world as being r. 
When a subject is in r, it is not the property s that is being represented, rather it is r 
(diamond-ness, or a symmetry of angles). One intuitive thought would be that both of 
these mental states represent properties that the object has, though the mental states 
differ because s has a different correctness condition from r. The interesting thing about 
the shape in Figure 6 is that it is able to satisfy the correctness conditions for two non- 
identical content-bearing states. 
When a subject is able to shift between these two ways of representing the same 
shape, how are we to account for the difference between the perceptual state that 
represents the shape as a square (s) as opposed to the mental state that represents the 
shape as a regular diamond (r)? The contents of these two mental states are non- 
identical contents. When a subject performs the aspect shift, they go from being in a 
mental with one content to being in a mental state with another content. What is it that 
explains this change in the subject's mental content? As it regards the MIC, our 
question is whether this change in the contents of the perceptual experience is due to 
some change of the mind-independent conditions of the external world, or is this simply 
a change in the way that the mind represents the shape. I will argue that it is the latter in 
this case, and it is for this reason that the contents represented in s and r fails to satisfy 
the MIC, and therefore s and r are not nonconceptual mental states (or at least they are 
not nonconceptual insofar as the representation of the object's orientation is concerned). 
My analysis of this example is directly contrary to Peacocke's, for I am denying that 
the representation of orientation is nonconceptual. However, I am not denying that the 
Cf. Peacocke (I 992a): §3.3. Peacocke claims that the contents that represent these shapes are 
nonconceptual. I am claiming that they cannot be. I will return to Peacocke's treatment of this example 
towards the end of this chapter. 
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representation of shapes is nonconceptual. As I argued above, the perception of shape 
(or generally primary qualities) is an excellent example of perceptual states that would 
satisfy the MIC. Here I am suggesting that the representation of shape (which is 
nonconceptual) is distinct from the representation of orientation (which requires 
conceptualisation). It will be helpful, then, to review Peacocke's position. 
In his (1992a), Peacocke argues that those mental states representing the shape in 
Figure 6 as a square and those representing the shape as a regular diamond are 
nonconceptual mental states. 8 This claim is meant to solve a problem for his theory of 
scenario contents-those contents that map the egocentric relations of objects in the 
visual array. On Peacocke's account, scenario contents specify the general layout of 
objects visually perceived in a subject's environment-it captures the way in which 
space is `filled out' around a subject-however such contents are insufficient to capture 
properties such as orientation. As Peacocke observes, if a subject looks at, say, a floor 
tile in the diamond orientation, the scenario content of their experience would map this 
region out as being square, as it is in fact square, but this would fail to capture the way 
in which the subject sees the tile, for he see it in the diamond orientation. Peacocke 
suggests that to see a floor tile as a square is to perceive a certain orientation of 
symmetry, namely it is to see the shape as being symmetrical about the bisectors of its 
sides, and to see the shape as a regular diamond is to see it as being symmetrical about 
the bisectors of its angles. Scenario contents fail to capture this `way of perceiving the 
object's orientation' because all that scenario contents can do is specify how space is 
filled out in a subject's visual array, and a floor tile occupies the same area of space 
regardless of how it is oriented. 9 Yet orientation, Peacocke seems to think, is something 
that figures in the content of a subject's perceptual experience. So, we must find some 
way of describing how orientation comes to play a role in a subject's perceptual 
experience. 
Before considering how Peacocke handles this, I would like to supplement 
Peacocke's example by saying a bit more about why orientation is so important. One 
thing that is somewhat unclear in Peacocke's discussion is just what it means to 
perceive orientation-what is the difference really between seeing something as a 
square and seeing that same thing as a regular diamond? Peacocke does offer a nice 
8 The sections from Peacocke's (1992a) under discussion here are §§3.1 and 3.3. 
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way of explaining the difference between squares and diamonds-they differ as to their 
perceived symmetry. But this still seems somewhat abstract and academic. Part of 
what it is to perceive the symmetry of an object must be to experience it as being 
symmetrical in some way that is distinct from its being symmetrical in some other way. 
But what does it mean to `experience it as being symmetrical'? Intuitively, I take this to 
mean that the two mental states are phenomenally distinguishable-it feels a certain 
way to see an object as a square, and this is distinct from seeing that same object as a 
regular diamond. 
For illustration, consider this example. Imagine a man who works as a floor tiller- 
one whose job it is to set ceramic tiles in bathrooms and kitchens. This man is good at 
what he does, but he is not very imaginative, for he only works with square-shaped tiles 
and only sets his tiles in square-oriented patterns. He never thinks to turn them on their 
sides to use a different orientation. Now, suppose this man drops a bag of tiles, which 
breaks and scatters his tiles all across the floor. He looks at the tiles, which lay in all 
manner of orientation to him. How is the shape of these tiles represented to him in his 
perceptual experience? Does he see some of them as squares and some of them as 
regular diamonds? Or does he just see all of them as squares, though some are on their 
sides? My intuition would be that he simply sees all of them as squares, though some of 
them are on their sides, and these ones he feels are `wrong'. And it is this 
phenomenological point about perceiving symmetry that I find quite striking, that things 
can look to be `right' or `wrong' to a subject. Think of the experience of looking at a 
place setting on a table and noticing that one fork is uneven. It looks wrong-it feels 
like the right thing to do would be to set the fork properly. I imagine that this is how 
some of the tiles on the floor would look to our unimaginative floor tiller: some of them 
would look out of place being on their sides. Suppose our floor tiller were to look at the 
two shapes in Figure 6. He would see the one on the left as a square that is properly 
oriented, and (I claim) he would see the one on the right also as a square, but one that is 
wrongly set on its side. This is what `experiencing symmetry' would mean: 
experiencing that there is a `rightness' or `wrongness' about the position of the object. 
If this is correct, then it is easy to see why Peacocke's scenario content proposal must be 
supplemented by another level of content, for scenario contents only specify the way in 
9 Orientation is not the only feature represented at Peacocke's level of protopropositional content. Most 
notably, colour would also be found at this level as scenario contents are insufficient to capture colour 
experience. 
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which the visual array is filled out, which itself could contain no notion of `rightness' or 
`wrongness'. 
Returning to Peacocke, he supplements his view of scenario contents by positing 
another level of (nonconceptual) content, which he calls proiopropositional contents. 10 
This level of content would account for those properties and relations that cannot be 
captured by his scenario contents but are still part of the perceptual experience. 
Protopropositional contents are nonconceptual in that a subject need not possess the 
concept square (or even the concept symmetry) in order to perceive an object as being a 
square (that is, being symmetrical about the bisectors of its sides). Furthermore, 
Peacocke claims, placing the perception of symmetry at this nonconceptual level also 
would allow for a non-circular way of explaining a subject's possess of the concepts 
square and regular diamond. It would be non-circular in that the concept square may 
be analysed in terms that do not already presuppose the subject's possession of that 
concept, rather all a subject would need is to be perceptual familiarity with perceiving 
an object's being symmetrical about the bisectors of its sides. The subject acquires the 
concept square by familiarising themselves with objects that look `that (square) way'. 
The reason why I disagree with Peacocke's analysis is because I think he accepts too 
readily that those properties that make a phenomenal contribution to perceptual 
experience must be properties of the perceived object of perceptual experience. I do not 
think that properties of orientation are like shape properties, where the latter are primary 
qualities. Rather I think properties of orientation are intentional properties-they are 
properties of the representational content, which I think of as tertiary qualities. And 
tertiary qualities are mind-dependent. This can be shown by examining how it is that 
the mental states s and r fail to satisfy the MIC. 
Consider what is involved in the correctness conditions for the belief ascription if we 
were to ascribe to a subject the mental state s. What must be taken into account in order 
to attribute s to a subject? Figure 6 is an ambiguous figure such that either mental state, 
s or r, could be a correct representation of the object's shape. The content of either 
mental state correctly represents the physical properties of the external world. If 
representing the shape of the object were all that mattered, then either s or r would do, 
but as Peacocke argues (and I agree) there is more to the representational content of 
these perceptual states than the shape of the object. The difference in orientation 
10 Ibid.: 77-80. 
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amounts to a phenomenal difference between the two mental states-that is, s is 
phenomenally distinct from r. Peacocke describes the difference between representing 
an object as a square or as a regular diamond as a difference between the orientation of 
symmetry. When one perceives an object as a square, they represent the axis of 
symmetry as falling between the bisectors of its sides, and when one perceives an object 
as a regular diamond, then they represent the axis of symmetry as falling between the 
bisectors of its angles. " I think this is right-Peacocke's way of describing the 
difference is one way of capturing the way in which the two perceptual states differ 
phenomenally in intentional terms: one mental state represents a square while the other 
represents a regular diamond. On Peacocke's account, the phenomenal distinction is 
due to a difference in the intentional content. 
However, crucially only one of these descriptions will capture the way in which the 
subject actually perceives the object as being. If this is correct, then attributions of 
belief states must take into account the way in which a subject represents Figure 6. It 
would be wrong to attribute a subject who represents the shape as a square the mental 
state r even though this may be a correct de re attribution-though the object does 
possess the property that would allow it to look like a regular diamond to a subject, 
attributing the mental state r to a subject who perceives it as a square would not capture 
the phenomenology of their experience. This would be as incorrect as describing my 
believing that `Hesperus is shining' as the belief that `Venus is shining'-it is correct de 
re but fails to capture the sense in which I am thinking of Venus. Rather to get the 
mental attribution right for a subject who perceives the shape in Figure 6 as being 
oriented in a certain way, we must retain the sense in which the subject represents that 
shape. Indeed, if we accept Peacocke's intentionalistic account of this example, then 
failing to capture the phenomenology of the subject's perceptual experience would also 
amount to a failure to capture the content of the subject's mental state. 
In order to explain the possibility of a subject's ability to shift between the two 
representational states, we cannot appeal to a change in the conditions of the external 
world-the shape itself has not changed-nor can we appeal to a change in the 
physiology of the perceiving subject. Both objects in Figure 6 can be said to possess 
both the property square-ness and the property regular diamond-ness (or if we wish to 
avoid talking of properties, then we could say that both objects possess the dispositions 
11 Peacocke (1992a): 76-77. 
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to look like a square and to look like a regular diamond), which is the reason why either 
mental state s or r could correctly represent those objects. So admittedly both mental 
states represent a real mind-independent property (or disposition) that the object has. 
The question, however, is what is it that has to happen in order for a subject to represent 
the object as s at one time and as r at another time? Here, the answer must be that 
something mental has to happen. This is a case where the mental states have distinct 
contents and yet the change in the subject's mental state is not due to the subject 
perceptually tracking some change in the conditions of the external world. Nothing in 
the external world has changed, all that has changed is the subject's focus of attention. 
Does this mean that the representation of the orientation of a shape is conceptual? 
The most natural way of describing this case is to say that the content of the subject 
experience changes because the subject conceives of the object in a different way, they 
represent the object under a different mode of presentation. For illustration, imagine a 
subject who did not possess the concept regular diamond but did possess the concept 
square-this may indeed be the case with our unimaginative floor tiller. It would be 
intuitive to think that this subject would only ever represent the shapes in Figure 6 as 
squares no matter what their orientation may be. Similarly, to take another example, 
think of the duck-rabbit picture and imagine how this picture would look to a subject 
that had never seen a rabbit and had no concept of rabbits but is familiar with ducks. To 
such a subject, the duck-rabbit picture would only ever look like a duck. Such a subject 
could not have a visual experience of the picture as of a rabbit. To see the duck-rabbit 
picture as a duck is to represent the picture under the mode of presentation duck, and to 
see the duck-rabbit picture as a rabbit is to represent the picture under the mode of 
presentation rabbit. 
As discussed above, in the cases of shape perception and colour perception there 
seem to be only two things required in order to account for the correctness conditions of 
these experiences: that the subject's visual system be physiologically constituted in a 
particular way and that the object of visual experience be physically constituted in a 
particular way. However, in the case of Figure 6 (or even in the case of the duck-rabbit 
picture) three things seem to be required: that the subject's visual system be 
physiologically constituted in a particular way, that the external conditions of the object 
of visual experience be constituted in a particular way and that the content ascription 
accounts for the sense in which the subject represents the object. If describing the 
difference between the mental states s and r must take into account the sense in which 
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the subject represents the object, then this cannot satisfy the MIC. Remember that the 
MIC states that the content of a mental state represents a mind-independent property of 
the object if we do not need to refer to any conceptual ability in order to fix the content 
of that mental state. 
6.5 One Possible Objection 
Before leaving this discussion, I would like to consider one possible objection. It could 
be objected that, in the case of Figure 6, the difference between those two mental states 
would satisfy the MIC as both mental states represent properties (or dispositions) that 
the object has independently of their being perceived. One might argue that s does 
represent a mind-independent property that the object has-the property of looking 
symmetrical about the bisectors of its sides-while r also represents a mind- 
independent property that the object also has the property of looking symmetrical 
about the bisectors of its angles. One might be motivated by the thought that these are 
both mind-independent properties-some object does not need to be perceived in order 
for it to have either of these properties. So, it would seem that there is a mind- 
independent way of describing the difference between these two mental states. 
This objection does not get at the heart of the MIC, but it does point out something 
important: that in the case of ambiguous figures, there must be something about the 
figure that makes the ambiguity apt that is, the figure must possess some pair of 
properties that accounts for the ambiguity. The duck-rabbit picture possesses both the 
property of looking duck-like and the property of looking rabbit-like to a perceiver. 
Similarly each object in Figure 6 possesses both the property of looking symmetrical 
about the bisectors of its sides (the square orientation) and the property of looking 
symmetrical about the bisectors of its angles (the diamond orientation). Both the duck- 
rabbit picture and the objects in Figure 6 are apt for aspect shift seemingly because they 
possess properties that make them apt for these ambiguous representational states. The 
objection we are considering raises the question whether we should think of being in the 
square orientation and being in the diamond orientation as mind-independent properties 
of these objects, or as primary qualities. This certainly raises some important questions 
about the distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary qualities. I will not be 
able to offer a full account of this distinction here, though I can offer some reason to 
think that this objection does not threaten the MIC, which might shed some light on the 
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distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary properties. 
The point of the MIC is that, for a single subject who is able to switch between the 
two representational states s and r, what changes is not the external object, rather it is 
the way that the object is represented in experience. Those cases that fail to satisfy the 
MIC are those where a subject switches from being in representational state with 
content p at time, to their being in representational state with content q at timet, where 
the explanation for the change in the representational contents is a mental change rather 
than a physical change. Nothing about the external world has changed that justifies the 
change in the subject's mental state, nor have the viewing conditions changed. All that 
has changed is the sense in which the subject represents the object. Of course, I would 
not want to deny that that particular shape-property of being a four-sided equilateral 
and equiangular figure is a mind-independent property, nor would I deny that the 
contents of shape perception are nonconceptual insofar as they represent that shape. 
Furthermore, it does not take any special conceptual ability to perceive a square as a 
four-sided equilateral and equiangular figure, nor does it take any special conceptual 
ability to perceive a regular diamond as a four-sided equilateral and equiangular figure. 
Clearly they both are. However, I am claiming that it does take a special conceptual 
ability to represent these objects as a square at one time and for the same subject to 
represent the same object as a regular diamond at another. It is orientation that is a 
tertiary quality, and the orientations of the objects in Figure 6 are susceptible to aspect 
shift. Aspect shift is a mental feat, not a perceptual one. 
What sort of conceptual ability does it take to represent the orientation of an object? 
As remarked above, perceiving an object as being oriented in a particular way is just to 
see an object as having some `rightness' or `wrongness' about its relative position 
within the visual scene. The sort of inferential or recognitional ability that a subject 
must possess in order for them to represent an object as standing in some orientation to 
the viewer must be one that allows the subject to perceive the object as being rightly or 
wrongly positioned within a visual scene. I envision this as a kind of recognitional 
ability that must be built up through experience. Through perceiving objects having the 
shape property of being a four-sided equilateral and equiangular figure, the subject 
builds up certain expectations about how a properly formed four-sided equilateral and 
equiangular figure should be positioned within particular contexts. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
To review, nonconceptual representational contents track mind-independent objects and 
properties of the external world. Nonconceptual mental states can be individuated by 
referring to those conditions of the world external to the perceiver that establish the 
veridicality of these representational states. The MIC states that, for nonconceptual 
mental states, when a subject experiences a change in the content of their experience, 
there must be an accompanying change in the conditions of the external world that the 
subject's perceptual experience is tracking in order to account for the change in their 
representational contents. If there is no change in the conditions of the external world, 
then the representational content of the subject's experience cannot be individuated 
solely in terms of the objects and properties of the external world. These mental states 
cannot satisfy the MIC. Failure to satisfy the MIC is typically due to some 
representational contents requiring that the subject possess a conceptual ability for the 
representation of some property, thus such contents cannot be nonconceptual. 
The MIC will be very important for my criticism of DeBellis' weak argument for 
nonconceptual content in musical experience. In Chapter Eight I will argue that those 
musical properties represented in a subject's auditory experience cannot satisfy the 
MIC, and therefore these cannot be nonconceptual mental states. However, before 
reviewing DeBellis' argument we should examine the perception of music. In the next 
chapter I will present some empirical studies of music perception and cognition. The 
remarkable thing about music perception is how highly cognitive it is. The question to 
consider in the next chapter is whether the empirical evidence can be taken as showing 
that the mental representation of some musical properties would fail to satisfy the MIC. 
I will argue that it does. In particular the empirical studies that I am most interested in 
are those having to do with the representation of musical pitch. After reviewing the 
empirical evidence for the representation of musical pitch, we will then be in the right 
position to consider DeBellis' claim that the contents of musical experience are 




THE EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE PERCEPTION OF MUSICAL PITCH 
Musical pitch and its mental representation is an interesting case in the study of auditory 
experience. Just what is represented in experience when a subject hears a certain sound 
as, say, a B-flat? We should try to imagine a case somewhat different to the cases 
examined previously. In Chapters Three and Four when we discussed DeBellis' 
representational theory of music and his rejection of weak intentionalism, we were 
mainly concerned with the representation of token sound-events that fell into certain 
relations with other token sound-events. In those early chapters, we considered what it 
was to hear one sound-event as being part of a melody or a rhythmic figure. The 
discussions in those chapters were mainly concerned with what it is to hear an 
individual sound-event as being a constitutive part of a larger musical figure that is 
constructed of a series of distinct sound-events. We previously examined what is was to 
hear a particular sound-event as standing in some relation to other sound-events-a beat 
is heard as being part of a rhythmic figure, or a note is heard as being part of a melody. 
The suggestion in those chapters was that to hear a series of sound-events as a melody 
(or rhythmic figure) is to hear certain musically salient relations as holding between the 
individual sound-events making up that series. 
The kind of examples I will consider in this chapter will typically be cases where a 
subject hears a single tone in isolation. We had a glimpse of what would be required of 
a subject in hearing a sound in isolation when we considered the tritone case in Chapter 
Four (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3 on pages 56 and 63 respectively). In the tritone case, we 
were asked to imagine a subject who hears two notes played together to form an 
ambiguous dyad. The sort of examples we will consider in this chapter will go one step 
further. Imagine someone who casually and randomly presses down on one key on a 
piano-say, the B-flat just below middle C-and listens to the resounding pitch. The 
subject hears the note B-flat and this is represented in her auditory experience. How are 
we to describe the content of that subject's auditory experience as representing the note 
B-flat? This question is related to a claim that I had made previously in Chapter Three, 
that all musical properties are essentially relational properties. In Chapter Three I had 
explained how musical properties such as melodic function could be relational 
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properties, as these properties must be analysed in terms of hearing the sound-event as 
part of some musical context. I had promised in that chapter that I would explain later 
how we can think of musical properties as being relational when the sound-event is 
heard in isolation. I will take up that challenge in this chapter. 
My feeling is that there are two descriptions that could be given, one in terms of the 
representation of legitimately mind-independent properties of the physical sound wave 
itself, such as the perceived frequency, intensity and duration of the sound-event 
(though these last two do not play a role in the perception of musical pitch), and another 
description in terms of the identity of that sound's falling under some musically relevant 
class of sound-events, which could (somewhat clumsily) be called `B-flat-sound- 
events', or more naturally 'B-flats". The first of these descriptions-the representation 
of frequency, intensity and duration-makes an excellent candidate for representational 
content that would be nonconceptual. Very few people possess even basic familiarity 
with the concepts that describe the frequency, intensity and duration of sound waves in 
auditory experience other than, perhaps, acoustical engineers or cognitive scientists 
studying auditory perception, and the technical concepts that these people employ need 
not be employed in experiencing a sound. Furthermore, mental states that represent the 
basic physical qualities of acoustics could easily be shown to satisfy the MIC, as these 
properties could be treated in much the same way that we treated colour properties. 
However it is that the physical properties of sound-events come to be represented in 
auditory experience, the contents of these mental states must be nonconceptual. 
The representation of these physical auditory qualities constitutes a level of 
perceptual experience that holds in common between concept-using and non-concept 
using creatures-obviously animals and infants exhibit clearly observable signs of 
perceptual sensitivity to differences in frequency, intensity and duration. But can it be 
supposed that animals and infants also hear these auditory-events as musical events? 
Imagine that there is a cat present in the room with the subject who is listening to the B- 
flat on the piano: we could describe the cat's auditory experience in terms of its 
perceptual sensitivity to the frequency, intensity and duration of the sound, though we 
might hesitate to ascribe to the cat an experience of hearing a musical pitch. Clearly the 
cat is able to exhibit behavioural responses to the sound of the piano, but can we thereby 
assume that it is responding to these sounds as musical tones, or as music? Animals 
certainly share with us the perceptual sensitivity to physical frequency, but the question 
is whether the representation of physical frequency is simply all there is to hearing 
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musical pitch. Can the representation of musical pitch be reduced to the perceptual 
sensitivity to physical frequency? This is the main concern of the second sort of 
descriptions of the representational states contrasted above, the sort that represents the 
sound-event as the musical pitch `B-flat'. It seems questionable to me whether such a 
reductionist account is possible, as the empirical evidence on pitch perception seems to 
indicate otherwise. In this chapter, I will review the empirical evidence on musical 
pitch. In particular the sort of empirical studies that I am interested in are those that 
hypothesise on the nature of tonality that quality of a tone's being related to other 
tones in a harmonic series-and those that enquire into the nature of pitch perception. 
To anticipate, the general finding is that tonality and pitch are not strictly objective 
features of the external world; rather our experience of tonality is the result of a 
cognitive process that orders the auditory stimuli in a certain way. The experiments and 
hypotheses examined in this chapter will show why the representation of musical pitch 
would fail to satisfy the MIC, so it will be helpful to spend a bit of time examining these 
empirical results in detail. 
7.1 Sound and Tone 
First, I will offer one distinction. In the following discussion, and for the remainder of 
this dissertation, I will adopt a terminological distinction between hearing a sound and 
hearing a tone. When I talk about the representational content of a subject's hearing a 
certain sound, what I have in mind is just what is represented at the level of physical 
frequency, intensity and duration the acoustical properties of sound-events. This is a 
level of auditory representation that does not already assume that the auditory events 
being perceived possess any sort of musical quality. By contrast, when I talk about the 
representational content of a subject's hearing a certain tone, I thereby intend that, in 
addition to frequency, intensity and duration, the subject also represents the auditory 
event as having some musical quality, specifically the subject hears the sound as being 
some musical pitch or other. Typically a subject hears a certain auditory event as a 
musical pitch though they might be in doubt as to exactly which musical pitch it is that 
they hear. So the subject who casually pushes down on the B-flat key of the piano 
would hear the resounding tone as some musical pitch though they might not know that 
they had pressed down on the B-flat (assuming that the subject is not a pianist and has 
no knowledge of the workings of the piano) and so might not think of the tone 
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specifically as a B-flat. Indeed, perhaps they are incapable of thinking in this way due 
to a lack of musical training. However, despite this lack of musical training, our casual 
piano-key-pusher still hears the resounding sound as a musical pitch-that is, the 
subject would hear the sound as a musical tone, though they would not know which 
tone it is. In addition, I will also use tone as a general term for sounds that are heard as 
being some musical note though the subject does not know which musical note it is, and 
will use pitch or note to refer to a cases where a subject is able to identify which pitch it 
is that they hear. In my terminology, a `sound' is just any auditory event that is heard, 
while a `tone' is a sound that is heard as standing in a melodic relation to other possible 
sounds that could be expressed in music theoretic terms. All auditory experiences 
represent sounds, while some of these experiences represent tones. 
Unfortunately, the plausibility of this distinction will only become clear once we 
have examined the empirical evidence on pitch perception. However it seems pre- 
theoretically plausible to distinguish sound-events that are not heard as having some 
musical quality-say, the sound of a glass breaking-from those sound events that do. 
If the subject who is listening to the B-flat on the piano simultaneously hears the sound 
of a glass breaking, why does the subject hear the B-flat as a musical tone but does not 
hear the sound of the glass breaking in this way as well? The suggestion that we find in 
psychological studies on pitch perception is that musical hearing represents a particular 
musically salient quality that is absent in episodes of non-musical hearing. The purpose 
of this chapter will be to examine the empirical evidence on musical pitch to understand 
what this `musically salient quality' that is absent in episodes of non-musical hearing 
would be. 
At the very beginning of Helmholtz's famous work on sound, he too distinguishing 
between `noises' and `musical tones', though the basis for his distinction is quite 
different from mine. Helmholtz's distinction rests on the claim that, to paraphrase, 
noises are complex and irregular auditory events whereas musical tones are by contrast 
very simple and regular. Musical tones are in a sense more `pure' in Helmholtz's view. 
As he nicely puts it: 
We perceive that generally, a noise is accompanied by a rapid alternation of different kinds of 
sensations of sound. Think, for example, of the rattling of a carriage over granite paving stones. 
the splashing and seething of a waterfall or of the waves of the sea, the rustling of leaves in a 
wood. In all these we have rapid, irregular, but distinctly perceptible alternations of various kinds 
of sounds, which crop up fitfully.... On the other hand, a musical tone strikes the ear as a perfectly 
undisturbed, uniform sound which remains unaltered as long as it exists, and it presents no 
alternation of various kinds of constituents. To this then corresponds a simple, regular kind of 
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sensation, whereas in a noise many various sensations of musical tone are irregularly mixed up and 
as it were tumbled about in confusion. ' 
Helmholtz's suggestion has a certain elegance and plausibility to it. Indeed, his 
distinction between `pure' and `irregular' sounds may be seen as forming the basis for 
one empirical hypothesis on pitch perception in infants. Infants before the age of five 
months exhibit little sensitivity to properly musical qualities, but they do attend to 
musical sounds with seemingly great interest. While proud parents might jump to the 
conclusion that their child likes listening to the music, it is more likely that what the 
child enjoys listening to are the relatively more stable pitches. Spoken language is a 
highly complex auditory event where the voice makes quick and erratic leaps in 
frequency and ranges over a relatively narrow bandwidth-in most Western languages, 
the equivalent of a minor third. Musical tones, on the other hand, centre on a single 
frequency for relatively longer time durations while the changes in frequency in, say, a 
simple children's' song are also much wider than in spoken language. As far as the 
sound events go, spoken language is characterised by very irregular frequency 
fluctuations over a narrow bandwidth while musical tones are more stable and change 
over wider bandwidths. The suggestion, which seems clearly in the spirit of Helmholtz, 
is that infants attend to the more `pure' musical sounds because of their more stable 
frequencies and greater tonal range. 2 
By comparison, my distinction between sound and tone is more psychological in 
nature than Helmholtz's. It would seem to be possible on Helmholtz's view to 
distinguish between a noise and a musical tone objectively, say by referring to a 
spectrometer-the more confused the spectrometer's reading, the more 'noisy'. My 
distinction is more concerned with what is represented in the content of a listener's 
auditory experience. Accepting that sometimes music is very confusing and irregular 
sounds have become more acceptable in music making (take the music of Igor 
Stravinsky or Albert Ayler for example), the real point of my distinction is that, while 
all tones are sounds, a sound is perceived as a tone just in case a constitutive part of the 
content of a listener's perceptual state represents that certain musical relations hold 
between the variously heard sound-events. 
I Helmholtz (1885): 7-8. 
`' Sloboda (1985): 198. 
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7.2 Pitch Perception in Cognitive Science 
The empirical evidence for the cognition of musical pitch is rather interesting, and very 
surprising. In the cognitive science literature, there was a revolution in thought about 
the constitutive elements required for the representation of musical pitch. This 
revolution was caused by the discovery of much empirical evidence that contradicted 
the once received view. This earlier view, attributable to Helmholtz, was that auditory 
experience represented musical pitch simply along the one-dimensional spectrum of 
physical frequency. The representation of musical pitch on this view could then be 
reduced to or explained in terms of a listener's representation of physical frequency, and 
any musical relation perceived between token sound-events-such as consonance or 
dissonance-could then be described as an harmonious (or disharmonious) blending of 
the frequencies and their overtones. 3 
The empirical evidence that overturned this was the discovery that musically 
sophisticated subjects would often find two frequencies more closely related if they 
were both members of the same pitch class. Subjects judged that tones separated by an 
octave sounded to be more closely related to each other than two tones that were closer 
in frequency. For instance, musically sophisticated subjects would find the resemblance 
between 440Hz (concert A) and 880Hz (A one octave higher) to be closer than the 
resemblance between 440Hz and 469Hz (B-flat). This is because, musically speaking, 
440Hz and 880Hz are both members of the pitch class `A'. The tones in this class are 
separated by an octave4-the intervals between the preceding and succeeding tones all 
form a ratio of 2: 1-and are heard as having the same melodic function-that is, they 
are all heard as having the same relation to the tonal centre within some melodic 
context. This could be taken as the definition of pitch class, that, within a certain 
context, notes that are heard as having the same melodic function will be notes of the 
same pitch class (though notes of the same pitch class can sound to have different 
melodic functions in different contexts). Thus, the tones 110Hz, 220Hz, 440Hz, 880Hz 
and 1760Hz are all heard as instances of A as Figure 7.1 illustrates. 
The roots of this theory can be found in Helmholtz's (1885) highly influential theory of `roughness'. 
It was hypothesised that, as each tone generates a particular series of overtones, then two tones will be 
more consonant if there is greater similarity in each tone's overtone series, whereas dissonance occurs 
where two tones have fewer matching frequencies in the overtone series. Thinking of his distinction 
between noises and musical tones, fewer matching frequencies would be noisier. 
4 For the non-musician, an octave is the distance in physical frequency between the first do and the 










Pitch Class `A' 
The tendency to identify two tones whose frequency stands in a 2: 1 ratio as belonging to 
the same pitch class is what music-psychologists refer to as octave equivalence. 
Seeking to explain why musically sophisticated subjects preferred the relation of pitch 
class over closeness of frequency, psychologists hypothesised that the representation of 
musical pitch could not be reduced simply to the one-dimensional spectrum of physical 
frequency. Findings such as these prompted psychologists to examine to what extent 
music-theoretic relations could be more salient to a subject's representation of music 
than the simple representation of physical frequency. 
The empirical evidence for octave equivalence I will focus on comes from a series of 
experiments conducted by Bharucha, Jordan, Krumhansl and Shepard. Again, 
according to the earlier Helmholtz-view of pitch perception, musical notes were classed 
along the one-dimensional spectrum of physical frequency where a tone with a 
fundamental frequency of, say, 440 Hertz (Hz) sounds `higher' than a tone with a 
frequency of 420Hz, and `lower' than a tone with a frequency of 490Hz. The 
classification of tones being physically `higher' and `lower' along the frequency 
spectrum is called their `pitch height', which is roughly the distance between two tones 
along the frequency axis. This was considered by the Helmholtz-view to be the primary 
means of classifying tones. However, in the middle of the twentieth century, 
psychologists began to question whether the classification of tones by pitch height was 
really all there is to a subject's representation of musical pitch. If so, then the 
phenomenon of octave equivalence would seem quite mysterious. 
The account that replaced Helmholtz's view holds that `pitch is a more complex 
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attribute having at least two components: pitch height and octave equivalence'. 5 Again, 
what is being called pitch height is simply the distance between two notes in physical 
frequency-musical notes within the same octave are referred to has having the same 
height-while octave equivalence is a psychological ability to assign tones to a pitch 
class. The range of human sensitivity to frequency roughly covers eight octaves, and 
each octave contains twelve discrete note classes (given Western chromatic tonal 
system), so that, for example, the note names `A4', `B4' and `C4' refer to three notes 
belonging to distinct pitch classes within the fourth octave, whereas `A4', `A5', and `A6' 
refer to three tones that belong to the same pitch class ranging over three octaves. 6 
In addition to the octave, many other intervals within diatonic harmony can also be 
described as regular ratios. For instance, the interval of a perfect fifth (P5) can be 
described as the ratio 3: 2, and a major third (M3) has a ratio of 5: 4. A perfect fifth is 
achieved, for instance, between the tones 440Hz and 660Hz; a major third is achieved 
between the tones 440Hz and 560Hz. Table 7.1 shows the frequencies and ratios for 
pitch classes in the Western chromatic scale using just intonation from Concert A fixed 
at 440Hz. Again, doubling (or halving) any of these frequencies would result in a tone 
of exactly the same pitch class one octave above (or below) the starting frequency. 
5 Krumhansl and Shepard (1979): 580. 
" There is an interesting debate in the cognitive science of music over the best way to map these pitch 
relations. One illustrative suggestion is that pitch relations must be represented on a three-dimensional 
map shaped like an upwards-spiral, or single helix. Pitch height is on this view represented along the 
vertical axis of the helix, and octave equivalence is represented by each segment of the helix that 
overlaps. All overlapping segments have the same pitch class, they possess octave equivalence. See for 
instance Krumhansl and Kessler (1982). For an overview see Krumhansl (1990), Ch. 3. 
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Pitch nass A A# (Bb) B C C# (Db) D D# (E b) 
htz 440 469.3* 493.88 523.25 550* 587.33 619* 
Ratio 1: 1 16: 15 9: 8 6: 5 5: 4 4: 3 45: 32 
Interval Unison m2 M2 rn3 M3 P4 TT 
Pitch Class E F F# (Gb) G G# (Ab) A 
Hz 659.26 698.46 733* 783.99 825* 880 
Ratio 3: 2 8: 5 5: 3 16: 9 15: 8 2: 1 
Interval P5 m6 M6 m7 M7 Octave 
Table 7.1 
Another interesting phenomenon that was noticed by empirical psychologists is that, 
in addition to finding octave equivalence to be a highly salient relation, subjects were 
also found to judge that certain other tones within the musical scale were better suited to 
finish a melodic phrase than some other tones such that a hierarchy of tonal relations 
could be constructed. Experiments by Krumhansl and Shepard (1979) and Bharucha 
and Krumhansl (1983) found that subjects preferred tones that fell within a diatonic 
harmony to non-diatonic tones, and also found that, within the diatonic tones, typically 
the octave, the fifth and third degrees of the musical scale were the most highly 
preferred, followed by the fourth, sixth, second and seventh respectively. This is what 
is known as the `tonal hierarchy'. 8 
A `tonal hierarchy' is a structured set of relations that holds between a series of 
musical tones. Within a given melodic context, certain tones sound to be better suited 
to follow other tones-some tones sound consonant and some sound dissonant. This 
phenomenon is relational because of the contextual nature of tonality-there are no 
' Frequencies in Hertz are from Luce (1993): 131, however those marked with an (*) have been 
estimated by calculating from the ratio. All ratios and intervals are given from Concert A and are from 
Helmholtz's `table of roughness' (1885): 332. Lastly, in the interval field of this table, the lower case `m' 
should be read as `minor', the upper case `M' should be read as `major', the upper case `P' should be read 
as `Perfect', and `TT' should be read as `Tritone'. It should also be mentioned that there has long been 
much debate concerning what the correct ratios for standard tuning should be. Helmhotlz's ratios in this 
table employ just intonation. If equal tempered intonation is used, one would find that many of the ratios 
would contain much higher integers. 
8 For a very good though technical overview on the tonal hierarchy hypothesis, see Krumhansl (1990): 
Ch. 2. 
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objective or context-independent properties of tonality. 9 The idea is that a sound having 
a frequency of, e. g., 523Hz has no inherent tonal quality just by virtue of the sound's 
having that frequency. I should here remind the reader of the example given in Chapter 
One (Figures 1.1 and 1.2, p. 19), in which the same tones played in different contexts 
would sound to have different directions of pull. To remind, in the context of the C- 
major tonality, C (523Hz) sounds to be the most consonant pitch. A natural melodic 
progression would be aB to C resolution (ti - do). However, in other contexts this 
sequence would sound to be less stable, such as in a G-major tonal context where B (mi) 
sounds to be more consonant than C (fa). 
Perhaps one of the more mysterious phenomena concerning music listening is that 
some notes just sound `right' (consonant) while other just sound `wrong' (dissonant). It 
is an interesting question why this should be the case, and it is this notion of tonal 
dependence and consonance that psychologists have enquired into. What is important is 
that this `sounding to be most consonant' is not something that the frequency 523Hz has 
necessarily just by virtue of its being that frequency. If this were the case, then it should 
not matter what tonal context 523Hz appeared in, which it most clearly does. As Meyer 
claims: 
... consonance and 
dissonance are not primarily acoustical phenomenon, rather they are human 
mental phenomenon and as such they depend for their definition upon the psychological laws 
governing human perception, upon the context in which perception arises, and upon the learned 
response patterns which are part of this context. 1° 
Whether Meyer's behaviouristic account of perception as a system of `learned 
response patterns' is tenable or not is not my concern. What does concern me are the 
perceptual foundations upon which such learned response patterns might be based. 
Meyer's claim, and the claim that appears to be widely endorsed by many cognitive 
9 The claim that `there no objective properties of tonality' is somewhat of an overstatement, but a 
justifiable one. There have, of course, been attempts to identify objective qualities. For instance, it is a 
common claim, traceable back to Pythagoras, that consonant intervals are those produced by ratios of the 
smallest integers (e. g. the octave 2: 1, perfect fourth 4: 3, and perfect fifth 3: 2); less consonant intervals are 
produced by ratios with larger integers (e. g. major sixth 5: 3, major third 5: 4, minor third 6: 5); and 
dissonant intervals are those produced by the largest integers (e. g. major seventh 15: 8, minor second 
16: 15, and the tritone 45: 32). This would seem to provide a mathematical explanation for consonance 
and dissonance; however such explanations seem to provide little to explain aesthetic tastes. Others have 
argued that consonance and dissonance are the result of frequency interactions in the overtone series. An 
interval will sound more consonant to the extent that the two tones have more overtones in common. This 
kind of theory. also associated with Helmholtz, offers an explanation of consonance and dissonance in 
terms of the `fittingness' or `roughness' of overtones. For an overview on these, see Krumhansl (1990), 
Ch. 3. 
I° Meyer (1956): 230. 
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scientists, is that pitch perception is the result of a psychological process that endows 
auditory events with differing degrees of significance, which can be described as a tonal 
hierarchy. The tonal hierarchy hypothesis is a very important claim, so it would be 
helpful to examine the empirical evidence for this more closely. 
7.3 The Probe Tone Study 
The tonal hierarchy hypothesis has been the subject of many empirical studies including 
those by Krumhansl and Shepard (1979), Krumhansl and Kessler (1982), Bharucha and 
Krumhansl (1983), Cuddy and Badertscher (1987) and Jordan (1987). I will give a brief 
examination of two empirical studies on the perception of tones. My presentation of the 
experiments here will begin with Krumhansl and Shepard (1979) as reported in 
Krumhansl (1990: Chs. 2& 5). 
In Krumhansl and Shepard's (1979) experiment, called the `probe tone study', 
subjects were presented an ascending C-major scale with the last note missing (Figure 
7.2). This consisted of the notes C, D, E, F, G, A, and B. 
CD EF G A B 
Chroma: 12 34 5 6 7 
Solfege: do re mi fa sol la ti 
The Probe Tone Study 11 
Figure 7.2 
These seven notes were then followed by the `probe tone', which could be any of the 
thirteen tones from the even-tempered chromatic scale (Figure 7.3). 
have included both the corresponding chroma positions below each diatonic pitch as well as their 
solfege names in order to aid ease of reference. I will often refer to pitches using both chroma and 
solfege terms. The reader unfamiliar with these terms may find it helpful to refer back to this table at 




The method employed by the probe tone study was to present to a subject an incomplete 
sequence of tones within an unambiguous harmonic context. After the incomplete 
sequence of tones was presented, the subject was then presented a `probe tone' and 
asked to rate how well each probe tone completes the scalar sequence on a scale from 1 
('very bad') to 7 ('very good'). The purpose of this experiment was to test whether 
subjects who were intermediate music listeners (the sort of musically sophisticated 
subjects for whom octave equivalence was deemed to be a highly salient relation) had a 
preference for certain tones within a particular tonal context. The hypothesis being 
tested was that a hierarchy of preferences would go some way towards explaining 
consonance and dissonance. The experiment was repeated with a descending C-major 
scale, an ascending C-minor scale and a descending C-minor scale; and subjects were 
broken up into groups depending on prior musical knowledge and experience. 12 
The results of this experiment (displayed in Table 7.2) show that subjects on average 
found the pitch C to be the most fitting tone to complete the sequence. ' 3 The pitches G 
and E scored highly in C-major, while in C-minor, the E-flat and G also scored highly. 14 
Also, these results show that all other diatonic tones (tones natural to the key) scored 
higher than the non-diatonic tones (in C-major, the non-diatonic tones are all those in- 
between tones, like `C# (Db)', which do not naturally occur in C-major). 
12 In Cuddy and Badertscher's (1987) experiment, the same type of experiment was conducted on 
children. In this, the same auditory stimuli were presented to children ranging from ages 5 to 9 that had 
attended some music classes in school. The fmdings of that experiment showed that the children's 
performance was nearly identical to the results for adult subjects compiled by Krumhansl and Kessler 
(1982). 
13 Some subjects showed a preference for the high C when the sequence was ascending and the low C 
when the sequence was descending; however either C was still more preferred than any other tone. 
Interestingly, this preference seems to correspond with the subject's level of musical training. See 
Krumhansl and Shepard (1979) for a more detailed account of their results. 
14 It is postulated by Krumhansl that the E-flat scored so highly in C-minor because of the closeness this 
tone shares with the tonic of the relative major. 
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C C# D D# EF F# G G# A A# BC 











   
C C# D D# EF F# G G# A A# B 
(Db) (B) (Gb) (Ab) (Bb) 
Table 7.2 15 
tC-Major 
- -U- -C-Minor 
What is interesting about these findings is that the resulting hierarchy is very closely 
correlated to theoretical expectations based on known tonal tendencies in Western 
diatonic harmony. The first and fifth scale degrees are known by musicians and music 
theorists to be highly `stable' tones, whereas the seventh degree is known to be a highly 
`unstable' tone. It is unsurprising from the point of view of the music theorist that the 
first and fifth degrees should score so high and the seventh, or even the non-diatonic 
tones, should score so low. 
In reference to these findings, we could consider again the point made above-that 
there are no objective properties of tonality. The claim was that sounds do not have 
their particular musical quality just by virtue of their being sounds of a certain 
frequency. Thinking again of the B-C resolution, in a C-major context, the note B 
sounds to be the least consonant of the diatonic tones and C sounds to be the most 
consonant. Referring to Table 7.2, the chroma position of B is 7 (ti) and C is 1 (do), 
where B sounds to be the least consonant of the diatonic scale degrees. However in a 
G-major context, as in C-B resolution, the same tones, B and C, would correspond to 
chroma positions 3 (mi) and 4 (fa). In this latter context, the note B, here the 3, would 
sound to be more consonant than C, the 4. This change in consonance is not due to any 
change in the tones' frequencies-in both contexts the frequencies are 493Hz and 
523Hz respectively. It is only due to a change in the tonal context-what changes are 
the tones' relative positions within the major key. 
The suggestion that Krumhansl and Shepard offer on the basis of these results is that 
IS Krumhansl (1990): 30-3 1. These results present the average score of three broad groups of subjects- 
subjects with little- to-no musical training (0-1 years), subjects with some musical training (2-5 years), 
and subjects with considerable musical training (5+ years). It should be noted that the results for subjects 
with the greatest overall average of musical training were both more uniform than either of the other 
groups and more exaggerated-subjects in the third group were more likely to give a score of one or 
seven, and gave these more often. 
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`the perceptual interpretation of sounds as music depends upon the categorical 
assimilation of those continuously variable sounds to an underlying discrete set of tones 
arranged in what we have been calling the tonal hierarchy', and `to the extent that tones 
are interpreted musically ... simple physical separation 
in log frequency gives way to 
structurally more complex and cognitive factors'. 16 Their idea is that a subject hears a 
sound as being a musical tone by assigning this tone a position within the tonal 
hierarchy, and that this is something that the mind does with the incoming auditory 
stimuli. Frequencies do not possess the properties of consonance or dissonance 
objectively; rather the same tone will sound to have a different tonal quality 
(consonance or dissonance) in different contexts. This tonal hierarchy is thought to be 
an internalised organisational ability that is responsible for endowing auditory stimuli 
with the particular musical relations that it sounds as having. The results of Krumhansl 
and Shepard's (1979) probe tone study suggest that incoming auditory stimuli gets the 
particular musical quality that it has by being organised into tonal relations that fit the 
tonal hierarchy. 
This hypothesis seems to go against intuition and raises a particular philosophical 
question. Is tonality a property of musical experience that is furnished by the mind, or 
is tonality an actual property of the sound-events that are heard in experience? This 
question is closely analogous to the famous question that Socrates once put to 
Euthyphro: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is the holy holy because it 
is loved by the gods? 17 To recast this question in the present debate, the question 
becomes, does musical pitch correlate to the tonal hierarchy because sound possesses 
tonality, or does sound possess tonality because the tonal hierarchy organises auditory 
experience in that way? The question essentially is to discover whether the tonal 
hierarchy truly is a psychological capacity that plays an essential organising role or is it 
merely an interesting explanatory tool. The hypothesis on offer stresses that the 
phenomenon of hearing sounds as having certain tonal relations is not something that 
can be explained by referring to the objective physical qualities of the auditory stimuli; 
rather it is necessary to musical hearing that the mind add something to experience. 18 
Providing evidence for this necessity is the task of Shepard and Jordan's (1984) 
`stretched scale' experiment, which is the second source of empirical evidence that I 
16 Krumhansl and Shepard (1979): 592. 
17 Euthvphro: I Oa. 
18 See Krumhansl's discussions of this throughout her (1990). 
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will discuss. 
7.4 The Stretched Scale Experiment 
Shepard and Jordan (1984) devised two experiments in order to test the extent to which 
these psychological capacities might play a role in fixing the character of a listener's 
perceptual contents. Their hypothesis was that if tonality is something that is added on 
in experience by the mind, then this should be detectable when the incoming auditory 
stimulus does not perfectly match the relatively mathematically stable relations of the 
tonal hierarchy. Shepard and Jordan's method was to present subjects with an imperfect 
musical scale where the intervals between each note are augmented in order to see 
whether subjects notice the discrepancy. Of their two experiments, Shepard and 
Jordan's second experiment sought to show that subjects who are presented with a 
subtly and systematically incorrect musical scale will still represent what they hear as if 
it were constructed correctly. I am mainly concerned with the findings of this second 
experiment and will focus my discussion on that. 
The intervals between the notes of a diatonic major scale are not all the same size; 
rather there are five major seconds and two minor seconds. The diatonic major scale 
consists of eight notes-do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, ti and do'. Figure 7.4 illustrates the 
relative distance between each step of the major scale. 
C C# D D# EF F# G G# A A# BC 
do re mi fa sol la ti do 
Figure 7.4 
All Western diatonic major scales (or the Ionian mode) follow this sequence of 
intervals. When a listener hears a tone as being do, for instance, they hear the tone as 
standing in certain relations to other tones within an harmonic context. Some of the 
relations that they hear this tone as standing in would be hearing the tone as being a 
major second below re, hearing the tone as being a perfect fourth below fa, hearing the 
tone as being a minor second above ti, and so on. For a listener to hear a tone as being 
C is just for the listener to hear this note as standing in these tonal relations. Shepard 
and Jordan's hypothesis is that these intervals constitute an internalised `schema' that 
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subjects must possess in order to represent sounds as tones that fall within diatonic 
harmony. A schema is a psychological prototype that, in this case, all incoming 
auditory stimuli are compared and organised in reference to. Their claim is that `the 
internal schema may act as a template that, when brought into register with a tonal input 
maps the unequally spaced physical tones into the discrete steps of the schema, with a 
resulting unique conferral of tonal stabilities ... on the tones'. 
19 The uneven spacing of 
the tones of the octave is very important: if an octave where divided into evenly spaced 
tones, then the listener would have no means of identifying where a particular tone falls 
within the octave as, in an evenly spaced octave, all tones would be the same distance 
from each other. Consider how, if all the notes of an octave were evenly spaced, as 
representing in Figure 7.5, 
do re mi fa sol la ti do 
Figure 7.5 
then a listener would have no way to identify the key. When all the tones are the same 
distance from each other, then there is no way of identifying where within a particular 
key any one note stands. 20 Such a scale would lack tonality, and this is exactly what, in 
essence, is the point of twelve-tone music, which uses all twelve tones of the evenly 
spaced chromatic scale equally giving no preference to any one tone, and thereby 
achieving atonality. However, the fact that the octave is unevenly spaced means that 
each tone occupies a unique position within the octave, having a unique set of relations 
to the other tones. Tones that have the same set of relations sound to be harmonically 
equivalent and therefore are members of the same pitch class. The idea that an 
internalised schema might act as a template for the incoming auditory stimulus might 
help us to explain how sounds are identified as being members of a particular pitch 
class. By hearing a sound as standing in a unique set of intervallic relations to other 
sounds, the subject is then able to place the tone somewhere within the tonal schema. It 
is hypothesised that it is due to this process of schematisation that sounds come to be 
represented as musical tones. 
19 Shepard and Jordan (1984): 1333. 
2° For a very interesting discussion of experiments in octave subdivision, see Sloboda (1985): 254-257. 
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It should be noted, however, that this process of schematisation does not provide an 
explanation of consonance and dissonance; it only provides a way of identifying tones 
as falling somewhere within the octave by attending to the intervallic distances of the 
tones. The phenomenon of consonance and dissonance requires another explanation. 
To tie this in with the discussion of consonance and dissonance above, we should 
remember that tones sound to be consonant or dissonant depending on the context in 
which they are heard. Hearing a sound as having standing in certain intervallic relations 
to other sounds, as described here, is the means by which a listener is able to identify 
the context. Based on my reading of the empirical evidence, it is uncertain whether 
these two hypotheses are jointly necessary, or whether their necessity can be separated 
out; nor am I certain as to whether these are the result of one psychological capacity that 
emerge together, or are the result of two separate and independent psychological 
capacities. I am thinking of these as being jointly necessary and therefore as being two 
aspects of one psychological capacity, however I would wish to reserve judgment on 
this until I have had the chance to review more empirical evidence on these issues. 
To demonstrate that the possession of such schemas are necessary for the 
representation of musical pitch, Shepard and Jordan presented subjects with an auditory 
stimuli that subtly stretched the sequence of intervals and predicted that subjects would 
still seek to organise the auditory stimulus in a way fitting the internalised schema. In 
their experiment, subjects were presented with a series of tones very similar to a 
diatonic major scale except that the intervals between each tone were uniformly 
increased by a ratio of 13: 12. In Figure 7.6 below, the bottom line represents the correct 
distance of the intervals of the chromatic Western scale while the dots along the top line 
represent the distance of the widened intervals of the stretched scale and where these 
tones would relatively correspond to the correct scale. Stretching each interval by a 
ratio of 13: 12 resulted in a scale built up out of intervals that were each slightly too 
wide, and yet wide enough to be detectable. 21 (Empirical studies of pitch perception are 
in disagreement as to how fine-grained the human auditory system is-the disputed 
range falling between one-sixth of a half-step to one-twentieth-however increasing a 
tone by 13: 12 would fall within this range. 22) If each tone of a scale is increased by a 
ratio of 13: 12, then a scale that begins on C would end with C#'. This scale is not a 
perfect octave; rather the stretched scale ranges over a minor ninth. The difference 
21 See Raffman (1993) on the detection of musical nuance. 
22 See Burns and Ward (1978): 456. See also Luce (1993), Part IV. 
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between the C' and C#' is a difference of a half-step, and as the difference between the 
C' and C#' would be like the difference between the notes B and C', we would expect 
that subjects should be able to recognise such an obvious tonal shift. However, this is 















Shepard and Jordan presented the stretched scale to subjects in both ascending and 
descending sequences. After both sequences, the subjects were then presented with the 
original starting note as a test tone and were asked whether the note was too high in 
pitch, too low or `about the same' as the first note that the scale began on. Of course, 
this note was in fact the note that the scale began on, however when subjects were 
presented with the stretched ascending sequence, 86 percent rated the note as too low, 
while only 9 percent correctly identified is as about the same. When subjects were 
presented with the stretched descending sequence, 68 percent rated the original starting 
note as sounding too high, while only 25 percent correctly rated it as about the same. 23 
In their experiment, the auditory stimulus that subjects are presented subtly subverts 
the physical relations of tone and yet subjects overwhelmingly still hear the stimuli as 
having the expected tonal relations. This result is interesting because of the way that 
subjects seem unable to notice the subtle shift in the scale. The stretched scale 
preserves the uneven spacing of the intervals of a major key, yet this scale violates the 
most centrally important musical interval-the octave. Despite this a statistically 
significant portion of subjects fail to notice the octave violation. It is interesting that 
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these subjects seem to hear the stretched scale as a correctly formed major scale. 
Shepard and Jordan explain this by suggesting that `each successively higher tone, 
being slightly sharp, might be accommodated by a small upward adjustment of the 
whole diatonic schema'. 24 These results are consistent with the postulation of an 
internalised schema. 
7.5 Pitch Perception: The Psychologist's Hypothesis 
How do the results of these experiments fit into the general picture of pitch perception? 
The psychological explanation for the representation of musical pitch goes like this: 
musical pitch is not reducible to the physical properties of sound waves. The 
representation of musical pitch involves both the representation of pitch height as well 
as octave equivalence. Pitch height is just the representation of the physical frequency 
of a sound; octave equivalence, on the other hand, implies that a subject hears a certain 
class of tones as standing in certain relations to other tones in an harmonic context. The 
relations that these tones stand in to each other are relations of relative stability. These 
stability relations can be expressed as a tonal hierarchy. Listeners recognise sounds as 
standing in certain tonal relations to other sounds by comparing the incoming auditory 
stimulus to an internalised schema. It is by identifying the unique intervallic relations 
that a sound stands in to other sounds that allows a listener to identify tones by pitch 
class. The suggestion, then, is that to hear a sound as a musical pitch is just to hear it as 
falling into some relational category within the tonal hierarchy. Hearing a sound as a 
musical pitch essentially involves representing the sound as fulfilling some role within 
the musical context. 25 The view is best summed up by Krumhansl where she says: 
Listening to music, we hear the sounds not as isolated, disconnected units, but integrated into 
patterns. Our perceptual experience goes beyond sensory registration of single musical events. 
Sound elements are heard in context, organised in pitch and time, and are understood in terms of 
their functions within that context. The absolute pitch of a particular tone is less important to the 
listener than the intervals it forms with surrounding pitches.... The listener appreciates the 
organisation of a musical work by assigning significance to the sounded elements according to 
26 their roles in the musical context, and by integrating them into the broader pattern . 
23 Shepard and Jordan speculate that the reason why subjects seemed to perform worse when presented 
with the stretched sequence in ascending order was because scales are more commonly played and sung 
as scales in ascending order. 
24 Shepard and Jordan (1984): 1333. 
25 The reader may notice here a certain closeness to Gestalt theory. Much of the empirical evidence on 
musical perception is presented with this as a background hypothesis. For an overview of how the 
empirical evidence fits with Gestalt theory, see Krumhansl (1990): Ch. 6. 
26 Krumhansl (1990): 3. 
134 
So following the psychologists' suggestion, my thought is that auditory-events are 
represented as nothing more than sounds with no musical significance and represented 
simply along the one-dimensional spectrum of frequency until they are heard as being 
endowed with some musical function, and this endowment is something that is provided 
by a subject's internal auditory processing system semi-independently of the objective 
quality of physical frequency. (I say `semi-independently' because certainly there must 
be something about the objective quality of the sound that makes it apt for hearing it in 
a certain way, but it is important to remember that the objective qualities of a sound can 
be overruled by musical concerns when it comes to be represented as possessing 
tonality as Shepard and Jordan's stretched scale experiment is meant to show. ) I take it 
that Krumhansl and Shepard's probe tone study illustrates the stability relations between 
tones within a tonal context while Shepard and Jordan's stretched scale experiment 
demonstrates how listeners must order incoming auditory stimuli in reference to an 
internalised schema of intervallic relations. There is of course a very large area of 
concern surrounding how it is that a listener comes to acquire such abilities. Before 
concluding this chapter, I would like to say something very brief about this. 
How does a subject come to possess such a psychological capacity? Is it innate- 
that is, does our possession of this capacity have a biological origin? Or are its origins 
based in experience? There have been may attempts to account for this in biological 
terms. While many of these often seem quite plausible when restricted to certain 
musical cases, they often fail to encompass the wide range of musical phenomena. For 
instance, they often work very well when restricted to examples of major key tonality, 
but will fail to account for minor key tonality. 
While some perceptual capacities do appear to be innate-such as the recognition of 
octave equivalence or memory for sequences of tones-many cognitive scientists argue 
that experience plays the strongest role in the acquisition of musical sensitivity. 27 The 
27 As an example, one interesting supposition is based on the commonality of intervals within the 
Western diatonic major key. Certain intervals occur frequently in the major key while other intervals 
occur very infrequently. For instance, the most common interval is the octave-taking the seven pitch 
classes within the major key, all of these have an octave. The second most common interval is the perfect 
fifth and the perfect fourth-there are six perfect fifths in the major key and six perfect fourths. In 
decreasing order of commonality, the remaining intervals are five major seconds, four minor thirds, three 
major thirds, two minor seconds and one tritone. It might then be thought that a perfect fifth is a pleasing 
and stable interval because of our familiarity with hearing perfect fifths while the tritone is such an odd 
and unstable interval because of its relative rarity-we are more use to hearing perfect fifths and so 
expect to hear them more often, and these expectations need to be built up through experience. While this 
is an interesting suggestion about the relative stability of intervals, it does not give us any means of 
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supposition is that there must be a period of enculturation during which a subject 
becomes habituated to the musically salient commonalities of a particular culture, or to 
a particular tonal system. The subject must move from simply hearing sounds as having 
certain physical characteristics (frequency, intensity and duration) to hearing sequences 
of sounds as having certain normative (musical) characteristics. It is this move to 
non-nativity-to a listener's having expectations about what the music ought to do-that 
is thought to endow auditory experience with tonality. 
The general hypothesis that empirical psychologists offer is that this feeling of 
stability is due to the listener's having built up a set of expectations of what the music of 
a certain culture commonly does. If this were so, then the effects of this period of 
learning must be demonstrable-it must be possible to show that a listener's perceptual 
capacities do indeed change and improve over time. For illustration, I will review the 
results of one such experiment. In an experiment by John Sloboda, 28 five groups of 
subjects were played four different types of musical examples in order to test the 
subjects' sensitivity to harmonic correctness and incorrectness. The subjects were 
grouped by age, the five age-groups being 5-, 7-, 9-, and 11-year old children and one 
adult control group. Each were played short examples that grew increasingly more 
difficult, each requiring greater listening skill from the subject. In each experiment, two 
short musical phrases were presented, one correct and the other-the test case 
'incorrect'. The subject's task was to identify the incorrect one. The first example was 
of a short three-chord sequence in which the incorrect phrase contained highly dissonant 
chords. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.7: Test 1 
understanding notes within a particular key. It may be that perfect fifths are such common intervals as to 
be inoffensive (or even boring) when compared with tritones, but we want to understand why certain 
' tcýc sound more consonant than other notes in a particular context. In order to explain the kind of 
stability relations described by the tonal hierarchy, some other explanation must be sought. 
2' As reported in Sloboda (1985). pp. 211-215. 
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Figure 7.8: Test 2 
The third example was again a short three-chord sequence, the correct one being a 
perfect cadence and the incorrect one being constituted of the same chords but played in 
reverse. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.9: Test 3 
The final example was of a single unaccompanied melody line in which the tonality of 
the incorrect line was obscure. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.10: Test 4 
The results (see Table 7.3 below) reveal that children at five-years-old performed 
only marginally better than chance on the first test and performed poorly on the other 
three tests. Children do not perform well on the second and third test until the age of 
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seven, and do not perform well on the fourth test until nine. However, by the age of 
nine children perform as well as adults on the first and second tests, and they perform as 
well as adults on the third test by the age of eleven. While children perform well on the 
fourth test by the age of nine, they do not improve until much later. 
Age 5 7 9 11 Adult 
Test 1 7.3 9.1 11.4 11.8 12.0 
Test 2 5.5* 7.7 9.5 9.3 10.6 
Test 3 5.6* 7.3 9.3 10.5 11.6 
Test 4 6.4* 7.3 9.7 9.6 11.6 
Table 7.3 29 
As previously mentioned, other empirical evidence suggests that children as young 
as one month can exhibit perceptual sensitivity to differences in pitch, and can even 
detect changes in a sequence of tones. Unfortunately this evidence cannot be extended 
into the claim that infants are responding or attending to the perceptual stimulus as 
music. As argued above, the perception of musical pitch cannot be reduced to physical 
frequency, and nor can we assume that an infant's responsiveness to differences in 
frequency show anything about their responsivity to tonality. What is lacking in infants 
is the ability to show any preference for or detect `mistakes' in phrases that 
demonstrates a concern for the musicality of the sound. What Sloboda's experiment 
suggests is that a subject's response to auditory stimuli as music must be gradually 
developed over an enculturation period. Of course I am not suggesting that the results 
of one experiment should be taken as conclusive evidence. These results should be 
compared with other research in this area, and the interpretation of these results should 
be carefully examined. However, if these results were accepted, then for my purposes 
the suggestion would be that the sort of abilities that a listener must possess in order to 
hear sounds as music must be developed over time during a period of enculturation, and 
therefore so too would the phenomenology of their perceptual experience develop over 
time. 
"' Scores are based on a scale of I to 12,12 being the highest reflecting that the subject correctly 
identified the incorrect example in each pair. Guessing at random would give a score of 6. Scores that 
are marked (*) are not statistically significant from random guessing. Scores that are underlined are not 
significantly different from one another. For more on this experiment, see Sloboda (1985): 211-215. 
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7.6 A Strong and Weak Interpretation of the Hypothesis 
Relating this to my overall project, there are two possible interpretations that we could 
give using the psychological hypothesis. The strong interpretation would be that 
listeners must possess a certain psychological mechanism (or set of psychological 
mechanisms) that are necessary for the representation of musical pitch and that these 
psychological abilities count as conceptual abilities. However, this interpretation is 
very controversial. While I have argued for a loose definition of concepts that would 
include things such as the cognitive abilities required for spatial reasoning, many 
philosophers would not accept the sort of psychological abilities that I have described 
here as concepts. I offered a definition of concepts based on the idea that concepts are 
inferential or recognitional abilities that a subject exercises in thought, these being akin 
to the sort of cognitive abilities associated with `knowing when'. While accepting this, 
some philosophers may still reject that the kind of psychological abilities that I have 
described as being necessary for the representation of musical pitch would still not 
count as either inferential abilities or recognitional abilities. What sort of inferences do 
these abilities allow the listener to make? And how can these abilities be recognitional 
abilities when the process of tonal schematisation that I am describing is not a process 
of recognition; it seems as though musical experience is not recognised, rather it is 
constituted by the process of schematisation. Indeed, some psychologists would not 
accept these as conceptual abilities either. Some psychologists who write about 
schemas argue that these do not count as concepts. Rather they are the preconceptual 
psychological abilities upon which lie the foundations of conceptual thought. 30 
If these objections were accepted, then what alternative would be left? We might be 
tempted to look more closely at the Mind-Independence Constraint. Though it might be 
rejected that the sort of psychological abilities required for the representation of musical 
pitch should count as concepts, it cannot be rejected that musical perception is strongly 
mind-dependent. The psychological hypothesis states that tonal relations are not mind- 
independent properties of sound-events, rather they are mind-dependent properties of 
auditory experience. The contents of musical experience clearly cannot satisfy the MIC, 
so an alternative weak interpretation of the psychological hypothesis might require us to 
create another level of distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. 
30 See for instance the discussion of `image schemata' in Johnson (1987). 
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Perhaps there is a meaningful distinction to make between mediated and unmediated 
contents of perceptual experience. Unmediated contents of experience would be those 
nonconceptual contents that satisfy the MIC, like the perception of shapes or colours. 
There are no mental abilities that a subject must possess in order to represent shape 
properties or colour properties in the contents of their experience. Mediated contents, 
on the other hand, form a middle ground between the nonconceptual-unmediated 
contents and conceptual contents. Mediated contents do not require the subject's 
possession of any concepts, but they do require the possession of a special cognitive 
ability in order to represent some property in the subject's perceptual experience. On 
this weak interpretation, the contents of musical experience would be nonconceptual- 
mediated contents as the listener must possess an internal schema for the ordering of the 
incoming auditory stimuli into discreet pitch classes, and the listener must hear tones of 
a certain pitch class as standing in certain stability relations to other tones within a 
musical context forming a hierarchy of stability relations. 
My project in this dissertation is to demonstrate the untenability of the 
phenomenological claim for musical understanding. The question we must ask in light 
of these two interpretations of the psychological hypothesis is whether the strong 
interpretation is required to undermine the phenomenological claim, or is the weak 
interpretation enough. While I would still wish to defend the strong interpretation, I 
think that the weak interpretation would be enough to reach the conclusion that I 
want-that the phenomenological claim for musical understanding is untenable as it is 
not the case that the phenomenology of musical experience does hold in common 
between both trained and untrained listeners. The empirical evidence reviewed in this 
chapter demonstrates how the contents of musical experience are dependent upon the 
listener's possession of a certain psychological capacity, and there is some evidence 
suggesting that a listener's sensitivity to musically salient qualities develops over time. 
I will proceed in the next chapter to examine DeBellis' weak argument for 
nonconceptualism in musical experience. I will criticise his view using the strong 
interpretation of the psychological hypothesis. If the strong interpretation is correct, 
then the contents of musical experience cannot satisfy the MIC, and DeBellis' 
nonconceptualism is false. If the strong interpretation is incorrect, then we must decide 
how the weak interpretation impacts upon DeBellis' nonconceptualism. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
DEBELLIS' WEAK ARGUMENT FOR NONCONCEPTUALISM 
DeBellis' weak argument claims that a listener can be attributed an auditory mental 
state that represents a sound as being a certain (musical) way though that listener lacks 
the particular music-theoretic concept that would normally correspond to a mental state 
having that content. The supposition is that a listener can be attributed a hearing 
ascription described in one of the representational theories of music discussed in 
Chapter Three and Four-GTTM, Schenkerian analysis, or the relative chroma model- 
and while listeners could be attributed content in, say, a GTTM graph, the listener does 
not need to possess the music-theoretic concepts that would characterise the content of 
that graph. The example DeBellis offers is of an intermediate ear training student that 
hears a certain note that her instructor has played on the piano as being a certain way 
though she is unsure what way that is because she lacks the concept to describe how she 
hears it. If the note being played is aG and she hears it as being the 5 of C-major, 
DeBellis claims that she can then be attributed a content-bearing state that represents 
that `x is a 5', and this content describes the way in which she hears it. ' 
My concern, however, is this: suppose that on Twin Earth her counterpart also hears 
the note G played on the piano, but this Twin Earth ear training student hears it as being 
the 1 of G-major. The question is, in what way do these two worlds differ? If they 
were thought to differ in some way that could satisfy the Mind-Independence 
Constraint, then this would be for them to differ in respect of the external properties of 
the sound waves. But this is not the case, as in both the actual world and the 
counterfactual world the listener and the Twin Earth-listener hear sounds of the same 
type. In all external or non-mental respects, the physical conditions on Earth and on 
Twin Earth would be indistinguishable. We should then consider whether the 
difference between these two worlds is a mind-dependent difference, after which we 
will then be able to consider how this impinges upon DeBellis' weak argument. 
My argument against DeBellis will be that if the contents of musical experience are 
nonconceptual. then, when we are faced with some ambiguous musical figure that could 
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adequately be accounted for by either of two non-identical representational states, the 
difference between these two mental states must be due to the representation of some 
adequately mind-independent state of affairs, as what is responsible for distinguishing 
nonconceptual mental states can only be relations to external properties or states of 
affairs. However, I claim, no such difference in the conditions of the external world 
exists in these cases of ambiguous musical figures. It would then follow if this is true 
that any difference between two perceptual states that suffice to represent the same 
ambiguous musical figure must be a mind-dependent difference. If we accept the strong 
interpretation of the psychological hypothesis from the previous chapter, then this 
failure to satisfy the MIC would mean that the contents of musical experience cannot be 
nonconceptual. However, if we can only accept the weak interpretation, then the 
contents of musical experience may be nonconceptual but mediated by a necessary 
cognitive ability. In this chapter, we will examine DeBellis' weak argument for 
nonconceptualism and determine whether the strong interpretation of the psychological 
hypothesis causes a problem for DeBellis. If it does not, then we will decide whether 
the weak interpretation is enough to undermine the phenomenological claim. I will start 
by reviewing DeBellis arguments and motivations for his claims about 
nonconceptualism for the contents of musical experience. 
8.1 Statement of DeBellis ' Weak Argument 
In the Chapter Four, we saw how DeBellis defends his strong intentional theory of 
music perception arguing that the phenomenology of musical experience is precisely 
what descriptions of music in GTTM or Schenkerian analysis attempt to capture. The 
graphs that these theories of musical analysis provide, he claims, illustrate the contents 
of musical experience. An important point for DeBellis is that both psychological and 
music-theoretic hearing ascriptions can be attributed to listeners that do not possess 
those concepts that characterise those contents. He claims that a listener may be 
attributed a mental state with some musical content that corresponds to either a 
Schenkerian or GTTM graph-say, hearing C/F-sharp as the dominant of G-major- 
though the listener lacks the concept `dominant of G-major'. As such musical hearing 
' For discussion of DeBellis' arguments, see Levinson (1996b). For an alternative version of 
nonconceptualism in musical experience, see Luntley (2003). For a nonconceptualist account of our 
perception of rhythm, see Roholt (unpublished). 
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is meant to describe the phenomenology of a listener's experience of some music- 
musical graphs of the GTTM or Schenkerian style are meant to describe the content of 
musical experience as it is represented at the listener's personal-level of experience. 
DeBellis thinks that such ways of hearing are meant to apply not only to musicians and 
music theorists-those who have had extensive training in listening to and categorising 
musical phenomenon-but to untrained listeners as well. 
This nonconceptualist strategy is central to DeBellis' view of musical understanding: 
his view is that, when an untrained listener hears the C/F-sharp dyad as the dominant of 
G-major, they hear it in the same way as the trained listener-that is, both the trained 
and the untrained listener can be ascribed the same type of perceptual experience, 
though the untrained listener of course has no means of reporting or ascribing to 
themselves such perceptual states. Thus, in the mind of an untrained listener, these 
perceptual contents are weakly nonconceptual: `one can satisfy the attribution without 
possessing the (music-theoretic) concepts contained in the attribution'. 2 What is 
implicit in DeBellis' account is his belief that the commonality of these two listeners' 
phenomenal experience is due to the content's being nonconceptual. DeBellis thinks 
that if the contents of musical experience were conceptual, then the untrained listener 
would be at a distinct advantage. By defending nonconceptualism for the contents of 
musical experience, DeBellis takes himself to be doing some justice for the untrained 
listener. 
This is the way that DeBellis argues for the weak nonconceptual claim. To say that 
some perceptual state is nonconceptual, on DeBellis' view, is to say that there is an 
epistemic inequivalence between the perceptual state and the sort of belief that would 
normally characterise such belief states. A listener might be attributed hearing that x is 
F-say, `S hears that C/F-sharp as the dominant of G-major'-and yet lacks the 
conceptual abilities requisite to entertain the belief that `C/F-sharp is the dominant of G- 
major'. The untrained listener's perceptual state is epistemically inequivalent to the 
corresponding belief state in that simply being in the perceptual state does not ensure 
that the listener is in or can have the associated belief. For the trained listener, it might 
be the case that being in the perceptual state is (sometimes) part of what it is to be in the 
belief state, but the point is that being in a perceptual state is not all there is to being in a 
belief state. 
`' DeBellis (1995): 27. 
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To demonstrate this to be the case, DeBellis goes on, the epistemic inequivalence 
must amount to more than just a listener's inability to form the belief that, e. g., 'x is the 
dominant of G-major'. Epistemic inequivalence would be demonstrated if we could 
find a divergence of belief analogous to Frege's Hesperus-Phosphorus case: for a 
listener who does not know that the names `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to 
the same planet, a listener who understands the meaning of `Hesperus' might 
understand what is being asked of the question `Is that Hesperus shining? ', though they 
would object to the thought that `Hesperus is shining' when looking up at Venus in the 
morning. The listener then believes that `Phosphorus is shining'. While not knowing 
that the names have a common referent, they are in no position to accept the thought 
that `Hesperus is shining' in the morning. Epistemic inequivalence requires that it must 
be possible to believe one thing while doubting the other. 
To show how this works in the musical case, DeBellis needs to construct a plausible 
case where a listener might understand what, e. g., being the dominant of G-major is 
while doubting that `x is the dominant of G-major'. (For simplicity, and to remain 
faithful to DeBellis' discussion, the following argument will see a return to the 
psychological theory of representation discussed in Chapter Three-the relative chroma 
model. And, of course, at this point in DeBellis' argument, attributions of this sort are 
taken to be weakly nonconceptual. ) The case DeBellis presents is that of the 
`intermediate ear training student' : 
Imagine a sophomore music theory student taking an ear training test. Her task is to label the 
pitches of a tonal passage she hears with scalestep numbers [chroma] in the key of the passage. 
Since her ear training skills are only average, she does not always know the right answer. So there 
is some pitch x-a 5, say-such that she is in doubt as to whether it is a 5; she is not disposed to 
assent to `x is a 5'. 
... 
For our listener, [learning that] `x is a 5' is informative; when her instructor tells her, `That 
was a 5', it is a genuine "extension of her knowledge", a belief she did not already possess. 3 
What is important in the intermediate-listener case is that the second-year ear training 
student must be in doubt as to whether the way that x sounds to her is what it is for the 
belief that `x is a 5' to be true. And DeBellis says that `having such doubt entails that 
one does not have the belief expressed by the sentence, and, therefore, whatever hearing 
a sound-event as a5 is. it cannot be that belief. 4 
Ibid.: 36. In terms of the plausibility of this example, I can attest to its accuracy through personal 
experience. Having suffered through two years of ear training (which many students spitefully refer to as 
`ear straining'), these are not skills that are acquired easily. 
4 Ibid. 
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This is a case of the argument from perceptual learning, referred to in Chapter Five 
above, which is a strong motivation underwriting DeBellis' view of musical perception. 
To remind the reader, the argument from perceptual learning is the claim that perceptual 
concepts are learned empirically. For this to be a real case of learning, the listener 
cannot possess the concept in advance, so the concept cannot be playing a role in the 
perceptual experience. Thus, in order to acquire some perceptual concept empirically 
requires a nonconceptual sensitivity to the relevant feature of perceptual experience. 
And this is what DeBellis claims to be happening in the case of the ear training 
student's learning what it is for x to sound as a 5. The ear training student must be able 
to hear x as being a certain way, and hearing this way she then learns that this is what it 
is for the belief that `x is a 5' to be true. This requires that the student must understand 
what it is theoretically to be a 5. So she possesses the capacity to believe that `x is a 5'. 
but what she lacks is the perceptual knowledge that the belief `that is a 5' corresponds to 
the way in which x sounds. DeBellis claims that she would then find it informative to 
learn that the way that x sounds is just what it is for x to be a 5. 
To summarise, the content of musical perception is weakly nonconceptual, DeBellis 
claims, when listeners may be perceptually sensitive to musical qualities such as those 
posited on the relative chroma model of pitch perception without requiring that the 
listener have any familiarity with the related music-theoretic concepts. And DeBellis 
takes this to be shown by his case of the intermediate ear training student. In this case, 
when an intermediate listener hears a piece of music, they can be attributed a certain 
perceptual content-that x is F-that captures the way in which the listener hears the 
music in music-theoretic terms though they are unable to either assent to or deny that x 
is F. On this view, a listener may possess the conceptual capacity to entertain the 
theoretical belief that x is F while still lacking the capacity to recognise that x is F in 
their perceptual experience. These sort of hearing ascriptions are weakly nonconceptual 
as it does require some understanding of the music-theoretic concepts. That perceptual 
content is weakly nonconceptual in this way also means that hearing ascriptions might 
themselves be some kind of belief, though distinct from music-theoretic beliefs. Thus 
the commitment to what DeBellis calls the Belief Thesis is not inconsistent with weak 
nonconceptualism. 
Nonconceptualism, even the weak sort that DeBellis offers describing the abilities of 
intermediate listeners, requires the satisfaction of the MIC. To remind the reader, 
nonconceptualism is the claim that a listener can be attributed a mental state with a 
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certain content even though the listener may lack those concepts that would normally 
characterise that content; the contents of perceptual experience are typical examples of 
nonconceptual contents. When perceptual experiences are veridical, they have the 
particular contents that they do by virtue of their representing objects, properties or 
states of affairs in the external world; thus perceptual experience represents the world as 
being a certain way because the world is that way. If this is true, then nonconceptual 
contents typically represent objects, properties or states of affairs of the external world. 
The MIC claims that perceptual contents can be nonconceptual only if the 
representation of some object, property or state of affairs does not require a listener to 
possess any special conceptual ability for the representation of that property in their 
perceptual experience. Therefore, if a listener S hears the note G as the 5 of C-major 
and the content of this perceptual state is thought to represent the nonconceptual content 
that `x is 5', then to satisfy the MIC there must be some external state of affairs that 
accounts for x's sounding to be 5 to S, which can be described independently of x's 
being heard by S. It must be the case that the mere representation in perceptual 
experience that `x is a 5' does not require any special conceptual ability. My worry is 
that this cannot be correct-that the MIC fails for the sort of hearing ascriptions that 
DeBellis is concerned to describe-because the representation of music does require a 
special conceptual ability, which seems to be evident when one examines the empirical 
data on music perception. 
8.2 Criticisms of DeBellis ' Weak Argument 
To show how it is that musical perception of the weakly nonconceptual kind fails to 
satisfy the MIC, we should consider cases of tonally ambiguous hearing ascriptions. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, what is musical about musical perception is the 
representation of certain significant relations holding between individual sound-events. 
However, there are some cases where the individual sound-events of a particular 
sequence could be described as having some musical relation, though it is ambiguous 
exactly what relation that is. Peacocke presented such a case in his argument for 
sensational properties of experience when he claimed that the difference between a 
listener who hears six beats as organised into two triplets (! -TJ 77ý) and a listener who 
hears those six beats as organised into three duplets (:. J7 J :) is a difference of their 
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representing different sensational properties, as discussed in Chapter Four (p. 55). This 
is a case where a listener can hear the beats being organised into some musically salient 
rhythmic relation, though it is ambiguous which relation correctly describes the way 
that the music is. Such cases can also be constructed for tonal relations as in the tritone 
case (p. 56). These are cases where a listener may represent some sound-event under 
either of two different descriptions where both descriptions could be correct. The 
listener hears the sound-event as being related to some particular musical context, but it 
is ambiguous which context is the correct one. Indeed, in such cases, the notion of 
`correctness' may seem irrelevant. Does `correctness' mean veridical-representing the 
world in the way that it is? If so, then either mental state would do this successfully. 
Some ambiguous musical figures such as the tritone case can be accounted for by two 
phenomenally distinguishable musical descriptions. On the other hand, if one mental 
state is to be preferred over the other as the `correct' one, then some notion other than 
veridicality is required. Perhaps `correct' means hearing the music in the way that the 
composer intended. If so, then this requires something more than what can be given by 
the contents of naive perceptual experience. The way in which we account for the 
problem of tonal ambiguity seems to be the central problem of DeBellis' argument for 
weak nonconceptual content. I will argue that the problem of tonal ambiguity cannot be 
accounted for in a way that would satisfy the MIC, and it is for this reason that 
DeBellis' weak argument fails. 
The problem with tonal ambiguity for DeBellis' weak nonconceptualism is that there 
is an important difference between representing a sound as being, say, the tonic of some 
key rather than its being the dominant-these are phenomenally distinct auditory 
experiences. On the intentionalist theory of musical experience (that DeBellis and I 
agree on), the phenomenal difference between these experience can be accounted for in 
this way: to represent a sound-event as being the tonic is to hear it as standing in certain 
musically relevant relations to other tones, that is, to hear the note as having a particular 
musical function. To represent a sound-event as being the dominant, on the other hand, 
is to hear it as having a very different musical function. The problem, however, is that 
either musical ascriptions of an ambiguous pair could satisfy the way that the world is- 
the difference between a listener who represents some constituent tone of a sound-event 
as being the tonic and some other listener who represents the same tone as being the 
dominant both represent a sound of the same physical frequency in the end. Their 
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representational states take the same referent, though they differ in sense. 5 There is no 
difference in the way that the external world has to be in order to be correctly described 
by one ambiguous figure or the other-both mental states are satisfied by the same state 
of affairs. 
To revisit a case that we considered early on in this dissertation, in the case of 
hearing the note B (490Hz) followed by C (523 Hz) as in Figure 8 below, what does it 
mean to hear these sound-events as being related in some musically salient way? 
Figure 8 
One suggestion would be that this would require of the listener the ability to identify 
these notes as `C' and `B', however this is surely much too strong. Such a recognitional 
ability is only had by listeners who possess perfect pitch, and it would clearly be wrong 
to think that a listener must possess perfect pitch in order to hear these sound-events as 
being musical tones. Rather, all that is required in order to hear these two sound-events 
as musical tones is for the listener to hear these tones as having some musical (i. e. tonal) 
function. But these tones will have different functions within different tonal contexts. 
As discussed previously, in the key of C-major, these tones would be the 1 and 7 (or in 
musical terms do - ti) and, on the relative chroma model, that is just how a listener 
would represent this sequence, as two sound-events represented by the tonal functions 
'I - 7'. However, in the key of G-major, these tones would be the 4 and 3 (fa -m i). 
Suppose a listener were to hear the sequence of notes in Figure 8 in isolation, say in 
an ear training class. If no tonal context is made explicitly, then it is left open whether 
the listener hears the sequence (and therefore represents it) as 1-7 or as 4-3. What is 
crucial though is that, while either representational content would satisfy the external 
conditions on the way that the music is (that is, either representational state would be 
veridical if veridicality just means correctly representing the external conditions of the 
world), only one of these descriptions would satisfy the way that the listener hears the 
music. In this example. the listener hears Figure 8 either as being 1-7 or as 4-3, and the 
5 Here I am thinking of the physical frequency of the sound wave as the referent and the melodic 
function as its mode of presentation. 
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conditions for the veridicality of the representational state are agnostic on how the 
music is for the listener. Either representational state may be veridical, but only one of 
these captures the phenomenology of the listener's experience. 
These mental states are distinct in that they do not have the same content (and are 
phenomenally distinct as well). As they are distinct, then these mental states must have 
different correctness conditions. However, there is no difference in the way that the 
world has to be in order for the world to be represented by one state rather than the 
other. Two distinct mental states can adequately represent precisely the same set of 
possible worlds the two mental states are co-extensional. However, if we were to look 
at the correctness conditions for hearing ascriptions, we would find a different story. It 
would be incorrect to say of the subject who hears G as the 5 of C-major that they hear 
the G as the 1 of G-major. It would be incorrect as `x is a 1' does not capture the way in 
which the subject represents the G (that is, it does not preserve the mode of presentation 
under which the subject represents the experience). Finally, if a subject's 
representational content employs a specific sense, then it must be the case that the 
subject possesses some capacity for the representation of this sense. Thinking of the 
subject who hears G as the 5 of C-major and her Twin Earth counterpart who hears the 
G as the 1 of G-major, the difference between these two mental states is that the two 
subjects refer to the same referent under two different senses. There is no mind- 
independent difference between these mental states; rather the difference is mental. 
Perhaps DeBellis could resist this by arguing that the sort of musical hearing he has 
in mind is much more primitive than the sort I am describing. He might argue that a 
listener hears music as being a certain way but that this is not the same as representing 
the musical function of notes. However, I do not think that this line would be open to 
DeBellis as a listener's hearing a sound as a musical tone requires that they hear the 
tone as standing in certain hierarchical relations to other tones in a context. As the 
psychologists say, this is a psychologically necessary condition. This musically- 
function-laden way of hearing a sound is essential to representing a musical note, and as 
stated earlier it is this representation of musical function that is important in the 
perception of musical pitch, rather than representing a tone by note name or identifying 
the frequency of a sound. The level of musical hearing that DeBellis is describing is not 
more primitive than the level that I am describing-we are both talking about the way in 
which music sounds to an intermediate listener. 
As discussed above, there is a real phenomenal difference between hearing x as a5 
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and hearing x as a ]-the perceptual states that these hearing ascriptions would 
correspond to have very different representational contents, that is they represent very 
different musical qualities, just as the mental state that represents that `Hesperus is 
shining' is a very different one from the mental state that represents that `Venus is 
shining'. The most natural way of explaining the Hesperus-Phosphorus case is to 
attribute concepts to the subject. Consider this case: suppose that S believes that 
`Hesperus is shining' and in the same world T believes that `Venus is shining', and S 
does not possess the concept Venus and T does not possess the concept Hesperus (and 
each lacks the other concept, neither of them knows that `Hesperus' and `Venus' refer 
to the same planet). Thus, when S looks up at the sky and thinks that `Hesperus is 
shining', and T looks up at the sky and thinks that `Venus is shining', S and T are in 
different mental states even though their belief states refer to the same states of affairs, 
insofar as these pick out the same referent. In this case, there is no difference in the way 
that the world has to be in order for either subject to be in their respective belief states. 
These are of course propositional belief states; what we are interested in here are 
perceptual belief states. If we were to look for a visual case that was analogous to the 
case of Figure 8, one where two subjects perceive different qualities of an ambiguous 
figure, then I think one could be supplied by the duck-rabbit picture. 
Suppose that S and T are both presented the duck-rabbit picture, where S lacks the 
concept rabbit and T lacks the concept duck. The intuition would be that S would see 
the duck-rabbit picture as a duck and could not see it as a rabbit as S does not know 
what rabbits look like. Similarly, when shown the picture, T sees it as a rabbit and 
cannot see it as a duck. Of course, there is no difference in the way that the world has to 
be in order for S to see the duck or for T to see the rabbit. However what is of interest 
is the way in which S's and T's perceptual states differ, both representationally and 
phenomenally. S's perceptual state represents very different intentional qualities than 
that of T's. But this difference is obviously due to their possessing different sets of 
concepts. Only a subject who does possess both concepts duck and rabbit will notice 
the ambiguity of the picture. 
Now, contrast this against a case where I claim that the MIC does hold, say in the 
case of colour perception. Suppose S and T are shown a scarlet-coloured paper card. 
Imagine that S possesses the concepts red and scarlet, but T only possesses the concept 
red. S would assent to the statement that `x is red', as would T, but where S would also 
assent to the more descriptive statement that `x is scarlet', T would not. That is, T 
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would be in doubt whether `scarlet' does accurately describe the coloured card that she 
was shown. This differs from the duck-rabbit case above in that we have no reason to 
believe that S and T are in qualitatively different perceptual states, though here they are 
in different belief states. What is common between S and T is that some external state 
of affairs obtains that is able to account for the qualitative similarity of S's and T's 
perceptual states. Further, if S and T were both shown a different coloured card, this 
time cayenne, and S also possesses the concept cayenne where T does not, both S and T 
should assent to the statement that `that shade of red is different from that first shade, 
though only S would assent to the statement that `this shade of red is cayenne'. T's 
perceptual experience is able to track changes in colour just as well as S's despite T's 
lacking the specific colour concepts that S possesses. 
My suggestion, then, is that the cases of ambiguous musical figures are more like the 
duck-rabbit case than it is like the colour case: the difference between hearing x as the 5 
of C-major as opposed to hearing x as the 1 of G-major is due to the listener's auditory 
experience organising what the listener hears in a different way. If tonality is not an 
objective property of sound-events but rather is something that is supplied by the mind 
in auditory experience, as the empirical evidence suggests, then any difference in the 
way that two subjects hear a piece of music cannot be attributed to any difference in the 
way that the world is. In the case of ambiguous musical figures, hearing ascriptions that 
differ as to their representational content and yet both equally get the world right do not 
differ in respect of the objective mind-independent properties that these perceptual 
states are tracking. The difference between these mental states cannot satisfy the MIC, 
therefore the contents of musical experience are mind-dependent. 
8.3 An Objection 
There is one serious objection that must be considered. It may be objected that my 
criticisms of DeBellis' weak argument fails to capture the distinction between 
conceptual and nonconceptual content-that the kind of abilities that I have described as 
being necessary for the representation of musical pitch simply are not conceptual 
abilities. For one thing, these psychological abilities operate at a subpersonal level, 
below the level of conscious thought. A theorist who held firmly that concepts are the 
constitutive elements of thoughts and beliefs-or, to put this in the language of 
conceptual abilities, that conceptual abilities are those abilities that operate at the 
1 c1 
conscious level of thought and belief-would object to my account on the grounds that 
the psychological abilities that I am describing are not properly the conceptual abilities 
that figure in the contents of thoughts and beliefs. DeBellis could then accept that the 
representation of musical pitch does require some kind of subpersonal psychological 
ability while still maintaining that the contents of musical experience are nonconceptual 
at the level of conscious thought and belief. This is a serious objection, one that 
threatens to undermine my criticisms of DeBellis' weak argument for 
nonconceptualism. If one were to take conceptual abilities strictly to operate over the 
constitutive elements of conscious thoughts and beliefs, then one might insist that the 
subpersonal psychological abilities that I am describing simply are not conceptual 
abilities. 
This objection is closely related to the problem noted at the end of the previous 
chapter, for this is really an objection against my strong interpretation of the 
psychological hypothesis. What I have argued for here, against DeBellis, is the claim 
that the contents of musical experience are dependent upon the listener's possession of a 
special psychological ability for the representation of musical pitch. As the discussion 
of ambiguous musical figures shows, the representation of musical pitch fails to satisfy 
the MIC. I do not see how this conclusion can be avoided. On a strong interpretation of 
this view, we might then argue that the psychological abilities required for the 
representation of musical pitch are to count as conceptual abilities. The kind of 
psychological abilities required for music perception are envisioned as being akin to the 
kind of conceptual abilities required for spatial reasoning, or the kind of conceptual 
abilities required for representing the orientation of an object (as discussed in Chapter 
Six). However, the strong interpretation requires further grounding in a plausible 
account of conceptual abilities. While my criticisms of DeBellis' weak argument for 
nonconceptualism may show that the contents of musical experience are mind- 
dependent, it is still uncertain whether this failure to satisfy the MIC really counts in 
favour of a conceptualist view of the contents of musical experience. My criticisms 
may be accepted by DeBellis, but, he may insist, that does not threaten the claim that 
these contents are nonconceptual, and he may press this objection along the lines give 
above-that concepts operate at the level of thought and the psychological abilities that 
I have described are subpersonal abilities that cannot count as concepts. Musical 
experience may require that the subject possess a psychological ability for the 
representation of musical pitch, but why should we think of these psychological abilities 
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as conceptual abilities? 
In response to this objection, I can only restate that I find this account of conceptual 
abilities to be too strong. Reiterating my claims from Chapter Five, it cannot be the 
case that conceptual abilities operate only over the constituents of thoughts and beliefs. 
If we did hold this strong view of conceptual abilities to be the case, then it would 
exclude spatial reasoning to be instances of conceptual thought. There would be no 
easy way of forcing those abilities that are in operation in spatial reasoning to fit the 
thoughts-and-beliefs model of concepts. The notion of conceptual abilities as operating 
over the constituents of thoughts and beliefs cannot be an exhaustive account of 
conceptual abilities. While a subject's having a belief with content p certainly does 
require the subject must possess the right conceptual abilities for the representation ofp, 
these cannot be the only conceptual abilities that a subject is able to possess. While the 
psychological ability that I am describing as being a necessary condition for the 
representation of musical pitch might be operating at a level below conscious thought, it 
is operating at the same level as spatial reasoning. If spatial reasoning requires 
conceptual abilities, then so too does the representation of musical pitch. 
If the opposition to this view of conceptual abilities is firmly entrenched, then we 
might be forced to concede the objection and retreat to the weak interpretation of the 
psychological hypothesis. The objection reviewed here-that the psychological abilities 
required for the representation of musical pitch do not count as conceptual abilities- 
does not threaten the weak interpretation of the empirical evidence. The contents of 
musical experience are mind-dependent, they fail to satisfy the MIC. We should then 
consider what mileage we can get out of the weak interpretation. 
8.4 A Weak Argument against the Phenomenological Claim 
The strong and weak interpretations of the empirical evidence give us correspondingly 
both a strong and weak argument against the phenomenological claim. The strong 
argument against DeBellis' weak nonconceptualism is that musical perception is not 
nonconceptual because the psychological capacities required would fail the MIC. This 
conclusion would then threaten the phenomenological claim for musical understanding 
in that it would create a gap between the musical experiences of trained and untrained 
listeners. Untrained listeners cannot have musical contents of the same type as the 
trained listeners as the former lack the requisite conceptual abilities. As the untrained 
153 
listeners would lack the required conceptual abilities for the representation of musical 
contents, so we would have reason to expect that the phenomenology of their perceptual 
experience would not be as rich as the trained listener. So then there would be no 
guarantee that the phenomenology of musical experience does hold in common between 
trained and untrained listeners. However, the strong argument may be rejected on the 
grounds that the psychological abilities that it describes do not count as conceptual 
abilities. The weak argument claims that the contents of musical experience are 
mediated contents because of their failure of the MIC, though this claim would be 
consistent with the claim that these contents are nonconceptual. I will say a bit more 
about mediated contents. 
By `mediated contents' I mean contents that require a special psychological ability 
for the representation of some property. These would be contents that represent some 
property that is not reducible solely to any physical cause in the environment-the 
property that these represent has both a physical external cause and an internal 
psychological component. Strictly speaking, the represented property is not a property 
of the object of the perceptual experience, rather it is a property of the experience itself. 
On this proposal auditory experiences have the property of tonality, sounds do not. As 
such properties like tonality could be called either `intentional properties' or `tertiary 
properties'. Mediated contents, if they do exist, would be nonconceptual contents in 
that the requisite psychological abilities that the subject must possess do not count as 
conceptual abilities, because they operate at a level below conscious thought. However 
these contents form a special class of nonconceptual contents that are distinct from, for 
instance, those contents that represent shape or colour properties. These latter contents 
could be described as being `fully nonconceptual'-they do not require that the subject 
possess any special conceptual ability in order for that subject to be in a certain content- 
bearing mental state, and the property that is represented in experience can be explained 
in terms of the subject's sensitivity to some feature of their perceived environment as 
the external cause of that represented property. Contents that are fully nonconceptual 
do satisfy the MIC. 
On the strong interpretation of the empirical evidence there would be no need to 
distinguish between mediated and unmediated contents. On the strong interpretation, 
the notion of nonconceptual content is narrower than on the weak interpretation. On the 
former, nonconceptual content is restricted to those perceptual contents that do satisfy 
the MIC. and any contents that fail to satisfy the MIC would be conceptual contents. 
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On the latter, however, the notion of nonconceptual content is broader as some of these 
contents will satisfy the MIC and some will not. Both mediated and unmediated 
contents would be nonconceptual on the weak interpretation. 
The weak argument against the phenomenological claim would hold that the 
psychological abilities required for the representation of musical pitch may be possessed 
to greater or lesser degrees in listeners. As was suggested by the developmental 
experiments conducted by Sloboda (pp. 136-138) musical sensitivity is something that 
develops over time. The supposition is that musical sensitivity develops as the 
listener's psychological abilities develop. The phenomenology of musical experience 
may not hold in common between two listeners due to a number of factors. It may be 
that two listeners differ in the degree to which their abilities have been developed, or it 
may be that two listeners differ with respect to the tonal system that they have been 
enculturated into. As these psychological abilities would be acquired through 
experience, then we may suppose that subjects who have had radically different past 
experiences may have developed different perceptual capacities. Some empirical 
evidence is starting to emerge that compares musical sensitivities between Western and 
non-Western listeners, however this evidence is quite sparse and incomplete partly 
because Western music has spread much beyond the West and partly because many of 
the researchers working in the psychology of music are working in the West. Relatively 
little data is available on the musical sensitivity of non-Western subjects. 6 
In terms of my overall project, the goal is to show that the phenomenological claim 
for musical understanding is unfounded-that is, I wish to show that the 
phenomenology of musical experience does not hold in common between all listeners. 
Both the strong and the weak arguments would suffice to make this claim. On either 
view the subject must possess a psychological ability for the representation of some 
musical properties. If one accepts my account of conceptual abilities, then the strong 
argument should work, however rejecting my account of conceptual abilities would 
seem to require that we adopt a distinction between mediated and unmediated contents. 
If this distinction is accepted, then we may retreat to the weak argument against the 
phenomenological claim. 
In the remaining chapters I wish to tie up a few loose ends. First, in Chapter Nine I 
will examine DeBellis strong argument for nonconceptualism in musical experience. 
6 However, see Carterette and Kendall (1999); Deutsch, Henthorn, Marvin and Xu (2004); Krumhansl 
(1990): Ch. 10; and Sloboda (1985): Ch. 7. 
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This is his claim that the contents of musical experience are not the same kind of mental 
state as belief states, and so a subject may be attributed a content-bearing mental state 
without the possession of any concepts whatsoever. I believe DeBellis does not give 
proper theoretical support to his claim and that a closer examination of the example he 
provides reveals the untenability of his position. Then in Chapter Ten I wish to present 
an alternative account of the representation of musical pitch. The motivation for writing 
this chapter is that, if we do accept my strong interpretation of the empirical evidence 
and hold that the psychological abilities required for the representation of musical pitch 
are conceptual abilities, then we must provide a plausible account of the representation 
of musical pitch, one that is able to account for both the physical properties of sound 
waves and the psychological properties of tonality. Finally, in Chapter Eleven I wish to 
examine one further interesting case where the contents of auditory experience may also 
fail the MIC, namely the auditory representation of spatiality. In this chapter I will 
apply the MIC to our perceived awareness of directionality through auditory experience 
and will enquire whether this too is a case that requires the listener's possession of a 




DEBELLIS' STRONG ARGUMENT FOR NONCONCEPTUALISM 
9.1 Statement of DeBellis' Strong Argument 
DeBellis offers two independent arguments for nonconceptualism. His second 
argument is meant to show that the contents of musical experience are not the same kind 
of mental state as belief states, where these latter present some information under a 
mode of presentation and, he claims, the former representations do not involve modes of 
presentation. DeBellis' strongly nonconceptual claim is the denial of what he calls the 
Belief Thesis-that musical hearing is a sort of perceptual belief (as discussed on p. 32), 
and that hearing ascriptions are ascriptions of perceptual belief. Again, a belief for 
DeBellis is a relation that holds between a subject and some information. The Belief 
Thesis is the claim that perceptual states are belief states of a certain kind, and belief 
states, we are told, are `unified under a single concept or mode of presentation'. I 
Beliefs, if they are beliefs about the same thing, must be type-identical mental states, 
where this is `for various tokens of that state to involve the same mode of presentation, 
to be exercises of the same concept'. 2 If a subject believes that a is F and believes that 
b is F, then of the objects a and b this subject believes the same thing, that is the subject 
believes that both are F. In belief statements such as these, `F stands for the same 
thing in both instances. On DeBeilis' view, the contents of beliefs exhibit generality. 
DeBellis' thought, then, is that if some mental state is a belief state, then at the very 
least subjects should be able to re-identify instances of that mental state that is, if a 
subject is able to believe that a is F, then they should be able to believe that b is F. 
DeBellis' claim that the contents of musical experience are strongly nonconceptual is 
the claim that the contents of musical experience are not beliefs in this way and that this 
can be demonstrated by examining cases where a listener hears some musically salient 
property in two different contexts and fails to recognise them as being the same. As he 
says, `in order to show that a certain state is not a belief, it is sufficient to show that 
different tokens of that state are not, as it were, unified under a single concept or mode 
1 DeBellis (1995): 58. 
2 Ibid. 
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of presentation in this way'. 3 
The view of type-identical perceptual beliefs that DeBellis has in mind is the sort of 
functionalist view found in Armstrong (1968). A subject who is able to, e. g., sort 
coloured cards into piles of red and non-red cards demonstrates a type-identical 
perceptual belief. The claim is that the subject represent the perceptual state (that `x is 
red') under a mode of presentation (in this case the mode of presentation red) even in 
the case where they do not possess any further conceptual capacity utilising the concept 
red beyond its application to perceptual beliefs. So, each time they place a card in the 
red pile, they represent the perceptual belief under the same mode of presentation, 
which is just to say that the subject has a perceptual belief that they recognise as being 
the same in some phenomenologically salient way to some other perceptual belief. 
DeBellis' task is then to show that subjects might fail to recognise that two experiences 
do share some phenomenologically salient property even though the object of both 
perceptual states is similar in what should be a salient way. And if subjects do fail in 
this way, then DeBellis takes this to show that perceptual states are not belief states. 
This is DeBellis' strong argument for nonconceptual musical contents: it is a rejection 
of DeBellis' Belief Thesis, thus contents that are strongly nonconceptual are not types 
of beliefs. 
The example DeBellis presents is one where a subject hears a melody where the 
same musical pitch occurs twice in that melody within a short space, and yet, oddly, 
many subjects often do not realise that the two pitches are identical. The example he 
gives is the first four measures of the American national anthem, `The Star Spangled 
Banner' :4 
Measure: (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Figure 9.1 
What we are interested in here are the notes that correspond to the two words in bold- 
the `Oh' in the pick-up measure (0), and `light' in measure four- in Figure 9.1. Both 
Ibid. 
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Oh-oh say can you see, by the dawn's ear -ly light... 
of these notes are F's, which is the dominant of B-flat-the key of this tune. DeBellis 
claims that, as these are both notes of the same pitch, then they should be represented in 
a subject's auditory experience under type-identical representations. Now, crucially, if 
these type-identical states were belief states, then subjects should be able to recognise 
them as being the same, to distinguish between instances of F from non-instances of F, 
and to recognise when they hear F again. However subjects have a real difficulty with 
this example-most non-musicians do not notice that the first note in measure (0) is the 
same pitch as the first note in measure (4). As DeBellis says of this example, this is 
not simply a matter of not knowing what the label `F' refers to; the listener cannot tell, in general, 
when two pitches of the melody are the same ... and when they are different. He cannot reliably discriminate between same-pitch pairs and different-pitch pairs; he is not (in general) able to grasp 
them as the same. Yet, on the given theory, he has type-identical representations of such pitches; 
hence, that representations (qua type) cannot be a belief and cannot involve perceptual concepts of 
absolute pitch locations. 5 
The two instances of F in measures (0) and (4) are both represented by type-identical 
contents, and yet average listeners are unable to tell whether these two pitches are the 
same or not. DeBellis claims that these states therefore cannot be belief states-that 
they are not represented under the same mode of presentation-which is proven by the 
listener's inability to perceptibly recognise instances of the same pitch. 
9.2 Criticisms of DeBellis' Strong Argument 
The example DeBellis constructs is meant to be like the case of sorting colour cards into 
piles of red and non-red cards. This sorting ability is hypothesised as being due to the 
subject's exercising of a perceptual belief. But in the case of Figure 9.1, the subject 
seems to be incapable of exhibiting what could be thought of as an analogous kind of 
sorting ability, the ability to sort instances of hearing an F from instances of hearing 
non-F. Unfortunately, DeBellis does not examine why it is that subjects often have such 
difficulty with this example, rather he just presents this as an obvious case proving his 
point-that the listener's failure to re-identify the same pitch again in such a short span 
of time proves that the representations of the F's in (0) and (4) are not a belief states. 
But there are two problems with this argument. First, the example is flawed-it 




identical representations, this does not seem to demand that we accept his point about 
the status of these representational contents. Taking my first objection, the flaw in the 
example is that the F in measure (4) is preceded by an E-natural, which modulates the 
tonality of the succeeding section from the key of B-flat into the key of F. The thrust of 
DeBellis' argument is meant to be that a subject should be able to recognise the 
sameness of the note F in (0) to that of the F in (4), as he hypothesises that any token 
representation of F should be type-identical with any other token representation of F. 
And yet subjects typically do not recognise the similarity between these two pitches. 
Considering the relative chroma model of pitch representation, I understand that 
view as arguing that pitch is represented as chromatic distance relative to some 
reference point, which is typically the tonic. The tune in Figure 9.1 begins in the key of 
B-flat-major, which, on the relative chroma model of representation, should make the 
first F in (0) the 5 of B-flat. But after the modulation in measure (4), the tonality has 
shifted to F-major, which would make the F in (4) the 1 of F-major-after the 
modulation in (3), the tune resolves to a different tonic. If the relative chroma model is 
accepted as a plausible account of the way in which melodies are represented in the 
contents of a listener's auditory experience, which DeBellis' seems to have accepted up 
to this point, then unsurprisingly listeners should not represent the F in (0) as being the 
same as the F in (4). Rather the F in (0) should be represented as the 5 of B-flat-major, 
and the F in (4) should be represented as the 1 of F-major. On the relative chroma 
model, subjects should represent this: 
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Figure 9.2 
Notice that the two F's are represented by different chroma values in Figure 9.2. 
DeBellis' argument seems to rely on the claim that subjects are unable to detect the 
similarity between two notes in terms of absolute pitch. This is evident in the quote 
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above, where DeBellis says `that representations (qua type) cannot be a belief and 
cannot involve perceptual concepts of absolute pitch locations. '6 But why should they? 
We have not yet been given any reason to think that subjects should be expected to be 
able to do this-we have not been given any reason to believe that hearing ascriptions 
represent melodies in absolute pitch. Up to this point, we have been assuming the 
relative chroma model of pitch representation, on which the F in (0) is not type-identical 
with the F in (4)-again, the former is the 5 of B-flat-major whereas the latter is the 1 of 
F-major. Therefore it should be no surprise that subjects often don't notice the 
similarity in absolute pitch between the two F's-it is not absolute pitch that is 
represented on this model. What is salient to the representation of a sound as a musical 
tone is the identification of that sound as having a particular melodic function. It might 
be worrying if it could be shown that listeners are incapable of recognising when two 
tones have the same melodic function, but this is not what DeBellis has shown. All he 
has shown is that listeners cannot reliably tell when two sounds are the same frequency. 
DeBellis' justification for thinking that the perceptual states that represent the F's in 
measures (0) and (4) ought to be type-identical is unfounded. There is no reason to 
think that these should be type-identical mental states. In fact, there is very good reason 
to believe that they are not type-identical: after the modulation, the first F in (0) is 
similar to the second F in (4) only in pitch, they differ as to their melodic functions. 
The case that he is describing is nothing like the case of sorting coloured cards into piles 
of red and non-red. If these notes are represented under some mode of presentation, 
then these would be the mode of presentation 5 for the F in (0) and the mode of 
presentation 1 for the F in (4). The example DeBellis offers fails because the two F's 
are distinguishable and so should not be type-identical representational states. These 
representational states represent the same sound as having two different melodic 
functions, therefore they are phenomenally distinct experiences, and therefore they 
possess different representational contents. In which case, it is no wonder that listeners 
cannot reliably tell that the two pitches in question are both instances of F. 
My second objection to DeBellis' argument is that, even if we accept DeBellis' 
analysis of what is going on in the representation of Figure 9.1, this does not seem to 
demand that we accept that these states cannot be belief states. DeBellis' strong 
argument is intended to deny that perceptual states that represent musical experience are 
6 Ibid. 
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a kind of belief state. He then presents Figure 9.1 as a case where a subject's perceptual 
state should be type-identical to another perceptual state that the subject was in only 
moments before, and yet average listeners are often unaware of the similarity between 
the two F-state-tokens. The explanation that DeBellis offers to understand why subjects 
often fail to type-identify the two instances of the F is that these mental states are not 
belief states. But that is simply moving too quickly. 
DeBellis' claim that perceptual states must be type-identical if they are to be belief 
states that have the same content seems unfounded. Think again of the example of 
sorting coloured cards into piles of red and non-red cards. However, also suppose that 
the deck of cards the subject is sorting contains some cards that are different shades of 
red-some dark red, some light red-as well as cards that are different shades of other 
colours, such as green, blue, and yellow. If the subject's task is to sort the cards into 
piles of red and non-red, then the subject may still make one pile for all the differently 
shaded red cards even though they are obviously distinct shades of red. If the subject is 
a normal perceiver and is perceptually sensitive to the differences in these shades of red, 
then presumably the corresponding perceptual states are not type-identical. And yet the 
subject places these cards in the `red' pile. In actual fact, it shows a certain conceptual 
sophistication if a subject is able to think `This is a red card' while also being aware that 
it is a different shade of red from any other card in their red pile. Now, admittedly, in 
the example that DeBellis offers, the listener is not able to do something analogous to 
this-the listener is not able to recognise that tones having different melodic functions 
are actually members of the same pitch-class-and to that extent this listener is not that 
conceptually sophisticated. But that does not give us a reason to believe that these notes 
are represented under some mode of presentation. It just means that notes of the same 
pitch class can be represented by different modes of presentation. That notes of the 
same pitch class can be represented by different modes of presentation should be 
unsurprising as this is just the intended use of the notion of mode of presentation. 
Furthermore, why should we think that the existence of distinguishable perceptual 
states would threaten the Belief Thesis? On the one hand, it cannot be the case that 
every belief state corresponds to just one perceptual state-type, otherwise the subject 
who is sorting the deck of cards into red and non-red piles should make separate piles 
for each distinct shade of red. DeBellis' has not given any justification for the thought 
that beliefs cannot be realised by more than one type of perceptual state, nor do I think 
he would want to defend this. On the other hand, even if belief state-types can only be 
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realised by one perceptual state-type, DeBellis has not yet shown that distinguishable 
perceptual states are not belief states tout court. All he has shown is that distinguishable 
perceptual states may not realise some particular belief state-type. Of course there will 
be borderline cases where a subject will be in doubt as to whether, e. g., a particular card 
is more red or more yellow, and their being in doubt certainly shows that these mental 
states do not involve the same mode of presentation, but that does not mean that the 
mental states are not belief states. Think again of the musical example DeBellis offers 
(Figure 9.1). What the subject fails to realise is that the first note in measure (0) is a 
member of the same pitch-class as the last note in measure (4), so the subject fails to 
represent them under the mode of presentation F, but this does not prove that the subject 
does not represent the two notes under any mode of presentation at all. As my first 
objection showed, it seems more likely that the subject does represent the F in (0) under 
the mode of presentation dominant and represents the F in (4) under the mode of 
presentation tonic. 
9.3 Conclusion 
DeBellis argues that the contents of musical experience are strongly nonconceptual on 
the grounds that these are not the same kind of mental state as belief states. Belief states 
can be individuated by their mode of presentation, and DeBellis claims that the contents 
of musical experience are not represented under any mode of presentation he thinks can 
be demonstrated by showing that subjects are not able to type-identify instances of the 
same pitch class. 
But I have argued that there is no reason to think that subjects should be able to do 
this. The example that DeBellis provides, claiming that the two F's in Figure 9.1, ought 
to be represented by the same mode of presentation. However, on my understanding of 
the relative chroma model of pitch representation, these mental states are not type- 
identical. Each mental state represents the same pitch class as having a different 
melodic function. It is still open to us to think that the representation of melodic 
function might be a mode of presentation, as DeBellis' argument has failed to convince 
otherwise. 
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CHAPTER TEN : 
THE REPRESENTATION OF MUSICAL PITCH 
In Chapter Seven I presented some empirical evidence for the perception of musical 
pitch. The evidence examined suggests that tonality is the defining characteristic of the 
perception of musical pitch and that auditory experience represents sound-events as 
possessing the properties of tonality by a psychological capacity that a listener possesses 
for the parsing of auditory stimulus. The tonal schema is a psychologically necessary 
condition on the perception of musical pitch. In Chapter Eight I examined DeBellis' 
weak argument for the claim that the contents of musical experience are nonconceptual 
and argued that his arguments fails because there is no sufficiently mind-independent 
difference between intentionally distinct representational contents that would satisfy the 
Mind-Independence Constraint. Rather the properties of music that are represented in 
auditory experience are the sort of properties that require something mental for their 
instantiation, namely the sort of psychological capacities described in Chapter Seven. 
This has left us with two alternatives: we may either reject that the contents of 
musical experience are nonconceptual in the way that DeBellis has described or we may 
argue that the contents of musical experience require a notion of mediated contents 
where these are still nonconceptual but dependent upon the listener's possession of a 
special psychological ability for their representation. If we do accept the stronger 
alternative, then it becomes necessary to offer an explanation of how it is that the 
representation of musical pitch is conceptual. In this chapter I will take up this 
challenge. My argument will be that, as far as the representation of musical pitch is 
concerned, the contents of musical experience have both a nonconceptual and a 
conceptual component. I will argue that part of what is involved in the representation of 
musical pitch is the listener's sensitivity to the purely acoustical property of physical 
frequency. Additionally, it also involves the representation of sounds has having some 
melodic function. These are two necessary but distinct components of the 
representation of musical pitch. Thus the representation of musical pitch is `mixed' 
content: a nonconceptual representation of physical frequency and a conceptual 
representation of melodic function. The discussion here will proceed under the 
assumption that we accept the strong argument against DeBellis' nonconceptualism; 
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however the view of contents that I will defend here would be compatible with the weak 
argument as well. 
10.1 A Proposal: Raff nan 's Theory of Nuance 
There does seem to be something intuitively compelling about the claim that musical 
perception is nonconceptual. Musical experience seems to be highly fine-grained. Any 
account of music perception must be able to explain the fine-grainedness of musical 
experience, yet in my examination of the empirical evidence I say nothing about this. In 
the present chapter I will provide a positive account of the representation of musical 
pitch that both accounts for the fine-grainedness of music perception and squares with 
my objections to DeBellis. I believe that these desiderata can be satisfied by adopting 
Raffman's account of nuance. I 
In Chapter Seven I explained how an octave is divided into the eight notes unevenly 
spaced notes of a diatonic scale and that the distance in frequency between these notes 
can be expressed by regular mathematical ratios. Tones that stand in a 9: 8 ratio are a 
major second; tones standing in a 4: 3 ratio are a perfect fourth; tones standing in a 8: 5 
ratio are a minor sixth; and so on. However, in actual live musical performances, these 
frequencies or ratios are often not exactly right. A musician might play Concert A 
slightly flat, say at 435Hz; or she might play the major third (the interval between, say, 
A and C-sharp) slightly sharp, going from 440Hz to 565Hz. Think of the large choirs 
that one might hear singing in a church service-it is nearly impossible to insure that 
each singer of the group will produce tones of exactly the same frequency. 
Tones are identified by pitch class, however tones rarely ever fall unambiguously 
within the bounds of a class of pitch. Pitch classes are vague concepts-the boundaries 
between two pitch classes are vaguely defined. For instance the note middle C roughly 
corresponds to the frequency 523Hz, and the B just below that roughly corresponds to 
490Hz. So, is the frequency 507Hz a middle C or a B? The answer is that it can be 
heard as either-507Hz may be heard as a slightly flat middle C or as a slightly sharp B. 
In the right context, these tones are heard as nuances of their respective pitch classes. 
Musical experience is more fine-grained than is demonstrated by one's ability to 
identify tones by pitch class. 
Raffman (1993). 
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Music-listeners are sensitive to such discrepancies. Pitch is heard across the entire 
auditory spectrum, analogously to the way in which colour is perceived across the 
colour spectrum. We see not only the primary shades like red, yellow, green and blue, 
but also all of the fine-grained differences in colour shade in between. Similarly with 
music, we hear not only A's and B-flats, but also many of the nuances of tone that fall 
along this boundary. Proof of perceptual sensitivity to these fine-grained uses of tone 
can be illustrated by a musician's use of vibrato-that shimmering effect that a 
musician achieves by alternately sharpening and flattening a tone in a rhythmic pulse 
across the fundamental pitch. Attending to a musician's use of vibrato is a clear 
example of a listener's perceptual sensitivity to such very fine-grained changes in 
auditory frequency. The listener hears the note `quivering', but always hears it as being 
the same note, or as being an instance of a certain pitch class. Furthermore, musicians 
often use these `nuances' intentionally to achieve a certain aesthetic effect. For 
instance, playing an interval slightly flat may produce a `dull' feel, alternatively playing 
an interval slightly sharp may produce a `fiery' or `agitated' sound. Nuances are often 
used intentionally in musical performance to accentuate certain stylistic effects. 
Performers use these nuances to their advantage when offering their own interpretations 
of a piece of music, and are often praised or criticised on these grounds. 
As Raffman explains, pitch class is not the `shallowest' level of hearing that most 
people are perceptually sensitive to, as the phenomenon of nuance illustrates. As she 
says, `our conscious perception of [nuance] in a musical performance indicates that the 
mental score is inferred from a still shallower level of representation at which these 
fine-grained within-category values are recovered'. 2 The ear training student's job is to 
learn how to make `category judgments' of pitch class. When an ear training student 
writes out a score for a simple melody, their task is to identify the tones at the level of 
pitch class, which, to put this in Raffman's terminology, is the `C-pitch' level of 
representation. C-pitch is that level of auditory perception that represents sound-events 
only as fine-grained as the classes of musical pitch that, say, the Western chromatic 
tonal system will allow. C-pitch roughly corresponds to pitch class. However, as our 
perceptual sensitivity to nuance shows, actual sound-events do not neatly fit into these 
coarse-grained distinctions. This more fine-grained level of nuance perception is what 
Raffman refers to as the `N-pitch' level of representation. N-pitch representation, 
z Raffman (1993): 67. 
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Raffman claims, is the shallowest level of pitch perception. 3 Raffman also uses the 
terms `C-interval' and `N-interval' to denote the difference between the coarse-grained 
music-theoretic conception of intervals and those fine-grained distances between two 
tones that are actually heard in musical performance. In what follows, I will attempt to 
provide a positive account of the representation of musical pitch that satisfies both our 
intuitions about the fine-grainedness of musical experience and the theoretical 
constraints placed on the contents of experience by the MIC by reviewing and 
expanding upon Raffman's account of nuance. 
I want to suggest a mixed view of perceptual contents for the representation of 
musical pitch. Borrowing Raffman's use of the distinction between C-pitch and N-pitch 
representations, I suggest that C-pitch representation is the sort of content that is the 
result of classifying incoming auditory stimuli along the internalised schema where the 
product of this process is a judgment of pitch class, while N-pitch representation is 
additionally represented along the physical frequency spectrum. 4 I will argue that the 
incoming auditory stimulus is represented in a listener's auditory awareness as a series 
of N-pitch representations, which are then organised into a musical structure by 
employing the internal schema to construct a mental score at the C-pitch level. In 
making this argument, I will occasionally refer back to the hypothesis suggested by the 
stretched scale experiment (pp. 130-134). 
As Raffman puts it, schematisation is a `psychologically necessary condition' for the 
N-pitch level of auditory experience to be represented as having those musically salient 
relations that hold at the C-pitch level. 5 For Raffman, C-pitch representation captures 
3 Is the use of the term `level' here significant? Do the C-pitch and N-pitch representations indicate 
different `levels' of representational content? In Raffinan's usage of C-pitch and N-pitch, she seems to 
suggest that it does, as when she says that pitch class is not the shallowest level of representation (1993: 
65-67). Raffman seems to be suggesting that N-pitch is the raw data of musical experience (which I take 
it would be something like what Evans calls informational content, or what Dretske would call the 
analogue content) while C-pitch is a level of representation that, to speak loosely, happens on top of the 
N-pitch level. I am uncertain as to whether I want to adopt Raffman's distinction between levels of 
representation. Another question that I am undecided on is whether the N-pitch and C-pitch contents are 
separate and distinct kinds of contents, or whether these are both of the same kind. It may be that N-pitch 
is something like an analogue, informational signal, which would be the level of content available to the 
pre-cognate workings of the auditory system, while C-pitch is a level of representation that lies 
somewhere below doxastic belief where contents begin to take on some belief-like structure that is 
imposed upon it by the mind. This is the model that I am considering, however much more thought needs 
to be given to these questions. 
4 This is essentially what Raffnan argues in her (1993): Ch. 4. My contribution to this argument is to 
make explicit the mixed nature of these contents. 
5 Ibid.: 83. This interpretation does seem to concord with Raffinan's explanation of nuance ineffability. 
There she claims that what is ineffable about musical nuance is the inability for verbalisation of the N- 
pitch level of representation. For more on ineffability and nuance, see her (1993), especially chapters 2 
and 4. 
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the relations between sound-events that are of musical significance and can be 
expressed in music-theoretic terms as the sort of relations that hold between the notes of 
the Western diatonic system; N-pitch is basically the representation of the physical 
frequency of a sound wave. Raffman's C-pitch and N-pitch levels of representation are 
jointly necessary to account for the richness of our musical experience. The C-pitch 
level of representation alone is not enough as this fails to account for the fine- 
grainedness of musical experience, while the N-pitch level of representation alone 
would fail to account for those tonal relations that are salient to a listener's musical 
experience. The suggestion, then, is that the contents of musical experience must take 
into account both C-pitch and N-pitch representation. The view that I am proposing 
follows Raffman's account very closely. I am doing little more here than taking 
Raffman's account, expanding on parts that she does not emphasise and explaining how 
her account fits in with the questions raised in this dissertation. 
The plausibility of this claim rests on two key points. The first is that C-pitch 
representation is due to a process of auditory schematisation that is a `psychologically 
necessary condition' for the representation of musical pitch. The second point is the 
plausibility of the claim that the contents of the perception of musical pitch consists of 
two parts-the N-pitch representation of physical frequency, which I claim is 
nonconceptual, and the C-pitch representation of musical pitch class, which I claim 
requires the schematisation discussed above. Here I am arguing for a mixed view of 
contents whereby the simple representation of physical frequency is nonconceptual 
(there are no conceptual abilities that a listener must possess in order to be in a certain 
contentful auditory perceptual state), but that the perception of musical pitch is 
conceptual in that the listener must possess a psychological capacity for the 
schematisation of tones into pitch classes. In this way, the perception of auditory events 
does not represent experience as having any musical quality until such contents are 
schematised. Insofar as some representational content is nonconceptual, it must to that 
extent also be non-musical, or at least it cannot be represented by the listener as music 
or as having any musical significance unless it is schematised. In the spirit of 
Helmholtz, we could say that auditory experience that is unschematised tumbles about 
in the confusion of non-musical sounds. In this first part of this chapter I will offer 
some reasons for thinking that tonal schematisation is a psychologically necessary 
condition on pitch perception, and in the second part I will offer a sketch of what is 
meant by this mixed content proposal. 
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10.2 Psychological Schemas as a Necessary Condition 
The first issue to consider is the claim that tonal schematisation really is a 
psychologically necessary condition for the perception of musical pitch. Why should 
we accept this? Apart from the empirical evidence, a reason to accept this claim 
emerges when we reflect on the pleasure or displeasure that a listener feels when 
presented with some music. The pleasure we take in listening to music is intimately tied 
up in the act of perceiving the music. One interesting feature of music perception is that 
sometimes, as in the case of a poor musical performance, a sequence of notes will sound 
out-of-tune. 6 Such is the case when one listens to the musical efforts of a beginner 
whose sense of intonation is still undeveloped their performance might approximate 
the right pitch class, but they fail to get the fine details of the intervals right. Proper 
intonation is a very difficult and highly prized skill that one masters only after years of 
practise. While the beginner's performance might accidentally contain an interval that 
an accomplished musician would use as a nuance, the beginner is unable to achieve this 
very regularly they are unable to use the `nuanced' intervals appropriately. 
What is important, however, is that the student's performance is heard as being out- 
of-tune and displeasing. Why should it sound displeasing? Why should a beginner's 
performance be painful to listen to? On the view of pitch perception that we are 
considering, a listener's sensitivity to intonation, like their sensitivity to nuance, seems 
to indicate that two things are happening at once. First, the listener must identify the 
sounds musically-that is, they must represent the sound as falling within some pitch 
class (C-pitch in Raffman's terms). Second, while identifying the tone as belonging to 
some pitch class, the listener must also hear the tone as either being a fitting or an 
unfitting member of that pitch class. The explanation for this that Raffman suggests is 
that `an interval is out-of-tune only relative to some standard or prototype ... [thus] we 
hear mistuned intervals as mistuned instances of the twelve C-intervals, not as in-tune 
instances of microtonal N-intervals'. 7 In order for a listener to hear an interval as being 
out-of-tune on this view, the listener must be capable of identifying correct instances of 
an interval. Intonation is then explained this way: a listener identifies two tones by C- 
pitch; the listener's possession of a tonal schema leads them to have expectations of the 
correct ratio between the two C-pitches; the listener then hears a tone as in-tune if the 
ratio between the two N-pitches squares with their expectation; alternatively the listener 
6 [bid.: 66. 
7 Ibid.: 85. 
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would hear the tone as out-of-tune if the ratio between the two N-pitches is radically off 
or if the relative tonal distances are not preserved systematically. (Remember how the 
stretched scale experiment showed us that a scale based on unusually large intervals will 
sound to be correctly formed to a listener provided that the augmentation of the tones is 
systematic throughout. ) 
If Raffman is right in suggesting that C-pitch schematisation is a necessary 
psychological condition on the representation of pitch, then this has the interesting 
result that C-pitch schematisation does make a phenomenological contribution to the 
way that musical experience feels to the listener, and this is shown by the case of 
intonation. What is significant about our sensitivity to intonation is that this case 
exhibits a clear phenomenological salience. Poor intonation is displeasing to listen to. 
One does not judge intonation academically, as if one is able to bracket off the feeling 
of displeasure from the perceptual experience in judgment. On this account, the 
phenomenological aspect of musical experience is the result of a clash between N-pitch 
and C-pitch representation, to speak somewhat metaphorically. 
Here I have offered some observations on the perception of intonation in addition to 
those made by Raffman that lend strength to the claim that schematisation is a 
psychologically necessary condition. The phenomenology of tonality is the result of the 
listener's perceiving the physical frequencies of sounds given at the level of N-pitch 
representation as standing in certain relations to other sounds at a level of C-pitch 
representation. It is Raffman's point that N-pitch representation is necessary to explain 
the fine-grainedness of auditory experience while C-pitch representation is necessary to 
explain the phenomenological salience of tonality. We are not able to identify tones by 
N-pitch as this is simply too fine. Our lack of an ability to identify tones at the N-pitch 
level means that we cannot identify (or verbalise) these fine-grained nuances, though we 
are sensitive to them in perceptual experience. Raffman makes a very nice point in 
support of this when she claims that, were our recognitional capacities to extend to the 
N-pitch level of representation, then we would not be able to hear nuance, rather we 
would hear each distinct tone as each belonging to indefinitely many pitch classes. If 
that were the case, then we would no longer be able to recognise the tonal relations that 
hold at the C-pitch level such as melodies as `the melody ... would vanish 
in a sea of 
8 fine details'. 
8 Ibid.: 85-86. 
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10.3 The Mixed Content View of Musical Pitch 
I would now like to turn to my second concern, which is to show how the contents of 
the perception of musical pitch may be mixed. In Chapter Five I defined the notion of 
some content's being attributionally nonconceptual as a subject's being in a content- 
bearing representational state even though the subject lacks the conceptual abilities that 
would normally be required for that subject to be in a belief state with the same content. 
By `mixed contents' I am suggesting that the contents representing musical pitch 
involves two distinct representational components, one of which is nonconceptual while 
the other is not. Contents may be mixed when it is required that a subject possess a 
certain conceptual ability for the representation of some component of that mental 
content. It is not necessary that the subject must possess a conceptual ability for each 
component of that representational state. And this is just what I am claiming about the 
representational contents of musical pitch, that it is partly nonconceptual with respect to 
what is represented at the N-pitch level, but is conceptual with respect to what is 
represented at the C-pitch level. In what follows, I will attempt to distinguish these two 
components of the representational contents of musical pitch and explain how they fit 
together. 
First, the representation of the physical properties of sound-frequency, intensity and 
duration-are nonconceptual contents, which means that a listener need not possess any 
special conceptual ability for the representation of these acoustical properties. In more 
detail, my suggestion is that auditory stimuli is presented to the listener merely as a 
series of sound-events that can be tracked and represented by the listener in terms of 
their perceived frequency, intensity and duration. The content of auditory experience at 
this level could be thought of as corresponding to the representational graph of an 
auditory spectrograph. At this most primitive nonconceptual level of auditory 
perception, what is represented in experience is an undifferentiated complex sound 
structure having no obvious musical significance. This level of perceptual experience is 
subpersonal and preconceptual. This is the N-pitch level of representation. Auditory 
experience is represented at this level as being a certain way describable in terms of the 
representation of certain acoustical properties, and as such these contents would satisfy 
the MIC as the properties of frequency, intensity and duration are all properly mind- 
independent properties. The content of N-pitch representation is common to both 
concept-using and non-concept-using creatures. 
When sound is interpreted as music, however, another representational component is 
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added to the raw auditory signal. The hypothesis from empirical psychology is that the 
N-pitch level of auditory information is fed into a psychological ordering mechanism- 
the tonal schema-that quantifies the complex sound structure into discrete frequency 
classes. At this point the individual sound-events making up the N-pitch information 
are ordered according to closeness of fit within the expected schematic tonal 
framework. The internalised schema of a Western subject consists of twelve discrete 
pitch classes corresponding to the twelve notes of the chromatic scale (see Figure 7.3, p. 
127) arranged within a hierarchy of stability relations, thus the task of the internal 
schema is to quantify the N-pitch input into the best fit of C-pitch note classes. This 
quantification into C-pitch assigns the sound a position within the tonal hierarchy, at 
which point musical relations that hold at the level of pitch class (consonance and 
dissonance) then become available to the listener through the listener's having built up a 
set of expectations for each melodic function. Representation at the level of C-pitch is 
the business of those theories of musical representation like Schenkerian analysis or 
GTTM. I leave it open which of these models best describes the way in which music is 
represented at the C-pitch level. For my purposes it is enough that, whatever the model, 
music must be represented in these C-pitch terms. However, the representational 
systems postulated by GTTM or Schenkerian analysis only takes into account the 
representational content of the musical relations at the C-pitch level of description. All 
that is represented by the C-pitch mental map are tonal relations. While this sort of 
representation is a necessary condition for tonality to play a role in the representation 
contents of experience, a full account of the representational content of a listener's 
experience would require a way of capturing the specific notes that a listener hears. 
The proposal that I am offering for the mixed contents of the representation of 
musical pitch could be described like this: contents that represent musical pitch consists 
of an ordered dyad of N-pitch and C-pitch constituents. The dyad representing a 
musical pitch would be order like this: <N-pitch, C-pitch>. For the listener who hears 
`Mary had a Little Lamb' in the key of C-major, the first note, an E, would be 
represented as `<659Hz, 3>', where `659Hz' denotes the actual N-pitch heard 
representing the physical frequency and `3' denotes the tonal function that the C-pitch 
schematisation has tacked on. 9 If this were the case, then the content of a listener's 
9 This is somewhat incomplete, as this description only covers frequency and tonal function. Other 
features that might enter into the content of the auditory experience would be intensity, duration, tempo, 
rhythmic grouping, and perhaps the sound's spatial location relative to the listener. A complete 
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pitch representation of the opening phrase of `Mary had a Little Lamb' in the key of C- 
major: 
would look like this: 
<659Hz, 3> - <587Hz, 2> - <523Hz, 1> - <587Hz, 2> - <659Hz, 3> - <659Hz, 3> - <659Hz, 3> 
Figure 10.1 
This proposal would allow for us to distinguish between a listener who hears `Mary 
had a Little Lamb' in C-major from a listener who hears the same melody in, say, D- 
major. A listener who heard `Mary had a Little Lamb' in D-major would represent the 
tones as having the same chroma values as in Figure 10.1 above. The difference, 
however, would be captured by the constituent of the N-pitch place. So, `Mary had a 
Little Lamb' in D-major would be represented like this: 
<733Hz, 3> - <659Hz, 2> - <587Hz, 1> - <659Hz, 2> - <733Hz, 3> - <733Hz, 3> - <733Hz, 3> 
Figure 10.2 
This would also offer a way of incorporating Raffman's point about the perception of 
nuance. A normal E (659Hz) might be represented as `<659Hz, 3'> while an E that is 
played slightly flat would be represented as `<650Hz, 3'>. In both cases, the listener 
represents the tone as 3, which accounts for the listener's hearing the two tones as 
having the same melodic function, while the N-pitch component of the dyad accounts 
for the nuance. Additionally, the mixed view of content could also be seen as taking on 
the two conditions for the perception of musical pitch hypothesised by psychologists, N- 
pitch and C-pitch taking the place of pitch height and octave equivalence respectively. 
There are two final points I should make clear. On this mixed view of contents, N- 
pitch content is present in the perceptual experience `all the way up', to borrow a phrase 
description of the representational content of a musical experience would require a very complex 
description. All that concerns me here is that some of the constituent elements of this content would 
satisfy the MIC (frequency, intensity, duration) while others are the result of some psychological ordering 
mechanism (tonal function, rhythmic grouping, and spatial location). 
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from Stalnaker. ' ° This is a point that Raffman also makes toward the end of her (1993): 
§4.2. The representational contents of musical pitch are constituted by both N-pitch and 
C-pitch representations. The nonconceptual N-pitch constituent is present very early on 
in the experience from the simple causal-mechanical process that goes on in the inner 
ear that begins with encoding the acoustical stimuli into an informational signal and 
remains present after the schematisation process identifies the tone as belong to some 
pitch class. 
Finally, both the N-pitch and C-pitch constituents of the ordered dyad make their 
own contributions to the phenomenology of the experience. We represent a sound as 
being some musical tone by hearing it as standing in certain (tonal) relations to other 
sounds. This is the representation of C-pitch where a sound is heard as belonging to 
some pitch class or other. The phenomenological contribution that pitch class makes 
was discussed in Chapter Seven-hearing a tone as being consonant or dissonant is a 
function of hearing it as belonging to some pitch class. And it is through N-pitch 
representation we identify the pitch height (differences in physical frequency) and 
perceive intonation and nuance. Imagine what musical experience would be like if 
either of these two components were missing. C-pitch representation alone would lack 
any phenomenology as it would lack pitch height, intonation and nuance; while N-pitch 
representation alone would lack tonality. This is just what non-musical sound is-N- 
pitch representation that has not been schematised. As Kant said, `Thoughts without 
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind'. I I In this instance, it would be 
C-pitch representation alone that would be empty and N-pitch representation alone that 
would be blind. While the phenomenology of intonation and nuance are due to a clash 
between what a listener expects to hear and what a listener actually hears, the 
phenomenological contribution of N-pitch is no less important than that of C-pitch. 
Indeed, it is the clash between these two that lends musical experience with the rich, 
`glittering' phenomenology that it has. 
10 Stalnaker (2003): 106. Stalnaker makes this point in reference to a claim by McDowell. McDowell 
worries that the contents of mental states involving perceptual experience cannot be different kinds of 
contents, as if they were then the epistemic link between perception and belief would have to be a link 
between contents of different kinds, which he finds implausible. Rather, McDowell argues that contents 
are of the same kind in both perception and belief, and if they are of the same kind then they must be 
conceptual `all the way down'. Stalnaker by contrast argues that belief states are about perceptual states, 
and belief states retain the content of perceptual states, so the epistemic link between conceptual and 
nonconceptual contents would remain if we thought of contents as nonconceptual `all the way up'. 
" Kant (1781/1787): A51/1375. 
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10.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, any account of auditory perception must take into account both the 
musical relations that hold at the C-pitch level as well as those qualities of musical 
nuance that must come out of the N-pitch level in order to accurately describe the 
representation of musical pitch. I have tried to accommodate this by offering a mixed 
content account claiming that the representation of musical pitch must be a structured 
content that represents both the mind-independent property of physical frequency (N- 
pitch) as well as the mind-dependent schematised property of tonality (C-pitch). What 
is musical about auditory experience would fail to satisfy the MIC, however the N-pitch 
component of the representational content would clearly count as nonconceptual. 
The view that I have expressed here assumes the strong argument against 
nonconceptualism-that the required psychological abilities for the representation of 
musical pitch are conceptual abilities. If this strong argument does not work, then we 
must resort to the weak argument, which posits the need for a mind-dependent mediated 
content. The mixed view of contents expressed here does not conflict with the weak 
argument. Indeed, this mixed view of contents may provide a way of understanding the 
nature of mediated contents. On the theory of mediated contents, the representational 
contents of musical pitch would be a nonconceptual mental state that has an added 
psychological component that is responsible for the representation of tonality. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: 
THE REPRESENTATION OF SPATIAL LOCATION 
IN AUDITORY EXPERIENCE 
In the previous chapters I argued that what is musical about the representation of 
musical pitch would fail to satisfy the Mind-Independence Constraint. This failure to 
satisfy the MIC then calls into question whether the contents of these representational 
states are conceptual contents or mediated contents. In this chapter I would like to 
examine another auditory phenomenon that offers an equally enigmatic problem, 
namely the representation of spatial location in auditory experience. Often, auditory 
experience seems to exhibit spatial qualities. Sounds often seem to be on the left, or on 
the right, or to come from directly behind, or being near or far. It seems to be part of 
our auditory experience that we hear directionality and distance. The spatial quality of 
auditory experience is such a commonplace perceptual phenomenon that its existence as 
a phenomenon hardly needs to be commented upon. Yet it is deeply perplexing how 
auditory experience comes to acquire this spatial quality. For one thing, spatial location 
is not a feature of auditory experience that can be accounted for by referring to any 
physical property of the sound wave. Therefore, while auditory experience can have a 
spatial quality, sounds themselves do not. So how does auditory experience acquire this 
spatial quality? 
In what follows, I will offer an account of how auditory experience can have a spatial 
content. I will position this concern within the intentionalist theory of perception that 
we have been working with. Furthermore, I will position my view within a strong 
interpretation of intentionalism. To remind the reader, in its strong form, intentionalists 
hold that any difference between two perceptual experiences is a difference that can be 
accounted for by a full description of the representational contents of the experiences. 
On this view, if two perceptual experiences have the same representational contents, 
then they must be phenomenally indistinguishable as well. 
I will begin by examining more closely whether spatiality could be reducible to some 
acoustical property. My argument will be that it cannot, rather spatiality in auditory 
experience is an intentional property of experience. Like tonality, auditory experience 
represents spatiality because the mind makes a cognitive addition to the content of the 
176 
experience. While the discussion of this chapter is a departure from the main concern of 
this dissertation (examining how the contents of perceptual experience may act as the 
basis for understanding music) the problem of the representation of spatiality does aid in 
our understanding of the contents of auditory experience and the theoretical force of the 
MIC. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate yet another way in which cognition 
plays a role in fixing the contents of auditory experience. My reason for demonstrating 
this here is because I do not want musical pitch to look like a strange and isolated 
auditory phenomenon. By demonstrating how the representation of musical pitch is 
akin to the auditory representation of spatiality, I hope to expand upon the range of 
intentional properties in auditory experience. 
11.1 Contrasting the Spatiality of Audition with Vision 
When one's auditory system is working properly, the content of auditory experience 
seems to include hearing the rain on the window, the students talking in the hall, or the 
birds singing in the back garden. More interesting cases would be those auditory 
experiences that represent certain states of affairs being the case. These are cases that 
could be described as `hearing-that', as when one hears that the chain on one's bicycle 
needs oil, or hears that the water in the kettle has boiled. One case of hearing-that that 
seems particularly puzzling is the spatial location of sounds-hearing that x is on the 
left. Certain auditory experiences seem to include representations of spatial locations, 
as when I hear the door open on my right, or the cat meowing right behind me. That 
spatial location does play some role in auditory experience should be intuitively clear 
from personal experience. 
Of course, not all auditory experiences have a spatial content. A clap of thunder 
might sound as if it surrounds the listener, and hearing a ringing in my ear does not 
sound to be located at all (one does not hear a ringing in the ear as being located at their 
ear). And not all cases where auditory experience does have a spatial content can be 
taken as veridical. Listening to music through headphones may give the illusion of 
space. An interesting case of a spatial illusion is Diana Deutsch's `scale illusion' 
experiment. ' In Deutsch's experiment, listeners wearing headphones are played two 
different melodies in each ear simultaneously (Figure 11.1): 








The melodies are constructed to be harmonically similar: both are in C-major, but make 
unusual leaps between the notes. The right ear channel opens with the highest note of 
the melody, a C5, then jumps down to a D4, then up to an A4, then down to an F4, then 
the melody repeats this sequence in reverse order. The left channel opens with the 
lowest note, a C4, then jumps to a B4, then E4, then G4, which then also repeats in 
reverse order. The thing to notice about these melodies is that they make unexpected 
leaps in odd intervals-the smallest interval used is a minor third (between the E4 and 
G4) and the widest used is a major seventh (between the C4 and B4). However, very 
interestingly, when listeners are asked to report on what they heard when played the two 
melodies simultaneously, what listeners most commonly reported hearing is nothing 
like the melody in Figure 11.1. They do not report hearing two angular melodies with 
odd leaping intervals, but rather report to having heard two perfectly smooth scalar 




Deutsch calls this the `scale illusion'. What is interesting is that, not only does the 
listener fail to hear the melodies as two angular passages, but they also misrepresent the 
directional location of the sound channels. Listeners reported hearing all the high notes 
as coming from the right channel and all the low notes coming from the left. Deutsch 
hypothesises that the reason for this auditory illusion is that perceptual experience 
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organises the passages in a way that makes musical sense. It is simply easier for a 
listener to think of or remember a melody that progresses in a uniform and predictable 
manner like that in Figure 11.2 rather than the difficult and angular melodies of Figure 
11.1. Deutsch (and Sloboda) draws the conclusion that listeners possess a cognitive 
mechanism that arranges these melodies into the more simplified and musically 
common form rather than struggle with the complicated and more uncommon angular 
melodies. And this example is not a simple trick of cognitive scientists, using strange 
laboratory experiments to arrive at stranger conclusions, but actually does reflect a 
phenomenon that happens in real musical listening. Sloboda cites real-life examples of 
similar sorts of perceptual tricks used by composers such as Tchaikovsky and 
Rachmaninov, where both composers have written a difficult musical passage that 
provides the illusion of something much simpler. 2 Furthermore, it should be noted that 
Deutsch's experiment cannot be explained in terms of that familiar psychological 
phenomenon known as the proximity principle, where subjects judge a pattern of dots, 
say, to form a single unit because of their proximity to one another. The subject's in 
Deutsch's experiment do not simply judge the notes to be related in the more 
predictable pattern of Figure 11.2, rather they hear the melody as being that way. 
Deutsch's experiment is a real case of auditory illusion-her subjects heard the melody 
as being a certain way that it actually was not. 
Despite these cases of illusion and misrepresentation or those cases where auditory 
experience has no spatial contents at all, this should not detract from the fact that under 
normal conditions and circumstances, the contents of auditory experience do seem to 
represent spatial locations. If auditory experience never represented spatial location, 
then it would be a complete mystery how one could, say, locate one's phone by 
listening to it ringing. 
The problem that we find with the auditory representation of spatiality is that 
audition is not a three-dimensional sense modality-as Strawson has I think rightly 
argued, hearing is not an inherently spatial sense modality in the way that vision is. 
3 
Contrast hearing with vision. When we look at the world, we not only see objects 
arranged in space, but we also seem to see the space within which objects can be 
2 Sloboda (1985): 157-158. 
Strawson (1959), Ch. 2; see also Nudds (2001). For an opposing view, from a cognitive science 
perspective, see Blauert (1997). There is also an interesting discussion of whether auditory experience is 
inherently spatial in Peacocke (1983): Ch. 2. I will not be commenting explicitly on Peacocke's 
arguments here. 
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arranged in such a way that has no analogous sense for audition. As Nudds puts the 
point: 
In the case of vision, we can distinguish between having an experience of there being 
nothing at a place where we could experience something, and not having an experience of 
anything in a place we could experience something; between, that is, being aware that 
nothing is there and being unaware of anything there.... It is this visual awareness of places 
where there is nothing which has no auditory equivalent. We are simply not auditorialy 
aware of empty places-there's no difference between not experiencing a sound at some 
place, and experiencing no sound there. 4 
The representation of spatial location in auditory experience is remarkably different 
from the representation of the spatial location in visual experience. In visual 
experience, I can not only see the objects in my immediate environment, but I can also 
see the empty space within which such objects could be arranged, or within which my 
own actions could take place. Auditory experience, on the other hand, does not present 
us with this representation of empty space. I can see an empty space in the room, but I 
cannot hear an empty space. 
Alternatively, contrast this with smell: our olfactory sense does not represent the 
smell of objects within a three-dimensional spatial array. I cannot close my eyes and 
build a mental map of the spatial layout of my surroundings on the basis of smell alone. 
The ability to locate objects by smell is little more than playing a game of `Hot and 
Cold'-to locate an object by smell, I must turn my head and decide whether the smell 
seems stronger or weaker. 5 We locate objects by smell on the basis of their scent being 
more intense at one place than another. Constantly making this judgment, I must 
`follow my nose'. Smell is an inherently non-spatial sense modality. The question is 
whether the proper model of spatiality in auditory experience should be described as 
being more like smell (inherently non-spatial) or more like vision or touch (inherently 
spatial). 6 If we are to side with Strawson and Nudds, then audition must be more like 
smell than it is like either vision or touch-the perception of empty space is not 
something inherent to auditory experience. However, audition differs from olfaction in 
one very important sense: sounds can seem to us to be located in space, which is just to 
say that auditory experience seems to represent spatial qualities, whereas olfaction does 
4 Nudds (2001), 213. Strawson's claim is central to Nudds' essay, and the present chapter was much 
inspired by Nudds. While I will not be following Nudds' view, I will also not have the space here to 
examine his account in detail. I would refer the reader to the original essay. 
5 Cf. Pasnau (1999, §8-9) also questions whether sounds are closer to smells or colours, and also refers 
to the `hot/cold game', though he argues that sounds are closer to colours on account of the fact that both 
of these can seem to be located. 
180 
not. There is no analogous sense in which one smell might seem further away than 
another smell, or as being on the left or the right as there is in the case of sound. 
Incidentally, if one were to seek further validation of the thought that auditory 
experience is inherently non-spatial, then such validation might be found in Smith's 
distinction between `phenomena' or `mere sensation' on the one hand and `physical 
bodies' on the other. His distinction rests on the idea that in perceiving, one has the 
experience of perspective with regard to physical bodies whereas `there are no 
perspectives to be had on our sensations'. 7 When one sees a vase, one can turn the vase 
or even walk around the vase and as one does so more perspectives are revealed to the 
onlooker. There is no such analogous sense in which one can experience a change of 
perspective with regard to a sound. A sound is, as it were, fully present in auditory 
experience-there are no `sides' that a shift in perspective would reveal. On his view 
sounds would fall into the category of 'phenomena'. By referring to Smith's 
distinction, I am not hereby endorsing it or his use of it, though what I am endorsing is 
the intuition that grounds this distinction that sounds do not have sides. One might 
object to this by agreeing that sounds do not have sides but that surely sound producing 
objects do, and sometimes hearing an object from a different side does have its own 
characteristic sound. Think about the sound of listening to a radio from the backside. 
However, this objection misses the point. When one listens to a loudspeaker from the 
backside, does one really gain a different perspective on the same sound? Surely, this is 
what would be required if we were to think that auditory experience was perspectival- 
that the sound we hear from the back of the loudspeaker is the same sound as the one 
we hear from the front, the only difference being that we have a different perspective on 
that sound. But why should we think this? It would be more natural to think that what 
we hear from the back of the loudspeaker is a different sound, one that is caused by the 
back of the loudspeaker. 
11.2 The Medium of Sound 
An intuitive thought about the nature of the properties that are represented in perceptual 
experience would be to think that the content of one's perceptual experience is causally 
related to some property instantiated by the object of perceptual experience. However 
6I owe this observation to Keith Hossack. 
Smith (2002): 135. 
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the question we must ask is, what is the object of auditory experience? As in the case of 
visual experience, this point is much debated. 8 Is it sound waves that we hear or is it the 
objects themselves that are the cause of the sound waves? Does one hear a ringing 
sound or does one hear the phone ringing? If it is the former, then for auditory 
experience to represent spatiality, sounds themselves must have spatial properties, 
however if it is the latter, then it is objects that cause sounds that possess spatial 
properties. I will briefly review these two positions. 
On the latter view, sounds are identified by their originating object, and sound-events 
have certain properties because their originating objects have these properties, so we 
can call this the originating-object view. 9 This view often seems to be the most 
intuitively appealing-I do not hear a sound wave ringing, rather I hear my phone 
ringing. Opposed to this, some argue that sounds themselves have properties that 
cannot be directly traced back to their originating objects, and that they will have 
different properties depending on where the listener hears the sound-on this view, 
sounds are located in space and have properties that are independent of their originating 
objects. 1° It can be easily demonstrated that a sound-event heard at position x has 
different properties than a sound-event heard at position y even though both sounds 
originate from the same object-perhaps the sound of the phone ringing is louder at x 
than at y, or perhaps at x the listener also hears an echo while at y they do not. As the 
two sound-events have different properties, then they are, on this view, different sounds. 
For reasons related to these, Nudds describes sounds as particulars objects that are 
independent of the objects that produce them; they are distinct objects rather than 
properties of an object. " On this view, sounds are often identified by the medium in 
which they are heard-indeed, some argue that sounds are properties of the medium12 
so I will call this the medium view. 13 Sounds seem to be all around us, embodied in the 
medium of their transmission. The medium view gains some plausibility from the 
thought that there is no sound in a vacuum, as there is no medium. Additionally, 
Strawson's claim that sound is an inherently non-spatial sense modality fits more 
naturally with the medium view of sound-Strawson's claim is a claim about sound, it 
8 See, for instance, O'Callaghan (forthcoming 2006); O'Shaughnessy (1957); and Pasnau (1999). 
9 Pasnau (1999) and (2000) argues for a version of the originating-object view. 
10 See Blauert (1997) for some discussion of this from a psychological perspective. 
Nudds (2001): 222. 
12 O' Callaghan (unpublished, a). 
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is not a claim about objects that cause sounds. 
Now, in the case of vision, our intuition is strongly in favour of an object-view- 
when a subject is looking at a red ball on a table, we would not say that what the subject 
sees is a light wave, rather the subject just sees the red ball. Our natural inclination may 
be to follow this in the case of sound as well-I hear my phone ringing-and thus 
support the originating-object view. This intuition is reinforced by the direct relation 
that the originating-object view implies between a listener and the object that is heard, 
whereas the medium view implies an inferential account of perceiving objects, which 
would require us thinking something like the ringing noise prompts the listener to infer 
that there is a phone nearby. 14 This is an awkward and unintuitive way of speaking. 
However there is good reason to support the medium view. For instance, sound-events 
have echoes. Think of the case of the whispering gallery: 15 if a listener changes position 
in a whispering gallery then the effect is lost as it can only be heard at certain points in 
the room. 
As in the case of vision, when a subject stands in a particular point in space and 
looks, they see a visual scene. The visual scene that that subject enjoys would be quite 
different if they had been standing at some other point in space-they would have a 
visual experience of a different scene. Theorists who defend the medium view are 
motivated by the same thought, that there is a sense in which the sound a listener hears 
at a particular point in space is like an `auditory scene'. In order to preserve the direct 
link between these effects and the originating object in the whispering gallery we would 
need to tell a very complicated story about the causal interactions between the position 
of the originating object, the position of the listener and the acoustical properties of the 
room. This isn't impossible, but the point is that the properties that one hears the 
sound-event as having are not properties that originate with the object. In addition to 
hearing the sound of the object, the listener also in a sense `hears' the effects of the 
13 It seems that the medium view may have been the dominate view throughout the Middle Ages and 
was also held by the likes of Descartes and Berkeley. See Pasnau (2000) for an historical discussion of 
the nature of sounds. 
14 Berkeley has Philonous expressing such an inferential view in the First Dialogue: `For instance, when 
I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but from the experience I 
have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless 
evident, that in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound: and the coach is not then properly 
perceived by sense, but suggested from experience' (1713 [1949]): 204. 
15 A whispering gallery is a room with elliptical ceilings or walls, so that a sound made at one focus of 
the ellipse will be reflected to other foci around the room allowing faint sounds to be heard clearly around 
the entire circumference. In a whispering gallery, a listener might hear a person who is standing ten feet 
in front of her as if she is standing directly behind her. 
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acoustical properties of the room. To preserve the direct causal link that the originating- 
object view requires, we find that we have to tell a story that takes into account 
properties that are not strictly speaking attributable to the originating object. 
Another reason to prefer the medium view is that this view is more accommodating 
to our intuitions about recorded sounds. Imagine a sound engineer recording a song. 
Suppose the sound engineer is recording a violinist who is playing in the studio and that 
the engineer is using some electronic processing equipment on the sound, say a 
compressor and a digital reverb unit. The sound of the violin is converted into an 
electrical signal by the microphones, which then travels through the mixing board, 
through a compressor and a digital reverb unit before being redirected to the studio 
speakers. In what sense are we directly hearing the violin? Are we not also hearing the 
effects of the microphone, the compressor and the digital reverb? Or are we only 
directly hearing the sound of the speakers? Surely there are properties that the sound- 
event has the effects of the compressor and the digital reverb-that cannot be 
attributed to the violin for its origin. Furthermore, what are we to say after the sound is 
recorded? When the violinist stops playing and joins the engineer in the studio to hear 
the result of the recording, in what sense are they hearing the violin? 16 And if we are 
not hearing the violin directly at this point, then why should we think that we were 
hearing the violin directly in any other case? '7 Again, while it may be possible to tell a 
long, complicated story about the causal chain that links the listener directly to the 
violin that accounts for the recording, it would be highly unintuitive. Our intuitions 
seem to go in the opposite direction in this case. 
When we consider these two views concerning the problem of spatiality in auditory 
experience, then on the medium view, sounds themselves have spatial locations. We 
hear sounds as being located in particular points of space. When I hear the telephone 
ringing and I am standing at position x, what I hear is the sound of the telephone ringing 
16 This example is in a sense analogous to the time-gap problem: an astronomer who sees a star 
exploding in the past has a visual experience of a star exploding now. Armstrong admits that seeing a star 
explode in the past involves a perceptual illusion of seeing something happening in the present, though he 
does suggest that in the case of sound there is less inclination to regard this as illusion. He suggests that 
the problem of time-gap may dissolve in the case of sound, presumably because it is more intuitive to 
think of hearing a sound wave than it is to think of seeing a light wave. See Armstrong (1961): 144-148. 
17 This move in arguing for the medium view is very close to the sort of move that a sense-datum 
theorists uses in defending their indirect realist account of perception. I should just like to point out the 
difference between the sense-datum theorist's use of this move and the defender of the medium view's 
use of it. The defender of the medium view is not arguing for anything as metaphysically dubious as a 
sense-datum. All the medium view theorists is defending is the claim that sounds are entities that are 
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at position x. If I were to move to position y, then I would no longer hear the same 
sound-that is, I would no longer hear the sound of the telephone ringing at position 
x-rather I would then hear a new sound, which is the sound of the telephone ringing at 
position y. 18 On the originating-object view, sounds themselves have no spatial quality, 
rather objects that cause sounds do. An object sounds to be located at a particular place 
and auditory experience represents the listener's orientation to that object. If this is 
correct, then the difference between hearing a sound as being on the right and hearing a 
sound as being on the left would be like seeing a different side of the same object. 
Someone defending the originating-object view must claim that by changing one's 
position in a room relative to a sound-producing object, the listener is able to hear the 
sound of an object from different perspectives. Spatiality in auditory experience would 
seem to require a perspectival analysis on this view. However the difficulty with this 
view is that it does not square with Strawson's claim that sound is an inherently non- 
spatial sense modality. It might make sense to describe vision in perspectival terms 
because when the subject walks around to the other side of the table they can see the 
perspective-that is, they can see the empty space around the table and the spatial 
relations between all of the visible objects in their view. But, repeating Nudds' point, 
there is no sense in which a listener hears empty spaces. The challenge for this view 
would be to explain how the change in perspective comes to be registered in auditory 
experience, how it is that listeners are perceptually sensitive to changes in location. If 
the originating-object theorist tried to meet this challenge by appealing to the way that 
sounds are perceived from different orientations, then it is difficult to see how their 
view is significantly different from the medium view. If it is objects that we hear 
directly and not sound waves, then the originating-object theorist cannot now begin 
appealing to sound waves. 
This is what we will consider: subject S hears a sound-event e at position x and 
subject T hears a sound-event at position y, and S and T hear these at the same time. S 
hears e as being on her left and T hears e as being on her right. Let us assume that in all 
other respects these sounds are tokens of the same type, that they are produced by the 
same cause, and that the two token sound-experiences are identical as to their 
distinct from their causal origins-that sounds can have properties that are not attributable to their causal 
origins and therefore we do not hear objects, we hear sounds. 
18 Interestingly, Nudds (2001) argues that sounds are distinct from their causal origins on account of our 
being able to reencounter the same sound at some other position or time. He refers to the case of Newton 
calculating the speed of sound by listening to the echo of a bouncing ball. 
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frequency, intensity and duration from the positions that the S and T hear e. While 
these acoustical properties hold in common between the representational states of S and 
T there is also clearly a difference as to the contents of their experience due to the 
difference in the spatiality. S hears e at position x as being on her left, so let us say that 
she is in a mental state with content (e)L, while T hears e at position y as being on her 
right, so we will label the content of her mental state (e)R. According to the MIC, if the 
representational contents of spatiality in auditory experience are nonconceptual then 
there must be some mind-independent state of affairs that accounts for the difference 
between hearing a sound as being on the left and hearing the same sound as being on the 
right. Does the difference between the mental states (e)L and (e)R satisfy the MIC? 
In what follows, I will offer an explanation of how we should think about the 
auditory representation of spatiality. My task here is not to decide between the 
originating-object view and the medium view-there is much that would need to be 
taken into account to decide between those-though some of what I will say will fit 
more naturally into the medium view. Between the originating-object view and the 
medium view, neither of these views is better suited to handle the auditory 
representation of spatiality. The medium view allows us to talk more directly about 
sounds themselves, as on the originating-object view sounds are just secondary qualities 
of an object. However, either view must offer an explanation of the representation of 
spatiality that takes the acoustical phenomenon into account-as commented above, 
even on the originating-object view we find the need to talk about a listener's perceptual 
sensitivity to sound waves in a particular spatial orientation. Therefore, I will proceed 
by examining the physical characteristics of sound waves and our perceptual sensitivity 
to properties of sound waves. 
11.3 Acoustics 
I take it as given that sounds carry information in the same sense that the rings of a tree 
carry information, i. e., about the tree's age. The question is, what sorts of information 
do sounds carry? Some candidates would be identifying information about the 
originating object and the spatial location of the originating object. 19 By understanding 
19 One questionable candidate might be that sounds carry information about the medium through which 
the sound is heard. The phenomenon of sound has physical behavioural qualities in air different from 
those in liquids, or solid bodies, or other gases (e. g. helium). While sounds might carry information about 
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the physical qualities of sounds we might come to see what sort of information sounds 
can carry. In this section, I will briefly examine some simple principles of acoustics 
that will aid us in this endeavour. It may be difficult to distinguish my philosophical 
claims from the more general claims about acoustics, so I will try to flag these as I go. 
My first philosophical claim is that what is directly heard in auditory experience is an 
event constituted by a sound structure where this is a complex pattern of air pressure 
fluctuations by compression and rarefaction at a particular rate of frequency, intensity 
and duration. 20 Now for the acoustics: One such compression-expansion rate, 
measured in cycles-per-second or Hertz (Hz), is called a frequency. Any given sound 
structure event involves a great many frequencies, typically having a small number of 
dominant frequencies, called the fundamentals, as well as a much greater number of 
secondary frequencies resonating at a significantly lower rate of intensity, called the 
overtone series. Fundamentals sound to be more dominant than the overtones because 
of their much greater intensity; thus simple sounds, like striking one note on a piano, 
can be identified with the sound structure's fundamental frequency, which is what in 
musical terms is commonly called the pitch. If the piano key corresponding to the note 
A-below-middle-C is struck, the fundamental frequency is given by the rate at which the 
length of the string resonates when stretched to a certain degree of tension. The 
corresponding string for A-below-middle-C, when tuned properly, standardly resonates 
at a rate of 440 cycles-per-second, or 440 Hz. More complex sounds-multiple notes 
struck on the piano, a dog barking, a human voice, a glass breaking-are constituted by 
multiple fundamentals and their overtones. 
The overtones, being less distinct due to their greater number and lower intensity, are 
heard as contributing to the timbre or `colour' of the sound structure-a particular 
auditory event gets its timbre from its possession of a unique overtone series. The 
relation between fundamental frequency and overtones involves a great many 
variables-in striking one note on a piano, such elements as the length of the string, its 
tautness, and the material that the string, hammer and piano body are made of will all 
play some role in determining the character of the overtone series-but the overtones 
the physical qualities of the originating object or the surrounding environment, and always does so 
through a medium, it is questionable whether sounds carry about the medium itself. Also, against the 
thought that sounds can carry identifying information about the objects that are their cause see Smith 
(2002): 49 and 144. 
70 By `sound structure', I am roughly following Levinson's use of this term. See his (1990). 
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can generally be characterised as being derived multiples of the fundamental. 21 
My second philosophical claim: Any particular auditory experience is not, however, 
exhausted by a description of the fundamental frequency and the overtones; or rather a 
better way of putting it is that an auditory experience cannot be fully described in terms 
of what could be called the direct or primary sound structure. The fundamental 
frequency and the overtones are the sound-events constituting the primary sound 
structure. However, additionally when a sound-event occurs, one thing that also figures 
in the auditory experience are the reflections of the primary sound in the form of echoes 
or reverberations, which can be called the indirect or secondary sound structures. 22 
While these sound-events are derivatives of the primary sound-event, they are 
temporally distinct and physically distinct as well. That they are temporally distinct 
from the primary sound should be obvious-we hear the primary sound at a different 
time from the secondary sounds. By their being physically distinct I mean that the 
structure of an echo's frequency wavelength pattern is usually not identical to the 
structure of the frequency pattern that the primary sound that it is a derivative of. For 
instance, certain materials have different frequency reflectance properties-while hard 
surfaces such as marble reflect a wide range of frequencies, wood surfaces such as pine 
are very good at absorbing low-pitch frequencies and reflecting high-pitch ones, and 
synthetic materials such as polystyrene are good high-frequency absorbents. If we were 
to identify a sound structure as a particular pattern of frequency-intensity waves, we 
would quite often find that primary sound structures differs in frequency and intensity 
from nearly all of its echoes. 23 In addition to this, sound also decays as it travels so that, 
by the time an echo returns even from a highly reflectant surface, some frequency loss 
will have occurred, usually in the higher regions of the overtone series where the 
wavelengths are quite small. These kinds of phenomena are so ubiquitous and subtle as 
to go barely noticed by most people, though they do make a large contribution to the 
content of the auditory experience. Echoes, then can be both temporally and physically 
21 For a more complete discussion of the acoustics of overtones, see Moore (1982), Ch. 4; Luce (1993), 
Chs. 2 and 3. 
22 It should be kept in mind that `primary' and `secondary' here are my own terms. In most textbooks 
on acoustics, the favoured terms are direct sounds for what I am calling the primary sound structure, and 
indirect sounds for echoes. I use `primary' and `secondary' as a way of emphasising the compositional 
parallel between these and the complex sound structure. Also, for an opposing view, see O'Callaghan 
(unpublished, b) who argues that echoes are not distinct from the primary sound. 
23 Some electronic devices are of course able to produce echoes physically identical in frequency and 
intensity, but this examples strike me as simply a multiply repeated primary sound structure that has 
electronically produced multiple instances rather than what would count as a naturally occurring echo. 
For a sound to be a natural echo, it must be produced by a sound wave's being reflected off of a surface. 
188 
distinct sound structures. 
If we want to give as complete an account of a listener's auditory experience as 
possible, then we must account for reverberations as well as the primary sound 
structure. If requiring an account of reverberation seems odd or unnecessary for a 
description of a listener's auditory experience, then think again of the experience of 
listening to a sound in a whispering gallery. In such cases what one is hearing is a very 
peculiar acoustical effect-the combination of the shape of the room and the reflectance 
properties of the room's building materials. While the `whispering gallery' effect is 
rather unique, a more common acoustical effect of this sort would be the `standing 
wave' effect. As two sound waves that have some frequencies in common reverberate 
within a solid structure, travelling across each other, certain frequencies can be 
amplified (as for example when two waves cross just at the point where both waves are 
compressed) or certain frequencies can be cancelled out (as when two waves cross just 
at the point where one wave is compressing and the other expanding). When two wave 
forms are `in phase' they essentially double up in their intensity, as opposed to when 
two wave forms are `out of phase' and equivocate each other. Such effects are so 
commonplace that recording studios spend great amounts of money on the structural 
design and sound proofing of their recording suites to minimise the effects of standing 
waves. 
Finally, my last philosophical claim in this section is that what a listener hears in 
auditory experience must be described both in terms of primary sound structures and 
their secondary sound structures. The combination of these two constitutive elements is 
what I call a compound or complex sound structure. Auditory experience comes in the 
form of complex sound structures, which could be type identified in terms of their 
frequencies (fundamentals and overtones, both primary and reverberated), overall 
intensity and duration. The sort of properties that auditory experience represents are 
those that individuate complex sound structures. These are highly complex patterns of 
frequency-intensity waves. Auditory experience is like a highly sensitive spectrograph 
and its content can be described in terms of its representing the frequency, intensity and 
duration of sound waves. 
11.4 The Encoding-Decoding Distinction 
With these thoughts in mind, we can now examine what sort of information can be 
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carried by sound. The two candidates I had suggested were information about the 
originating object and information about the spatial location of the object. As it is the 
second candidate that is the focus of this chapter, I will go quickly over the first one. 
Regarding the originating object, one can identify at least the type of object from which 
a sound originates by attending to the timbre of the sound. The difference between the 
sound of a viola and the sound of an oboe is a difference in timbre. As I mentioned 
above, the timbre of a sound is given by the quality of the overtone series, and quite a 
large number of factors can play a role in fixing this quality: metals tend to produce 
higher frequencies better than wood; the resonation pattern of, say, stringed instruments 
will contribute differently to the character of the overtone series than would wind 
instruments; as the sound reverberates within the body of an instrument, the 
instrument's shape will also contribute to differences in the overtones. Only by 
listening to the sound itself can one distinguish between a silver trumpet and a brass 
trumpet-or to put it another way, if one wants to learn to distinguish the sound of a 
silver trumpet from the sound of a brass trumpet, the only thing one can do is to attend 
to the particular timbral quality of the sounds themselves. (Additionally, we may even 
be tempted to describe secondary sound structures as carrying information about the 
reflectance surfaces as well-for instance, wood panelled walls will have different 
reflectance properties to, say, smooth stone walls-but this would be taking us too far 
afield. ) 
It may be that sound waves do transmit information about the originating object. 
However, concerning the auditory representation of spatiality, we get a different story. 
While a great deal of information can be gleaned from a complex sound structure, 
spatial location cannot. The only information that can be had from a complex sound 
structure is whatever information can be carried by the physical properties of sound- 
frequency, intensity and duration-and different directions in egocentric space do not 
possess different physical acoustical qualities. There is no information specific to the 
primary sound structure of my phone's being on my left that prompts me to look to my 
left, nor would this information be present in the secondary sound structures either as 
these are mere derivatives of the primary and should carry no more information about 
the sound source than the primary (what extra information the secondary sound 
structures carry would not be about the sound source but rather would be about the 
reflectance surface). The representation of spatial location in auditory experience 
requires a bit more than can be had by the complex sound structure. 
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Of course, the way in which we detect spatial relations in auditory experience is quite 
well known. When I hear my phone ringing on my left, the primary sound structure of 
the ringing phone initiates a process of encoding the auditory information first in my 
left ear with greater intensity at one time, then produces a similar process of encoding 
with lesser intensity milliseconds later once the sound reaches around my head to my 
right ear. When the signals from the ears are decoded in that part of the brain that 
handles auditory perception, the difference in intensity level and time difference 
between the two signals is represented as the sound's being favoured in my left ear. 
There are thought to be three cognitive mechanisms working in conjunction that serve 
to locate sound: interaural time difference (ITD), interaural amplitude difference (IAD) 
and pinna filtering. ITD is a subpersonal cognitive mechanism that is thought to 
calculate the time delay of the encoding of a sound between the two ears. Time delay in 
human hearing can be noticeable for differences as short as 20 microseconds. However 
ITD is not sufficient on its own for spatially locating sounds as, somewhat surprisingly, 
sensitivity for ITD decreases slightly for sounds that occur at right angles to the 
perceiver, nor is ITD very effective for high pitched sounds that have a frequency 
wavelength smaller than the width of the human head (so the sound never refracts 
around the head to the other ear). In such cases, the listener's auditory system must 
calculate the intensity difference (IAD) between both ears. Finally, pinna filtering is an 
effect whereby slight echo patterns are created by sounds as they are reflected off of the 
many folds inside the outer ear (the pinna) and as they travel through the ear canal. 
Sounds coming from different directions will cause slightly different reflectance 
patterns in the pinna. Pinna filtering is the auditory system's primary means of zenith 
localisation (locating a sound along the up-down axis) and it is the only monaural 
localisation mechanism of our three. 24 For these reasons, ITD, IAD and pinna filtering 
should be taken as three distinct mechanisms of auditory calculation working in 
tandem. 25 While this process is particularly sensitive in bats (as they are able to detect 
such differences in the distance and direction of objects in their environment as small as 
the insects they hunt by listening to their own echoes), it is sufficiently sensitive in 
'' Humans are worse at locating sounds on the front-back or up-down axes than we are at the left-right 
axis. We can do it, we are just not terribly good at it. The auditory mechanism that helps us to locate 
sounds along the front-back or up-down axes (pinna filtering) relies on monaural auditory cues, which is 
less accurate than the binaural mechanisms interaural time delay or interaural amplitude difference. 
's For more on the psychophysics of space perception, see Moore (1982) Ch. 5; Luce (1993) Part II, § 10; 
and Blauert (1997) Ch. 2. 
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humans to provide a general direction of objects. 
26 
What I am calling `encoding' is that physiological process by which the acoustical 
properties of sound waves become converted into the electro-chemical signal of the 
listener's auditory system. This is basically the physical-physiological process that goes 
on within the listener's inner ear. As such this is an entirely mechanical process. The 
electro-chemical signal of the auditory system may be described as having content 
insofar as it is a subpersonal informational state that represents acoustical properties of 
sound waves. The content of an auditory informational state co-varies with the physical 
properties of sound waves such that the content could be described in counterfactual 
terms. 
By contrast, what I am calling `decoding' is something that happens much further 
along in the auditory system-in the auditory cortex. In the auditory cortex, the electro- 
chemical signal that is received from the cochlea is decoded in such a way as to make 
sense to the listener of the three-dimensional space around them. My suggestion is that 
it is at the level of decoding that the representation of spatiality is added to the contents 
of the auditory experience. As such, decoding would be a necessary psychological 
requirement on the auditory representation of spatiality. The process of decoding would 
include learned recognitional capacities that are informed by ITD, IAD and pinna 
filtering. The point is merely that the auditory representation of spatiality is not 
information that is carried by the sound wave simpliciter, but requires the processing of 
the auditory information in a particular kind of way-the auditory representation of 
spatiality is not a naively acoustical phenomenon; rather it is a psychoacoustical 
phenomenon. 
If we were to put our two candidates for the kind of information that sounds carry 
into the terms of the MIC, identifying information about the originating object and the 
spatial location of sounds, then clearly our first candidate would pass. Perceptual states 
that represent timbral properties are sufficiently grounded in the mind-independent 
properties of sound waves. The difference between a mental state that represents a 
sound as having been produced by a silver trumpet and another mental state that 
represents a sound as having been produced by a brass trumpet will be grounded in the 
mind-independent timbral properties of the sound wave. There is no psychological 
26 Incidentally, certain physiological limitations of the human auditory system mean that we are worse at 
judging along the front-back or up-down axes than we are at judging left-right axis. Think of the 
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capacity that a listener must possess in order to represent audible differences in timbre. 
The auditory representation of spatiality, however, does require something mental-it 
requires a psychological capacity for decoding sound. While the process of decoding is 
still a largely mechanical-physiological process, it involves more than the simple 
algorithmic calculation of frequency and intensity differences between the two auditory 
channels. In the next section I will offer a suggestion of what is involved in the process 
of decoding such that it might fail the MIC. 
11.5 Cross-Modal Judgment 
Space is not intrinsic to the domain of sound, however space may be intrinsic to the 
either the domain of vision or touch. A listener learns to make spatial judgments based 
on the information they receive about the world from vision or touch. My suggestion, 
then, will be that a listener must equate the information they receive from auditory 
perception to things that they have seen or felt in the visual or tactile domains-the 
objects that a listener sees and feels become identified as the source of the sounds they 
hear. 27 Thus a listener is able to learn to make reliable judgments about the spatial 
location of objects in auditory perception by inferring a relation between the sounds 
they hear and the objects they see and touch. If behavioural responses to sounds come 
in the form of some learned behavioural capacity that when a sound is favoured in the 
left channel, the originating object must be on the left, then the listener must have had to 
learn that an event in one domain is somehow linked to some fact in another domain. 
What the listener must learn is to equate the information they receive from the non- 
spatial domain of sound to one of the inherently spatial domains of vision or touch. 
This is the important point: that a listener represents spatiality in auditory experience via 
cross-domain judgments, and this would fail to satisfy the MIC. 
Here is an example of how cross-modal judgments would play a role in the spatial 
location of sounds. Think of the experience of hearing a sound coming from behind 
you. You hear a sound behind you that you are unable to locate accurately, so you turn 
your head to the left. Upon doing so, your left ear is now turned towards the origin of 
the sound while your body is still facing straight ahead. Having your head turned in this 
experience of hunting for a noisy fly in a room-we often cannot tell whether the fly is in front. behind, 
above or below. Pinna filtering is not as effective as ITD or IAD for localising sounds. 
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manner means that the sound is favoured in your left ear, and so you judge the sound to 
be coming from behind you. But how did you arrive at the judgment that the sound is 
behind when all that should be present in naive auditory experience is the sound's being 
favoured in the left channel? If this calculation was a naive mechanical process, then all 
we should expect it to do would be to calculate the difference in the left and right 
auditory channels. Thus, all that one should expect to find in the content of auditory 
experience when one turns one's head to the left in order to listen to something behind 
oneself is the judgment that the sound is coming from the left. How then does she get to 
the judgment that the sound is coming from behind? 
What is interesting about this example is that the sound continues to sound as though 
it is coming from behind even though-thinking of the content of the informational 
state after the process of decoding-all that the auditory state should represent is that 
the sound is favoured in the left channel. I take it that the reason for this is that the 
process of decoding is not just a simple, mechanical process. First, the process of 
decoding calculates the time and intensity differences between the left and right 
channels, then it must make a cross-modal judgment that relates the result of the 
calculation to some fact within one of the spatial sense modalities. A listener must 
judge that the auditory stimulus that presents some sound as being favoured in the left 
channel correlates to some cause of the sound that can be located (by touch or vision) on 
the left. A listener must learn to correlate an auditory (non-spatial) stimulus with a 
(spatial) non-auditory fact. The auditory stimuli prompts the listener to seek out the 
origin of the sound either by vision or touch, and it does so by the listener's having 
learned that sound-experiences of a certain kind are reliably linked to states of affairs in 
the visual or tactile domains. When a listener is presented a sound on their left, they 
represent the sound as being a certain way. This mental state has a phenomenal quality 
that is distinct from mental states that represent sounds in other directions from the 
listener. However this phenomenal quality of the auditory experience would be 
meaningless to the listener unless they were to learn that sound that are that phenomenal 
way are caused by objects located in a particular direction, and this directionality is 
something that is provided by either vision or touch. The same suggestion would apply 
to pinna filtering though the success rate lowers because the perceptible differences in 
the encoded echo patterns are so fine. 
27 Similarly Nudds (2001) argues that experiencing the production of sounds is also a bi-modal 
phenomenon. 
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This psychological ability that we have is of course a very primitive ability-it is one 
that we share with animals-but its primitiveness does not detract from the point that 
the ability to learn to make judgments about one sense domain from the sensory 
stimulus given in another sense domain is an ability that an organism must acquire. It is 
not an ability that a creature has that simply falls out of naive auditory sensitivity, but 
must be combined with some other (inherently spatial) sense modality. It is conceivable 
that a listener could fail to learn to connect auditory experiences with spatial states of 
affairs, perhaps due to some fault in the listener's auditory processing mechanisms, or 
some freakish feature of a hostile environment that makes the directionality of sounds 
unpredictable. Or, rather, imagine a creature that only had a sense of sound-a creature 
that lacks both the sense of vision and touch. Even if the creature's auditory system was 
as sensitive as that of a bat's, why should we think that the spatial location of sound 
would ever enter into its auditory experience? 
I suggest that sound localisation fails to satisfy the MIC because it necessarily 
requires a process of decoding. But why couldn't we say that the location of sounds is 
somehow caught up in the encoding of the sound-event instead? Pinna filtering, for 
example, provides very intricate and distinct echo patterns that help the listener to locate 
objects (albeit poorly), and this should be information that is available at the level of 
encoding. But, this does not work: it is certainly true that the echo patterns provided by 
pinna filtering is a constitutive part of the informational content of an auditory 
experience at the level of encoding, however this alone does not allow the listener to 
make spatial judgments. For pinna filtering to work in this way, what would be 
required in addition is a recognitional ability that allows one to notice the fine 
differences between these echo patterns and to relate them to some egocentric spatial 
position. Pinna filtering works like this: a listener hears a sound; the sound echoing in 
the pinna creates a particular echo pattern; that pattern is encoded in the content of 
auditory experience along with the primary sound structure. In order for the listener to 
know that the particular echo pattern associated with this sound corresponds to the 
sound source's coming from a particular direction, the listener would have had to built 
up a store of recognitional templates to relate echo patterns to the directions of 
egocentric space. And this would again require an exercise of cognition-a 
recognitional ability-at the level of decoding as this ability to recognise echo patterns 
simply is not the business of the encoding systems. 
Finally, it could be questioned whether this ability to make cross-modal judgments 
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that I have described is truly a learned ability. Perhaps it is innate instead. This 
question is closely related to the well-known example that William Molyneux once put 
to John Locke: 
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a 
Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when 
he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and 
Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quaere, Whether by his 
sight, before he touch'd them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which 
the Cube? 28 
Molyneux answered his own question negatively, and Locke agreed. Their thought was 
that, in this case, the subject was able to identify the sphere and cube by reference to 
their experience of touch, but as the subject has yet to have an experience of seeing 
either a sphere or a cube, then we should not think of the subject as able to distinguish 
the two by sight alone. Their claim can be interpreted as arguing that perceptual 
concepts such as cube or sphere are not unified over all sense modalities. Rather there 
may be distinct concepts for each sense modality. In the case above, it is thought that 
the subject does possess the tactile concepts cube and sphere, but due to their blindness 
does not have any proficiency with the visual concepts cube and sphere. 
Applying this thought to the present discussion, the question about whether this 
ability to make a judgment about one sense domain from the basis of sensory evidence 
given in another sense domain must be learned or is innate is really a question about 
whether the subject has any reason to believe a priori that certain evidential grounds 
that are given in one perceptual domain should be necessarily tied to judgments or 
beliefs about another domain. My suggestion is that there is not. When a listener hears, 
say, that a certain sound-event is favoured in their right ear, that might give them good 
evidential grounds for forming the belief that `x is to my right', and the rational linkage 
between the auditory perceptual experience and the spatial belief might be a necessary 
linkage. But, whatever necessary link there is between hearing a sound as being a 
certain way and making judgments or forming beliefs about the spatial layout of the 
surrounding environment is something that a listener must learn a posteriori. To repeat, 
what they must learn is that some state of affairs of which they are able to make 
judgments about in one sense domain (hearing) is necessarily related to some state of 
affairs which they are able to infer in another sense domain (touch or sight). 
In conclusion, my suggestion is that the auditory representation of spatiality is an 
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aspect of experience that only becomes represented at the level of the decoding of 
auditory information, not in the encoding. By saying that some information is 
represented at the decoded rather than encoded level, I mean that, when a sound-event 
occurs, the process of encoding that goes on in the inner ear and the resulting 
informational state does not, at that point, include spatial information. Rather such 
information only arises once the signals from the two auditory channels are decoded. 
Decoding, while being a subpersonal and largely mechanical process, requires the 
listener's having acquired an ability to make cross-modal judgment between an auditory 
stimuli and an expectation of something's being the case in one of the inherently spatial 
sense modalities. The process of decoding adds something (spatiality) to the content of 
the auditory experience that was not there at the point of encoding. Perhaps a better 
suggestion would be that spatiality is not literally added to the auditory experience, 
rather all that happens is that the auditory information becomes correlated with our 
sense of spatiality that is already inherent in vision or touch. The process of decoding is 
a psychologically necessary condition for the auditory representation of spatiality and 
therefore would fail to satisfy the MIC. While my discussion in this chapter raises 
many more questions-like for instance, whether the process of decoding should truly 
count as a conceptual ability, or whether the representation of spatiality in auditory 
experience should instead count as mediated contents-I hope that it has been sufficient 
to show that, if my suggestion here is correct, then the representation of musical pitch is 
not the only auditory phenomenon that fails to satisfy the MIC. 
28 Locke (1700): 88-89. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: 
CONCLUSIONS: UNDERSTANDING MUSIC 
12.1 Summary 
The phenomenological claim for musical understanding holds that the phenomenology 
of musical experience holds in common for both trained and untrained listeners and that 
musical understanding is grounded in the listener's enjoying a perceptual experience 
with a certain content. If this claim were successful, it could be used to argue that 
untrained listeners are at no disadvantage to understand some piece of music compared 
to trained listeners. DeBellis' argues on the back of a strong intentionalist theory of 
musical perception that the content of an untrained listener's mental state represents the 
same type of content as that of a trained listener-as two intentional states that are 
phenomenally indistinguishable would be intentionally indistinguishable on the strong 
intentionalist's view. Untrained listeners enjoy the same type of content-bearing mental 
states as trained listeners. And if trained listeners and untrained listeners do enjoy the 
same type of mental contents, then these contents must not require the listener's 
possession of any music-theoretic conceptual abilities for their representation. The 
contents of musical experience must be nonconceptual. 
The empirical evidence on the perception of musical pitch does show, however, that 
listeners must possess a special psychological ability for the representation of musical 
pitch. Musical pitch is not a primary or even secondary property. It is rather a tertiary 
property-a property of representational experience. Tonality is a property that enters 
into the contents of experience at a very late stage and is mediated by a psychological 
ability. The representation of musical pitch fails to satisfy the Mind-Independence 
Constraint-it is not an instance of naive perceptual experience. 
How strongly can we take the results of this empirical evidence? I have offered two 
interpretations of the psychologists' hypothesis. On one interpretation, the failure to 
satisfy the MIC means that the contents of musical experience cannot be nonconceptual. 
On this strong interpretation, the psychological ability that is required for the 
representation of musical pitch should be thought of as a conceptual ability. It would be 
considered a conceptual ability akin to that of spatial reasoning. It is a conceptual 
ability that operates without the listener's having to exercise conscious control over it 
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though the effects of this ability are felt in the listener's conscious personal-level 
experience. 
However, it is acknowledged that there may be powerful arguments against this 
interpretation. Though the empirical evidence is strongly in favour of the existence and 
operation of some kind of psychological ability, it may be objected that these abilities 
are too primitive or subpersonal to count as conceptual abilities. Even on the account of 
conceptual abilities that I previously offered in Chapter Five-as non-linguistic, 
inferential or recognitional abilities as might be required to explain cases of knowing 
when-one may still reject the claim that the psychological abilities required for the 
representation of musical pitch are conceptual abilities. 
In the face of these objections I offered a weaker interpretation of the psychologists' 
hypothesis, though this interpretation required that we draw a new distinction between 
mediated and unmediated contents. On this view, the contents of musical experience 
would still be nonconceptual-the psychological abilities required for the representation 
of musical pitch would not count as conceptual abilities-and yet the idea of mediated 
contents take into account the point that the contents of musical experience do not 
represent wholly mind-independent properties of the external world. Mediated contents 
are mind-dependent contents and they represent intentional properties or tertiary 
qualities. 
On either the strong interpretation or the weak interpretation, the phenomenological 
claim does not fare well. The problem for the phenomenological claim is that both the 
strong and weak interpretations provide the theoretical space to drive a wedge between 
the mind-independent publicly accessible properties of sound-events and the 
phenomenology of musical experience. Listeners require a certain psychological ability 
for the representation of musical pitch, and there is no guarantee that any two listeners 
would possess saliently similar psychological abilities. For instance, much empirical 
evidence shows that children of a certain age are unable to offer judgments on the 
fittingness or completion of a musical phrase. Some experiments have shown children 
to be unresponsive to tonal dissonances that are obvious to an adult listener. 
Furthermore, there would be no guarantee that the psychological abilities that adult 
listeners possess would be universal across cultural boundaries. If these abilities must 
be learned from experience, then it may be the case that the kind of abilities that a 
Western listener acquires could be wholly different to the kind of abilities that listeners 
of far distant cultures acquire. 
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There is much empirical evidence as well as enthnomusicological evidence showing 
the existence of many `musical universals'-musical qualities that nearly all known 
tonal systems share. For instance, the intervals of the octave and the perfect fifth appear 
in nearly every known tonal system. Additionally, the principles of subdividing and 
octave seem to follow common principles. Almost all musical scales divide the octave 
unevenly, and the number of distinct steps in a scale typically ranges between 5 and 9.1 
Interesting as this is, we must still admit that the differences between the music of 
different cultures is vast. My suggestion is that the qualitative differences in musical 
experience between listeners of distant cultures would be equally as vast. 
Of course, the debate over musical understanding is a debate about what is required 
for listeners of the same cultural background to understand a piece of music, so 
shouldn't we think that the qualitative differences between these listeners would be very 
slight? Among listeners having the same cultural background, there would be wide 
convergence in the phenomenology of musical experience. Adult listeners enculturated 
into the Western tonal system would broadly hear music in much the same way. 
However, the differences would be most apparent in the details, though it would be an 
empirical matter to discover what differences are most acute. Does a listener who has 
received extensive musical training really possess a more developed ear such that their 
experience is qualitatively different from the untrained listener? This thought makes the 
Humean standard of taste spring to mind. Does the well practised judge who exhibits 
delicacy of taste, freedom from prejudice, good sense and a breadth of experience have 
a qualitatively different experience from the layman? We might compare the 
differences between the trained and the untrained listener using an analogy to wine 
tasting. I am ashamed to admit that I have a very unrefined palate. I can distinguish 
very broad differences in wines-I can tell the difference between a spicy and a fruity 
red wine for instance-but that is all. I imagine that my experience of tasting wines 
must be analogous to what it is like for untrained listeners to listen to music. The 
trained listener, like the experienced wine taster, will enjoy a richness and fineness of 
detail that would be largely lacking in the untrained listener. 
What I find so interesting about the case of musical experience is that the qualitative 
differences that arise between two listeners cannot be attributed to any physical mind- 
independent cause. Provided that both listeners have an auditory system that functions 
See Sloboda (1985): §7.2.2. 
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in the same way, the contents of two listeners' experiences at the informational level of 
the encoded signal may be remarkably similar-perhaps they do not differ in any way 
that would significantly effect the qualitative aspect of their experience if the two 
listeners did possess similar psychological abilities. What difference there is does not 
(always) arise at the level of encoding; rather much of the qualitative dissimilarities 
arise at the level of decoding, when the auditory signal is interpreted as music. Again, it 
should be left to the empirical psychologists to discover the causes of phenomenological 
dissimilarities and the extent to which two listeners' phenomenal experience can differ, 
however I hope to have shown here that the phenomenological claim is untenable as a 
basis for understanding music. 
12.2 Musical Understanding 
My project in this dissertation has been to show that the phenomenological claim is 
unfounded. I hope my arguments have been sufficient to show the weakness of the 
phenomenological claim. I could stop here having reached my intended goal, however I 
do not want to leave the issue of musical understanding unresolved. Before leaving this 
discussion, I would like to offer a few suggestions on how to find our way back to a 
fruitful discussion of musical understanding. 
I had claimed early on that the debate over musical understanding is the result of two 
desiderata, (1) that there is a correct or optimal way to understand a piece of music, and 
(2) that untrained listeners are at no disadvantage to trained listeners to correctly 
understand a piece of music. If we reject (1) then we have a clear way to accommodate 
the untrained listener. Rejecting (1) allows us to think that there might be differing 
degrees of understanding, and this seems to square with the intuition that there can be 
differing degrees of appreciation. The problem with rejecting (1), however, is that the 
notion of understanding music would then seem empty and vacuous. If musical 
understanding merely amounts to the way in which a listener hears the music, then why 
bother calling it `understanding'? Once we reject (1), then we also lose purchase on the 
thought that one listener can understand the music more deeply or in a better way than 
another listener. There would be no sense in saying of someone that they `fail to 
understand the music', as by rejecting (1) it would simply be impossible for someone to 
fail to understand, unless failure to understand meant something like failure to 
experience some sound-event as music at all. Rejecting (1) seems to leave us with an 
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empty notion of understanding. On the other hand, the trouble with rejecting (2) is well 
known. What, on this view, would count as understanding? Would this mean that only 
Mozart understands the music of Mozart? There seems to be no obvious answer that 
would be non-arbitrary. 
As a compromise, I would like to offer a weakened version of (2). What is causing 
trouble for accepting (2) is that it seems to offer no restriction on the abilities of the 
listener. A weakened version of (2) might hold that there is some degree of training that 
is required for understanding, though this does not need to amount to music-theoretic 
knowledge. Weakening (2) might allow us to accommodate our intuitions about 
musical understanding, however there is an inherent problem in offering a weakened 
version of (2). It becomes very difficult to find a non-arbitrary point at which to draw 
the line between trained and untrained listeners. How much training is enough to ensure 
understanding? The position we must try and sail between is the Scylla of demanding 
too much effort and attention from the listener that understanding requires music- 
theoretic knowledge and the Charybdis of requiring so little from the listener that we are 
left with an empty and vacuous notion of understanding. 
The suggestion that I wish to make will not be terribly different from those offered 
by Davies (2003), Kivy (1990) and Levinson (1997). I will merely try to make it 
explicit how this suggestion might accommodate our intuitions on musical 
understanding. The intuitions that ought to be satisfied are these: that there is a 
meaningful distinction between understanding and misunderstanding a work, that 
music-theoretic knowledge is not requisite on understanding, and that our account of 
understanding must be grounded in the phenomenology of the perceptual experience. 
That I would wish to incorporate this last point into my account of understanding may 
come as a surprise, so I will briefly explain why I have rejected DeBellis' account only 
to now try to accommodate his point. The problem is that DeBellis' account is too 
accommodating. It is indefensible that the phenomenal quality of musical experience 
for an untrained listener is qualitatively like the experience of the trained listener. I 
think it is right in claiming that musical understanding should be grounded in the 
contents of perceptual experience-it is for this reason that I initially took such an 
interest in DeBellis' view. However, alongside this point, we must acknowledge that 
there can be great differences in the phenomenology of musical experience between two 
listeners such that the untrained listener is at a disadvantage. It takes quite a bit of 
training to get to the point where the phenomenology of experience is rich enough to 
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achieve understanding. And understanding music is an achievement-it can be hard 
work that takes much attention and concentration. 
The weakened version of the argument would look like this: (1) there is a correct 
way to understanding a piece of music, and (2*) such understanding need not be 
expressible in music-theoretic terms. The difference between (2) and (2*) is that, on the 
latter, listeners need to have achieved a certain degree of sensitivity and discrimination 
in music listening. This does not necessarily constitute music-theoretic knowledge, 
though it does form the foundations upon which such conceptual knowledge can take 
hold. For instance, consider the intermediate ear-training student example that DeBellis 
offers as a motivation for accepting the phenomenological claim. These students are 
very highly trained-they are conservatory students. What they are doing in ear- 
training class is beginning to put their musical experience into theoretical terms. These 
students have probably long since achieved what is required for musical understanding. 
A proper account of musical understanding should tell us something about what it is 
to aesthetically appreciate a musical work. If we were to try and find a line between 
understanding and failing to understand a musical work, perhaps it would be this: a 
listener understands a musical work when and only when their listening skills are 
sufficiently trained to the point where each salient feature of the musical work makes 
the appropriate contribution to the listener's phenomenal experience. In its most basic 
statement, the idea is that a listener understands the music when nothing relevant to the 
composition of the piece escapes their attention. Now this statement needs to be 
qualified. How detailed should the listener's hearing be? Does this mean that the 
listener must be able to distinguish each line of a musical work and identify it? As a 
general statement, I would expect that the listener's hearing should be as detailed as the 
musical composition would require. Some compositions are more difficult than others. 
The degree of sensitivity required to understand `Mary Had a Little Lamb' is very low 
and would be achieved by any listener who is able to hear when the melody is at its 
most tense and when it is at its most resolved. The understanding listener need not 
recognise that the note at the end of the first phrase (see Figure 3.2, page 48) is the 
mediant, but the listener must recognise the tension of that note relative to the tonal 
context. Comparatively, the degree of sensitivity required to understand, say, 
Stravinski's Rite of Spring is something that would take years to develop. 
Let us take some less difficult cases. It would not be necessary to hear, say, every 
note of the counterpoint being played by the second violin, but it would be required that 
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the listener hear the harmonic tension between the first and second violin. It would not 
be necessary for the listener to hear the exact voicing of the chords that a jazz pianist 
uses, but it would be required that they hear the harmonic function of the chord. 
Furthermore, there would be other audible features of a musical performance that the 
listener would not be required to hear in order to understand the musical work. It is not 
necessary that the listener should distinguish, say, the sound of a silver trumpet from the 
sound of a brass trumpet. This is unnecessary because it is irrelevant to the identity of 
the work. This is just the familiar distinction between identifying performances and 
identifying musical works. However it would be necessary that the listener could 
distinguish the trumpets from the saxophones. As Levinson claims, the instrumentation 
may be a necessary feature of a musical work, 2 but this would not mean that the make of 
the instrument was too. A listener would need to develop a different set of listening 
skills for different musical genres. The listening skills that one needs to sensitively 
attend to jazz music would differ from the listening skills that one needs to sensitively 
attend to baroque music. Again it would not be necessary that a listener should be able 
to give a name to each feature of the auditory experience that they must discriminate, 
though it is required that the listener should be able to sensibly discriminate and attend 
to those features. 
While this suggestion of what constitutes musical understanding is far from 
complete, I hope to have shown that my critical conclusions of the phenomenological 
claim does not sever us from ever hoping to explain musical understanding. My point 
has been that musical understanding must begin with the auditory sensitivity of the 
listener. If the listener is unresponsive to certain phenomenal qualities of the music that 
comprehending listeners are sensitive to, then this listener cannot hope to understand the 
music. Understanding must be a normative notion or else it amounts to little more than 
relativism. Does Mrs. Munt understand the music in some way comparable to that of 
Tibby? Our first question should be: can she discriminate the music in some way 
comparable to Tibby? 
`' Levinson (l 990). 
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